THE CONCORD REVIEW

I am simply one who loves the past and is diligent in investigating it.
K’ung-fu-tzu (551-479 BC) The Analects

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1      Rares Stefan Nitu
       Aztec Empire

21     Michael Rubel
       The Church Committee

45     Emily Mu
       First Opium War

63     Shuchen Liang
       History of Geology

77     Jordan Singer
       Atatürk & Erdogan

89     Marie Tashima
       Dmitri Shostakovich

109    Sarah Kang
       Orange Revolution

131    Matthew Waltman
       John Peter Zenger

149    Chou-Hsien Lin
       Gustavus Adolphus

167    Byung Joon Lee
       Presidential Campaigns

201    Arthur Chang
       Anthracite Coal

218    Notes on Contributors
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LA MALINCHE AND MEXICO’S FALL: TO WHAT EXTENT IS MALINALLI (LA MALINCHE) RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEMISE OF THE AZTEC EMPIRE?

Rares Stefan Nitu

In what way is the Aztec slave girl and interpreter Malinalli (La Malinche) responsible for the fall of the Aztec Empire? Considering the importance of interpreters in early European voyages to the Americas, this extended essay aims to evaluate the impact Malinalli’s linguistic ability had on the Spanish conquest of Mexico.

The investigation first considers the particular ways Malinalli facilitated the conquest and proceeds to analyze the importance of the linguistic and cultural advantages her translation provided the Spaniards, examining her contribution to the forging of military alliances with native tribes. Including both Spanish and Aztec accounts of the events, the investigation focuses on, but does not limit itself to, the 16th century. Given that references to Malinalli only consist of a few surviving primary accounts, the essay primarily consults secondary sources. Where primary sources do exist, such as Hernando Cortés’ correspondence with the King of Spain, these documents were obtained either in print or online and cautiously analyzed. As many primary documents have not been translated in English, the investigation focuses on secondary...
sources that quoted or expanded on these original documents. Several other factors such as the impact of technology on the conquest are investigated through journal articles and books, and presented before a conclusion is reached.

After establishing the significance of allies to the Spanish army and the importance of communication between the two cultures, this essay concludes that Malinalli was essential for the fall of the Aztec Empire, but shows that she is not singularly to blame for the events that unfolded. It further argues that interpreters played a vital role in the early European successes in the Americas, yet this generalization should be approached with caution, as the wider importance of the interpreter cannot be ascertained from a single case study.

Introduction

“Language has always been the consort of empire.” Only days before Christopher Columbus set sail for the New World, Spanish scholar Antonio de Nebrija foresaw the implications of language in the subsequent European colonization of the world.¹ Much has been written on the colonists’ immunity to disease and technological superiority as they subjugated entire nations, but the influence of language on empire often passes neglected. Significant in that it broke down cultural barriers between civilizations and allowed for colonization subsequently to take place, the role of the interpreter is best exemplified by a slave girl whose actions proved invaluable in the Spanish conquest of the Aztec Empire. Accounting not only for her importance as a translator, but also for her knowledge of the Aztec land, customs and military tactics, this paper will investigate the extent to which the girl born Malinalli, known today as La Malinche and sometimes addressed by the Spaniards as simply la lengua—the tongue—was responsible for the demise of the Aztec Empire.

Aside from its significance as a case study of the wider importance of the interpreter in history, this question is fundamental to the identity of an entire nation. Born into a noble family but sold into slavery by her mother, Malinalli was presented as a gift
by a local tribe when conquistador Hernando Cortés and his men anchored on the coast of Mexico in 1519. Learning Spanish besides the native Nahuatl tongue, Malinalli actively participated in the destruction of the Empire two years later and now embodies the archetypal traitor in the eyes of modern Mexicans. Symbolizing disassociation with all that is Mexican, she remains ingrained in the collective consciousness of the nation as “the ethnic traitress supreme,” to the point that her very name has become a defamatory remark. A closer examination of the girl who “acted as Cortés’ interpreter, tactical guide, advisor, lover and intermediary…” reveals the modern Mexican sentiment to be concurrent with historical facts, as Malinalli is shown to bear some responsibility for the siege and fall of Tenochtitlan—the Aztec capital. Through her role as a cultural and linguistic bridge between two worlds, offering the Spaniards her knowledge about the natives and most importantly being able to help negotiate military alliances with them, Malinalli proved to be a crucial factor in the Spanish conquest of Mexico. Albeit recent historiography tends to minimize the role ascribed to her by the conquistadors themselves—by crediting factors such as the Spaniards’ technological advantage, differences in ideology or Cortés’ adroit diplomacy—a critical analysis of both sources reveals that, while not singularly responsible, Malinalli greatly facilitated the subjugation of the Aztec people.

Investigation

A Cultural And Linguistic Bridge

Having an interpreter in their camp was a blessing for the Spaniards: it enabled them to communicate with the natives, learning about the people they were encountering and gaining crucial geographical and cultural knowledge. In 1519, Hernando Cortés was bent on uncovering the riches of America and bringing Christianity to barbaric lands. Yet faced with a radically alien civilization, communication proved impossible until Malinalli—now newly baptized Doña Marina—was offered to him after a skirmish with the native inhabitants of Potonchan. Described by historian William H. Prescott as “a circumstance of the last importance to the success of [Cortés’] enterprise,” the girl’s ability to interpret
for the Spaniards made her acclaimed in their camp to the point that she began to accompany Cortés on every expedition.

The best portrait historians possess of Malinalli comes from Bernal Diaz del Castillo’s eyewitness testimony, written 50 years after the events of the conquest to correct the hagiographical account given by Cortés’ chaplain, Francisco Lopez de Gomara. Along with the correspondence between Cortés and King Charles I of Spain, Diaz’s account is the oldest known primary source regarding Malinalli. A soldier in the army, Diaz is more critical of Cortés and gives Malinalli the leading role in the interactions with the Mexica, claiming that “without Doña Marina we could not have understood the language of New Spain.” Albeit susceptible to hyperbole, his characterization of Cortés’ interpreter and future mistress parallels the Mexica portrayal of Malinalli. After the conquest, Spanish missionaries such as Fray Bernardino de Sahagún and Diego Muñoz Camargo worked with the natives to record their version of the conquest, Sahagún concentrating on the Aztecs and Camargo supervising the history of their most bitter enemies, the Tlaxcaltecas. In the latter codex, Lienzo de Tlaxcala or “The History of Tlaxcala,” Malinalli is depicted in a position of power at Cortés’ side in all key points of the conquest, from the first Spanish meeting with the Aztec Emperor Moctezuma to the surrender of Tenochtitlan. These sources attest that most communications between the Spaniards and the Mexica passed through Malinalli, a matter of utmost importance in the early stages of the conquest.

The act of translating opened the flow of information about the new continent, as Cortés was able to access knowledge ranging from the geographic layout of Mexico to its “customs (...) order of succession of kingdoms [and] economic organization...” through Malinalli. Primary sources provide examples in which she explains the practice of human sacrifices, relates the mythological origins of the Mexica and mentions it is customary for a friendly village to provide men to carry visitors’ baggage. In the context of historical analysis, this is paramount as it brings forward evidence regarding Malinalli’s knowledge of multiple
facets of the Aztec culture, supporting the claim that she would have supplied geographic, strategic and cultural intelligence to Cortés and therefore making her helpful in a large part of the Spanish maneuvers in Tenochtitlan. As historian Albert Marrin states, Cortés had not the slightest clue as to where Moctezuma’s capital city was located,¹⁶ and would have been unable to reach the heart of the empire without the linguistic and cultural advantages provided by Malinalli. Her mediation of every encounter between the natives and Cortés, along with her insights into the region’s cultural, military and even medicinal facets—for she tended to Cortés when he was injured—indicate that she indeed “…held the fate of the Spaniards in her hand”¹⁷ during the early part of the conquest, thus being essential for Tenochtitlan’s downfall.

Active Involvement

However useful the knowledge she brought them, the conquistadors would not have benefitted from their interpreter’s service had she not actively participated in the events of the conquest. Malinalli’s dedication to the men who resurrected her from slavery and addressed her with the honorific title of doña is evident in her relationship with Hernando Cortés—with whom she had a son—and confirmed by modern Mexican sentiment, where she is seen as a traitor for this association. Through using her standing among the natives to influence events in favor of the Spaniards and even uncovering conspiracies, the determined interpreter regularly facilitated the conquistadors’ mission.

Loyal to the Spaniards to the point that Cortés would send her in his stead to talk to Moctezuma,¹⁸ Malinalli quickly became familiar to her compatriots, who admired her for her standing and her “mastery of ‘lordly speech’” used by the nobility.¹⁹ While Bernal Díaz’s claim that she “was obeyed without question by all Indians of New Spain”²⁰ is implausible given the hindsight bias existent in Díaz’s late account, her influence is certainly palpable in the oldest native account of the conquest, in which she attempts to persuade the Mexica to surrender.²¹ Written by anonymous authors in Tlatelolco—a city that had been absorbed by Tenochtitlan—in 1528, this account carries substantial national bias, an example of
its limitations being the constant claim that no one in Tenochtitlan took up arms against the Spanish and the Tlatelolcans waged a heroic war by themselves. Regardless, its proximity to the conquest implies it was written by men who had witnessed Malinalli’s actions, and its claims about her are supported by other incidents. Bernardino de Sahagún’s Codex Florentino—compiled around 1580 from Mexica accounts—includes another incident where Malinalli persuaded the Aztecs to “bring food, fresh water, and all that was needed…” to the “…weary and exhausted” Spaniards.22

Given that she was the familiar figure amidst the unknown invaders, the native tribes approached Malinalli more than Cortés, and the interpreter often used this opportunity to “…magnify the prowess of her adopted countrymen”23 or claim that the strangers had received tokens from Moctezuma in order to impress the chieftains. Armed with the power of bilingualism, she was able to skew conversations in the Spaniards’ favor, particularly during the Spanish kidnapping of Moctezuma. Arguably one of the turning points of the conquest, the attempt was resisted when the Emperor refused Cortés’ diplomatic suggestion that Moctezuma should live with the conquistadors. A frustrated Velazquez de Léon—one of Cortés’ captains—is recorded by Bernal Diaz as shouting “either we take him, or we knife him!” When asked by Moctezuma to translate, Malinalli cunningly rendered the threat as a friendly advice “to accompany them…to their quarters.”24 Stepping outside her role as a translator, Malinalli contributed all the more to the conquest through such designs.

Cortés’ Testimony

As Malinalli’s actions would have been recorded by her countrymen if they were of any importance, the fact that Hernando Cortés only mentions his interpreter twice in his entire report—five letters—to King Charles I of Spain has given rise to doubts about her importance and to varying interpretations of Cortés’ purpose in writing the letters. Written as the events in Mexico were unfolding, the Cartas de Relation or “letters of relation” remain the oldest primary sources on the conquest. While some historians have taken the scarcity of references to Malinalli at face value and
have downplayed her role in favor of other factors, others such as Cordelia Candelaria have argued otherwise, pointing out that Cortés’ purpose in writing to the King was to secure “royal favor [and] prestige” and concluding that “Cortés’ Cartas are understandably self-serving and one-sided,” an explanation for the lack of references to his interpreter. This is a plausible explanation considering that Cortés was in Mexico contrary to orders, and being pursued at court by his superior, Diego Velazquez.

A closer examination of the time Cortés does mention Malinalli only bolsters the case for her importance, as the conquistador credits her with uncovering a dire conspiracy in the city of Cholula: “my interpreter…was told by another Indian woman and a native of this city that…the people of the city were about to fall on us and kill us all…” This account is corroborated by Bernal Diaz, who confirms that after asking “…how, when and where the plot had been made,” Malinalli reported to Cortés, who massacred the people of the city. It is worth mentioning that this version is vehemently contradicted by Sahagún’s native informants, who blame the massacre on the lies of Cortés’ staunchest native allies—the Tlaxcaltecas. Yet in a situation where neither superior weapons nor diplomatic concessions could have saved the conquistadors, Malinalli’s ability to converse in confidentiality with her compatriots and report any sign of mischief to the Spaniards proved to be essential to their survival. Along with the influence she held among the natives and her active designs to favor the Spaniards in verbal exchanges, her careful guarding of the invaders is another example of the direct responsibility she bears in the conquest of Tenochtitlan.

Role In The Forging Of Alliances

Armed with linguistic aptitude and unwavering fortitude, Malinalli possessed both ingredients for what arguably became the decisive step in the Spanish conquest of Mexico: the procurement of native allies. Her contribution to this brilliant enterprise—from enabling the Spaniards to understand native complaints to her direct involvement in negotiating alliances—secured the allegiance of many city-states hostile to Moctezuma’s reign, and culminated
in a (perhaps exaggerated) figure of 24,000 allies at the final siege of Tenochtitlan. During Malinalli’s first translation in the city of Cempoalla, Cortés not only learned about the nature of the Empire, but became aware of the many grievances the locals had against Moctezuma. The “…extensive taxation on goods and services” included captives for human sacrifices and was loathed by many subject cities, leading “…to disharmony and disunity.” This policy forced the natives to look to the conquistadors as possible liberators. After comprehending the magnitude of the empire, the conquistadors were quick to notice that an early encounter with the entire Mexica force would end in defeat unless they enlisted the help of other cities. Such a plea for assistance would have been impossible without the translation provided by Malinalli, who secured the Spaniards’ greatest allies—the men of Tlaxcala. (This alliance is graphically depicted in Camargo’s *Lienzo de Tlaxcala*, and Malinalli’s placement between Cortés and the Tlaxcaltec chief Xicotencatl underscores her role as a mediator.) Choosing to “endure great evils” rather than succumb to Aztec supremacy, the Tlaxcaltecas became vital to the conquest, granting the Spaniards refuge after they were decimated in the incident that is now known as *La Noche Triste*—the Night of Sorrows. Subsequently, as Cortés began plotting an eventual siege of Tenochtitlan, a reconnoitering expedition around the lake upon which the city was built depended entirely on Malinalli to secure the support of adjacent towns, as “she alone could shape the results and the negotiations of treaties…” Yet besides Malinalli’s ability to negotiate and portray the Spanish as saviors of the oppressed tribes, she was also responsible for instructing the latter. As the Spanish army was almost entirely composed of natives, she would relay Cortés’ instructions and communicate with them.

An analysis of Malinalli’s very name offers conclusive proof of her importance to this part of the campaign: the native tribes would always address Cortés as Malinche, or “Malinalli’s captain,” indicating their familiarity with and the importance they attached to the Aztec interpreter. In the conclusion of his classic history of the conquest, William H. Prescott gravely affirms that “the Aztec monarchy fell by the hands of its own subjects…. Had
it been united, it might have bidden defiance to the invaders." 36 Malinalli’s part in securing allies for the Spaniards mirrors the one played in the general story of the conquest: much like the first piece of a jigsaw puzzle, she enabled events that could not have unfolded had the foundation not been laid out. In this respect, as in many others, Malinalli proves to be a main contributor in Tenochtitlan’s demise.

Credit Dispute

William H. Prescott is not alone in his conclusion, as anthropologist George C. Vaillant also states that “Indian perfidy… virtually accomplished the downfall of Mexico." 37 Yet as it is difficult for the historian to discern who should be properly acknowledged for this most important step in the conquest—Malinalli or Cortés—both original and modern histories have tended to discredit the interpreter in favor of Cortés’ genius, suggesting that more than anything it was the conquistador’s brilliant leadership and masterful diplomacy that secured the campaign’s success. This is true especially of Francisco Gomara’s 1553 account and has been reflected in post-independence Mexican thought, where the only thing Malinalli is credited for is being Cortés’ mistress. 38

It cannot be denied that while Cortés was a skillful strategist: with “an indomitable spirit [and] dazzling qualities,” 39 his greatest asset was diplomacy. Albeit sailing to Mexico in direct violation of his orders, he immediately cast himself as King Charles’ personal ambassador. Aware that the Mexica greatly honored ambassadors, 40 Cortés put Moctezuma in the loathsome position of not being able to legally wage war on the conquistadors. 41 Furthermore, upon realizing that the empire was much less united than it seemed, he set to work by adroitly pitting Tenochtitlan and other city-states against each other. Once Moctezuma’s first envoys reached the conquistadors in the city of Cempoalla, Cortés ordered the chieftain to arrest the envoys before personally setting them free in secret, the incident sewing discord between the two cities and allowing Cortés to demand allegiance from Cempoalla should they desire protection from Moctezuma’s revenge. 42 His diplomacy extended to sending Spanish troops to aid allied cities in their struggles
even as the conquistadors “were in a condition to receive succor much more than to give it.”45 This, along with small gestures such as mourning for the death of a Tlaxcaltec chief44 secured the undivided loyalty of most city-states in Mexico, and proved essential for the toppling of Aztec rule. The military spirit of the Spanish conquistador attracted allies, inspired comrades and eventually brought to its knees an empire that had successfully repelled him the first time—during La Noche Triste. Yet while Cortés’ skillful maneuvering certainly rallied the conquistadors to a final conquest, Malinalli’s role cannot be brushed away as she carried out many of these negotiations—sometimes on her own terms—enabling the action following Cortés’ idea. By considering the language barrier and the lack of knowledge concerning the native subjects’ feelings towards the Emperor, it becomes implausible to argue that Cortés’ diplomacy would have obtained the same effect as it did without the aid provided by Malinalli. As Tenochtitlan’s vassals fell off one by one, Malinalli and Cortés “played on Indian psychology as master pianists would execute a duet.”45

Technological Superiority

Notwithstanding the conclusions reached about Malinalli’s importance and responsibility, an investigation of the downfall of the Aztec Empire must take into consideration other possible factors, and assess Malinalli’s responsibility in comparison. Perhaps the most widespread argument as to why Hernando Cortés was so successful in his campaign concerns the technological superiority of the Spaniards over the Mexica—both in terms of firearms and animals brought to Mexico. Historian Jared Diamond argues that one of the reasons for the general success of Western nations against the New World was the development and possession of firearms “…that defeated thinly armored Indians.”46 Due to this discrepancy, the Aztecs were unable to defeat the Spanish in open battle even though they greatly outnumbered the invaders.

Weaponry

Of particular assistance during the final siege of Tenochtitlan were the firearms on land and the brigantines on water:
while the Spanish ships would overturn Aztec canoes and cut off supplies to the city, soldiers would ensure protection during a retreat by shooting while others loaded, keeping a constant fire on the enemy. Further assisted by cannons, the domination of the Spaniards seemed complete, as this allowed them to breach fortifications and made the Mexica describe the event as an impulse to flee “without rhyme or reason (…) as if [our] hearts had fainted.” Yet while important to the final outcome of Cortés’ campaign, the technological advantage only existed in open-field encounters, as Bernal Diaz states that “neither cannon, muskets, nor crossbows were of any avail…” whenever the fighting took place inside the city of Tenochtitlan. As the two greatest battles of the conquest—the defeat during La Noche Triste and the final siege—were fought there, and with historian Hugh Thomas stating that “superior technology did not count” in street battles, the impact carried by firearms was not entirely decisive.

Animal Power

Along with firearms, the Spanish made use of war mastiffs and horses during the conquest; these animals are also widely credited with a pivotal role in the campaign. Especially the horses caused havoc during battles, handing the Spanish the advantage in many encounters and leading Cortés to comment that “…after God, our only security was the horses.” Yet while again in the open field the Aztecs had no match for the horsemen’s speed and tenacity, horses proved useless when fighting inside the city or on the narrow causeways that linked the capital to land, as the Aztecs would jump in the water and strike at the horses’ legs. This perceived superiority of the Spaniards can be further questioned when one analyzes the aftermath of the conquistadors’ defeat during La Noche Triste. Forced out of the city by the Aztecs, the Spanish possessed “no muskets, cannon or powder” and were only aided by a crippled cavalry in their subsequent battles. Their salvation came not from technology, but from persuading neighboring city-states to offer them shelter—this being evidence of a more diminished technological impact on Cortés’ success and an enterprise in which Malinalli was again pivotal,” leading
Hugh Thomas to assess the girl’s value as “…equivalent to ten bronze cannon.”

Mexica Ideology

A second factor that greatly facilitated the conquest of Mexico stems from the ideological differences of the two nations regarding combat. Practicing a sacred type of warfare—treasuring honor and sacrifice over efficiency in battle—the Mexica themselves compromised their chances to resist Cortés’ charge and sped up their decline. To begin with, the intentions of Aztec warriors on the battleground were not to kill, but to obtain victims for rituals. As historian Miguel Leon-Portilla notes, “Aztec warriors never forgot that their first duty was to take captives to be sacrificed.” Consequently, a climactic moment passed unobserved when the Aztecs “laid hands on Cortés and dragged him…try[ing] to carry him off alive.” Cortés was duly rescued by his compatriots, but had the Mexica been more concerned with actually defeating the invaders, they could have killed the commander on the spot. This behavior was worsened by the many formalities existent in Mexica warfare, among which killing from a distance was considered dishonorable and a declaration of war was required before charging. An analysis of the evidence clarifies the impact the dissimilar ideologies carried, as testimonies show that a refusal to fight for the sake of fighting greatly hurt Aztec chances of survival. Yet, while this is arguably a major independent factor in Tenochtitlan’s fall, it also serves to bolster Malinalli’s importance: Cortés’ interpreter was familiar with her kinsmen’s ideology, and she is even depicted by native sources (Lienzo de Tlaxcala) while “instructing” Spanish attacks. Armed with the pivotal knowledge provided by her, Cortés could instruct his troops and take advantage of the Aztec rituals.

Conclusion

Philosopher Thomas Carlyle once claimed that “the history of the world is but the biography of great men.” His comments started a current of historiography known as the ‘great person’ theory of history, one of the various approaches to determining Malinalli’s responsibility for the fall of Mexico. Under this view,
individuals are seen as the driving forces in historical change, and Malinalli then becomes a catalyst to the conquest. Herbert Spencer argued that the theory is flawed, for every man is “a product of his antecedents” and thus no individual can have such an impact on history. Yet Malinalli was shunned by her own kin and forced to adapt to a society with customs and values alien to hers. Her active role in mediating encounters and forging alliances with the natives places her at the heart of the action and gives her great responsibility for the fall of Tenochtitlan. Differing interpretations do exist though, as other historians argue that historic change occurs because of the economic and geographical differences that allowed civilizations to develop in different ways. Under this approach, Malinalli’s part becomes less significant given the technological advantages possessed by the Spaniards.

Yet while various interpretations can be expressed, given the standpoint from which one approaches the events of the conquest, this paper has followed an empirical approach and focused on source material to reconstruct the past. Given Malinalli’s knowledge of not just the language, but of the customs of the land, and furthermore given her willingness to stand by the invaders and aid them through the act of translation and the acquisition of allied forces, it can be concluded that the Aztec interpreter played a great role in the Spanish conquest of Mexico. Having the advantage of understanding the other side without being understood, Malinalli provided Hernando Cortés with help to be successful in his daring endeavor. No one event or person can be looked at as the sole reason for the fall of Moctezuma’s mighty empire; it is important to state that Malinalli is not singularly responsible. Yet the importance of language and the role of the interpreter in the colonization of the Americas has been demonstrated in this case study, and albeit other instances may differ, Malinalli played too great a role for her not to be considered essential for the demise of the Aztec Empire.
Notes


4 The Mexican pejorative *malinchista* is derived from Malinalli’s more common name, La Malinche.


6 It should be noted that disease (smallpox epidemics) is often cited as a factor in the European colonization of the Americas. In the case of the Aztec Empire though, the first major epidemic took place during the final siege of Tenochtitlan, by which point Cortés was already assured of victory. For the purposes of this paper, disease will not be considered a major factor in the conquest of Tenochtitlan. See Martha Few, “Invasion and Conquest of Mexico,” Jay I. Kislak Foundation, http://www.kislakfoundation.org/pdf/VE02Few.pdf (accessed August 2, 2014)


8 Initially, the Spanish would make use of a double translation. Being fluent in Nahuatl as well as Chontal Maya, Malinalli would translate from the former into Maya. A second interpreter, Jeronimo de Aguilar, would then convert the Maya words into Spanish. By becoming Cortés’ lover, Malinalli quickly mastered Spanish and eliminated the need for a double translation.

9 The people known colloquially as Aztecs called themselves *Mexica* or *Tenochca*, the first of these names being derived from the name of their capital city, Mexico-
Tenochtitlan (abbreviated by most historians as Tenochtitlan). For the purposes of this paper, the terms *Mexica* and *Aztecs* will be used interchangeably. See Albert Marrin, *Aztecs and Spaniards: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico* (New York: Athenaeum, 1986)  


13 Francisco Lopez de Gomara, *Historia de La Conquista de Mexico* [Cortes: The Life of the Conqueror by His Secretary], trans. Lesley Bird Simpson (n.p.: University of California Press, 1964)  


15 Diaz del Castillo, p. 109  

16 Marrin, p. 87  


18 Diaz del Castillo, p. 231  


20 Diaz del Castillo, p. 86  


22 Bernardino de Sahagún, “Codex Florentino. Book XII,” in *We People Here: Nahuaíl Accounts of the Conquest of Mexico* (*Repertorium Columbianum*) 1:58–164  

23 Prescott, p. 99
Regarding the incident, Bernal Diaz states he was a witness to the dialogue, a statement that places more value on his testimony. See Diaz del Castillo, p. 221


Hernando Cortés, “Second Letter,” in MacNutt, 1:297

Díaz del Castillo, p. 196

Sahagún, p. 94. This version is misleading though, in that it pictures the Tlaxcaltecan allies spreading lies inside the city, when Bernal Diaz clearly states Cortés was forced by the Cholulans to leave all allies outside the city before entering it. See Diaz del Castillo, p. 190

Díaz del Castillo, p. 389


Candelaria, p. 4

Xicotencatl the Younger, quoted in Diaz del Castillo, p. 167

Ruth Karen, Feathered Serpent: the Rise and Fall of the Aztecs (New York Simon & Schuster [Juv], 1979) p. 124

MacNutt, p. 328

Prescott, p. 488


Prescott, p. 419

A surviving account from the Codex Ramirez—a late 16th century Aztec work based on earlier sources—tells of a discussion between Moctezuma and his nephew regarding Cortés’ ambassadorial status, with the Emperor’s nephew
saying “it was not proper for a great lord (...) to turn away the ambassadors of another great king.” See Miguel Leon-Portilla, ed., The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Beacon Press, n.d.) p. 170


42 Diaz del Castillo, p. 113
43 Prescott, p. 458
44 Ibid., p. 356
45 Vaillant, p. 244


47 Diaz del Castillo, p. 373
48 Bernardino de Sahagún, “Codex Florentino. Book XII,” in We People Here: Nahuatl Accounts of the Conquest of Mexico (Repertorium Columbianum) 1:58–164

49 Diaz del Castillo, p. 341
50 Thomas, p. 399


52 Cortés, p. 301
53 Tenochtitlan was built upon a lake, and could be reached from land via three long, low causeways.
54 Diaz del Castillo, p. 302
56 Thomas, p. 172
57 Leon-Portilla, p. 70
58 Diaz del Castillo, p. 342


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If a dictator ever took charge in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny. And there would be no way to fight back.

—Senator Frank Church on August 17, 1975 episode of NBC’s Meet the Press

The Watergate scandal was one of the most disconcerting to rock the United States, creating distrust of government among citizens and politicians alike. The wiretappings, break-ins, and “black-bag” jobs of Watergate, investigators would soon find, though, merely followed a trend of mid-20th-century intelligence abuses within the U.S. government.1 After World War II, the United States had formed a 13-agency intelligence community with the purpose of guarding against the Russians.2 Before Watergate, though, neither legislators nor the public would hear much about the agencies which encompassed the Central Intelligence Agency and large parts of the Departments of Defense and Justice. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, one of the only pre-Church-Committee intelligence oversight groups, aired con-

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cern over some illegalities within that intelligence community. The hierarchy of authority, though, clearly favored intelligence agencies: many of the Board’s requests to obtain incriminating documents were simply rejected. The “Family Jewels,” a 1973 presentation of almost 700 CIA policy violations, finally forced legislators to examine intelligence actions and abuses that had been undertaken during the Cold War. In January of 1975, the Senate voted, with a majority of 82 yeas to four nays, to create a panel investigating possible intelligence corruption, forming the Special Select Committee on Intelligence. The group resolved to “conduct an investigation and study of...illegal, improper, or unethical activities...engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.” A Democratic senator from Idaho, Frank Church, was chosen to lead the Committee. Church’s staunch “dove” status in Vietnam motivated him to investigate abuses there, but his panel, which would come to be known as the “Church Committee,” would probe a much larger scope. Within months, the Church Committee began its investigation into covert operations, both domestic and abroad, that were executed without substantive oversight by proper legislative powers. Many of these programs, the Committee declared, “illustrated fundamental weaknesses and contradictions in the statutory definition of [intelligence] authority:” agency actions had not only been unwarranted legislatively, but were often blatantly illegal. Some laws prompted by the Committee did have an effect, such as those regulating domestic data and record collection within agencies. And, ultimately, the Church Committee increased public awareness of the possible dangers of intelligence operations. While the Committee influenced the better management of America’s intelligence community, it failed to fulfill its goal of creating and maintaining complete federal oversight of government intelligence agencies.

Much of the legislation prompted by the Committee’s findings reacted to discoveries of domestic intelligence abuses ranging from the 1940s into the early 1970s. Findings most representative of intelligence agencies’ indifference to legislative statutes were data collection programs such as Project SHAMROCK and Operation CHAOS, among other National Security Agency (NSA) opera-
tions. The NSA, founded in 1952 with the open-ended executive order to conduct “signals intelligence,” read foreign telegrams in its Project SHAMROCK program. By the early 1970s, the NSA, a program chartered for foreign investigation only, had intercepted millions of American telegrams, largely choosing targets by their presence on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s watch list. No executive or legislative order had permitted the NSA to use the FBI’s watch list in identifying domestic targets, or even to surveil domestic targets at all. When questioned by Church Committee member and later vice president Walter Mondale, the NSA’s deputy director, Benson Buffham, explained that legality “didn’t enter into the [SHAMROCK] discussion.” The CIA undertook a similar program, Operation CHAOS, but presidential pressure actually prompted this scheme. Concerned about proliferating protests within the U.S., President Lyndon Johnson repeatedly requested the CIA to reach outside of its foreign jurisdiction and investigate American Communism. So, in 1967, Operation CHAOS began with a first mission of monitoring “Soviets, [Chinese Communists], and Cubans” who could possibly use unrest to infiltrate the nation. Through the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, this search broadened, investigating protesters from “Negro expatriates” and supporters of the U.S. Peace Movement to women’s “liberationists.” By 1974, the CIA held names of 300,000 Americans, 7,000 of which included extensive files that the Committee deemed “wholly irrelevant to the legitimate interests of the CIA or any other government agency.” Upon the Church Committee’s investigation into Operation CHAOS, the CIA rationalized the program by describing it as meant to protect “facilities from possible violent public demonstrations.” Not only had the CIA and other agencies ventured far from their chartered purposes, but they had, without legislative action, invaded the privacy of countless citizens—and legislators felt a need to prevent such abuse from ever happening again.

CHAOS, SHAMROCK, and NSA data collection represented only a fraction of counterintelligence, a sector dominated by the FBI umbrella program known as the Counter Intelligence Program, or COINTELPRO. Founded in 1956 to “contain the
[Communist] threat,” COINTELPRO reinforced public attacks on supposed Communists, such as those by the House Un-American Activities Committee. After the end of the 1950s’ “Red Scare,” the FBI noted a decreased zeal for and increased difficulty in prosecuting Communist Party members. With that decline in public support, COINTELPRO started to covertly target groups that were less Communist and more tangentially at risk for alleged Communist infiltration: simply “rabble rousers,” as some FBI leaders described them. Beginning in 1960, the FBI expanded COINTELPRO to undertake what the Church Committee called “harassment of innocent citizens...[that] did serious injury to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom.” Direct Communist investigations became merely a subset of COINTELPRO, as investigations of peripheral groups with “seriously exaggerated” Communist ties took the forefront. Those investigations of, as Walter Mondale described, “no meeting...too small, no group too insignificant” entailed more than the data collection that had occurred in Operations SHAMROCK and CHAOS. Each COINTELPRO operation carried out a “smear campaign” against different organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan and Civil Rights leaders like Martin Luther King.

The Ku Klux Klan lay at the focus of one politically-charged COINTELPRO operation in the 1960s. FBI Director William Sullivan founded a program in September 1964 to “expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize” white hate groups, almost exclusively composed of Ku Klux Klan chapters. Vaguely citing “devious maneuvers and duplicity” as cause to infiltrate the Klan, Sullivan, as he bragged in one internal FBI memorandum, assigned more than two new informants to the operation each day during its first year of existence. These COINTELPRO operations, while having approval from Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and President Johnson, were still illegal in method. Instead of trying only to limit the violent acts of the Klan themselves, the Bureau’s attempts tried to “curb the organization,” hoping violence would dissipate too. With its network of informants, the FBI provided evidence of Klan activity to the public, often illegally obtained through wiretappings and microphone surveillance, in order to
alienate citizens and Klansmen alike from the KKK cause. One Miami television studio received inside information regarding Klan operations, contingent on its production of anti-Klan documentary *Thunderbolt on the Right.* The FBI funded and set up a new Klan chapter, led entirely by informants, meant to attract members away from real KKK organizations and gain more unrestricted access to Klan information. Agents drew a series of cartoons ridiculing Klansmen for allowing the FBI to enter their ranks, sending the illustrations to select chapters across the country most susceptible to “demoralization.” Individual leaders who preferred to keep their Klan work secret would also suffer attacks by the Bureau. The FBI decided to cause “considerable consternation” to the leaders, without any explicit proof of the latter’s wrongdoing. That targeting, accompanied by the creation of extensive information files for each Klansman, was merely prompted by each one’s membership in a legal, albeit sometimes violent, organization. Ultimately, George Moore, then-Section Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section of the FBI, called the Klan COINTELPRO “the most effective [he had] seen the Bureau handle.” While many agents rightly vilified the Klan for its racist and sometimes-violent policies, attacks against the KKK at best *peripherally* targeted violent acts, the acts that the FBI actually had the jurisdiction to prevent. When questioned by the Church Committee, Attorney General Katzenbach denied that anti-Klan operations “harrass[ed]…persons exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights.” However, the Committee determined that, in the KKK COINTELPRO, intelligence collection went beyond its legal limit.

Another notable example of COINTELPRO’s illegal action lies in the FBI’s 1963–1968 blackmailing of Martin Luther King. The FBI, after seeing King’s August 1963 “Dream” speech, deemed the leader too threatening a force in the Civil Rights Movement. King, internal memos wrote, had become popular enough to unify a movement largely composed of the Black Panthers and other violent black nationalists. The Bureau, with no congressional approval, almost immediately began its mission to “completely discredit” King. This mission, though, would circumvent even presidential permission: the Committee’s two sections
devoted to analyzing the targeting of King found no mention of President Johnson’s approval or even his acknowledgement of the operation. Using what memorandums called “cooperative” news organizations, the FBI provided article content and photographs to media with the request that they be used to show the “militant aggressive” nature of Civil Rights campaigners. A note written by Bureau members, accompanied by tape recordings of King’s hotel room, even attempted to convince King to commit suicide before his 1964 acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize. Calling King “done,” the note declared its recipient had only “one thing to do” before his “abnormal self [was] bared to the nation.” The Bureau later sent in a female agent hoping to seduce King, and used wiretappings to supply morally-incriminating information about his private life to the press. Between 1963 and 1968, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover also forced employees to label King a “Soviet pawn” in reports, threatening to fire them if they did not comply. Even after King’s death, FBI agents attempted to control public opinion, claiming King’s position as a possible “messiah” for the “black nationalist movement.” The Church Committee retroactively investigated King’s supposed crimes or acts of violence. Affirming its suspicions that COINTELPRO’s motives were unjustified, the Committee found no evidence of King’s wrongdoing. Similar tactics and a general lack of sufficient rationale could be seen across the broad spectrum of COINTELPRO subjects. Clearly, the FBI had used COINTELPRO as a poorly-justified method of victimizing those who gave any impression of hoping to change the status quo.

Unlike the KKK’s and MLK’s designated counterintelligence programs, the FBI’s Operation HOODWINK actually did target Communist groups, staying in line with the original mission of COINTELPRO. However, Operation HOODWINK attempted to undermine domestic Communism by fomenting hatred of Communists within organized crime groups like New York’s Sicilian “La Cosa Nostra.” Under the command of Director William Sullivan, the Bureau began in 1966 by penning a series of letters to create a clash between Communists and La Cosa Nostra (LCN), believ-
ing the mob, if not the government, might be able to weaken the Communist Party. After the bombing of several New York City Communist chapters, FBI agents, acting as an anonymous Communist, wrote identical letters to three of the most powerful mob bosses in the city. Blaming a variety of mafia groups, or “hoodlums,” for the bombing, the notes declared a Communist wish to “get even” and “rid the country of [the mob]…through socialist reform.”38 While the FBI concluded in early 1967 that these and other counterintelligence operations caused no “adverse reactions” to Communists within La Cosa Nostra and other mobs, the Bureau continued in attempts to generate a confrontation between the groups. Agents sent one paragraph to the New York Daily News to be inserted into a column, describing “commies…[who are] now ready to take on local hoodlum elements.”39 Using intelligence on La Cosa Nostra operations, the FBI’s New York “Special Agent In Charge” wrote more letters, this time published in the Communist newspaper The Worker and describing LCN’s specific drug-selling methods.40 Another intricate letter took on the narrative of one gangster who, lamenting to his superior, described his brother-in-law’s experience as a Communist. Relaying news from this “brother” that Moscow leaders wanted to undermine New York City gangs, specifically La Cosa Nostra, the author encouraged his boss to take preemptive action against the Communists.41 Although this last letter “appeared to have convinced” some gang leaders, by 1968, memos to FBI Director William Sullivan noted a lack of “any…clash” between the Communist Party and La Cosa Nostra.42 Two years of deceptive effort by the FBI had, on the whole, been for naught. Without any proof of success, Operation HOODWINK, while being one of the few COINTELPROs to target outright Communists, did so by trying to use organized crime.

Even the FBI director felt qualms, though, about the later Huston Plan. The Huston Plan, an intelligence agenda publicized during the Watergate hearings, was illustrative of agencies’ disregard for executive decisions. In the early years of U.S. intelligence, J. Edgar Hoover, concerned with matters of ethics and legality, implemented restrictions on the number of agencies’ permitted
Michael Rubel

warrantless surveillances. According to these restrictions, other divisions of the government had to be notified upon the implementation of any new warrantless surveillance missions. In June of 1970, then-Hoover’s assistant, William Sullivan, enlisted White House assistant Thomas Huston to expand the reach of those surveillance capabilities. Sent by Sullivan, Huston persuaded President Richard Nixon to have a meeting with head intelligence directors regarding the surveillance limit and possible joint operations between domestic and foreign agencies. Then and in subsequent months, Huston would push Nixon to allow a foreign agency, the CIA, to use the domestic facilities of the FBI and NSA, and vice versa, all the while increasing allowable data caps. Succumbing to bureaucratic pressure from the National Security Council and intelligence leaders, President Nixon adopted all of Huston and Sullivan’s suggestions, and there was no indication showing Nixon knew of the intensive, already existing NSA and CIA domestic surveillance programs. Even Hoover was concerned by the increase in unchecked power, and persuaded the President to change his mind in July of 1970, only five days after the initial authorization. When President Nixon soon discovered and halted a 20-year mail-opening CIA operation and an NSA program that intercepted millions of international cables, he believed he had averted future abuses. Agencies, though, implemented several of Huston’s propositions regardless, lowering the average age of college informants and increasing the availability of intercepted mail intelligence. The FBI, from then on, continued to execute the concerned “black-bag jobs,” FBI break-ins that would place surveillance devices in nondescript locations, undertaking even what Huston called “clearly illegal.” Executive attempts to investigate intelligence abuses were ignored, and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with no progress in mitigating FBI action, failed to pursue the matter. Sullivan recalled the thought process that went into the Huston Plan and similar acts: “The one thing we were concerned about was this: Will this course of action get us what we want….As far as legality is concerned, morals, or ethics, [that] was never [given thought] by myself or anybody.” The Huston Plan was yet another testament to illegalities being
executed within the government itself, illegalities that went forth with explicit non-complicity from the President. The Committee’s findings, supplemented with previous action, created a wave of legislation meant to prevent domestic abuses, from Operation CHAOS and Shamrock to COINTELPRO and the Huston Plan, from ever happening again.

Even before the Church Committee officially formed, findings of abuse prompted the passing of the 1974 Privacy Act and the 1975 strengthening of the Freedom of Information Act, two relatively successful pieces of legislation. The Privacy Act seriously hampered agencies’ ability to collect Project SHAMROCK-esque private information on individuals, and the Freedom of Information Act allowed citizens to access files that agencies kept on them, like those recorded in Operation CHAOS. The latter act also enforced the method with which government agencies could purge sensitive information. Hoping to avoid incrimination from actions of the Reagan administration, President George H.W. Bush attempted to prevent releases of more details of the 1986 Iran-Contra affair. National Security Archive journalist Scott Armstrong objected, though, claiming the public deserved the opportunity to know such information. The next three presidents would collectively spend over $9 million legally fighting to destroy those Iran-Contra details, but the revised Freedom of Information Act made that information available to the public upon request. Here, the action prompted by the Church Committee had successfully created checks and balances to prevent an abusive cover-up of illegal domestic intelligence actions. While the Committee found agencies had been disregarding laws and executive actions within the United States, though, Church’s investigations into Cold War espionage operations abroad, especially in Cuba, Vietnam, and Chile, proved just as damning.

Several projects demonstrated a CIA hope of toppling the pro-Soviet Cuban government through psychological warfare and attempted assassination. Almost immediately after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, President Eisenhower began efforts in 1959 to undermine Castro’s grip on the nation. While the Eisenhower-
led, CIA-executed Operation Pluto used traditional tactics, like lowering Cuba’s export quotas to the U.S., more components of the program were extreme and anything but legislatively-approved. CIA agents hoped to render Castro incomprehensible in his speeches by spraying him with a specially-formulated drug, or make Castro’s symbolic beard fall out with poison-tainted cigars. In 1960 alone, such schemes cost the CIA $15 million. A year later, President Kennedy approved an undercover attack on Cuba, this time with Cuban exile ground forces at the Bay of Pigs. Legislators, the Committee wrote, could have prevented or fixed the failed attack had it not been “cloaked in secrecy.” American failure here, though, did not deter Kennedy from a fight against Cuba. Inside the White House, he would proclaim the necessity that continuing American efforts against Cuba would simply have to be more covert. That escalation continued to bring Cuba down a path as the CIA’s first expansive covert operation abroad. The National Security Act of 1947 gave the CIA no explicit permission or directive to take such actions, but the National Security Council and presidents would continue to issue provisions to the CIA charter. Employing the CIA as a sort of personal counterintelligence tool abroad, the President would, through actions in Cuba, set a precedent of unchecked manipulation that could bypass legislation.

While Lyndon B. Johnson is often blamed for America’s expansive deployments in Vietnam, his administration also took a covert role in manipulating Vietnamese politics prior to and during the ground war. Even before Johnson, though, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy hoped to destroy any possible leftist influence in Vietnam through regime control, especially during the period of instability in the wake of France’s exit after the First Indochina War. In the 1950s, Eisenhower had some success in Vietnam, supporting the installing of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. While the American role in the 1950s’ Vietnam conflict had been no secret, Eisenhower’s actions, executed by the CIA, were unknown even to most congressmen. Even after Eisenhower left office, President Kennedy—preferring a less dictatorial leader—had Diem assassinated in late 1963, weeks before his own death. For the next two years, the U.S. cycled
through, on average, over one new leader in “Vietnam every two months.”58 With no viable Vietnamese leaders, newly-installed President Lyndon Johnson sent 7,000 more military advisors to South Vietnam. Undertaking OPLAN34A,59 he began a scheme, without congressional oversight or approval, of more than 1,000 attacks of harassment and psychological warfare.60 Only after the late 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident could Johnson stage a larger, public attack on North Vietnam. Before then, though, Johnson and his two predecessors had unilaterally embarked on covert attempts to manipulate a sovereign nation.

The Church Committee discovered an even more recent example of the CIA’s rogue, manipulative role in global politics through the agency’s actions in Chile. Distinctly not wanting to “stand by and watch a country go Communist” in the midst of the Cold War, as National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger reflected, the CIA took a variety of clandestine actions in Chile from 1963 to 1973.61 In 1963 and 1964 alone, the CIA spent $3 million, none of which was formally sanctioned by legislators, to damage Marxist Salvador Allende’s chances of winning the 1964 Chilean presidential election.62 These actions, often at the behest of President Richard Nixon, did not just entail surveillance and counterintelligence. In following years, the CIA would implement extensive propaganda campaigns against Allende in Chile, in 1971 and 1972 paying more than $1.5 million to El Mercurio, the largest newspaper in Chile’s capital, for its increasingly anti-Allende stance.63Initially, the CIA attempted to bribe Chilean congress members to initiate a special, sans-Allende election. After that payment failed to create action, the CIA pressured the Chilean military to plan a coup.64 CIA missions in 1970 dispersed weapons and tear gas to Chilean schemers, and the President and many intelligence officials explicitly sent paramilitary agents to support the eventually successful 1974 military uprising.65 While Committee investigators acknowledged that the U.S. position on Chile was aligned with its public foreign policy towards other Latin American powers, containment attempts in Chile were executed largely in secret, without Senate or House approval.66 Of the 33 covert operations undertaken in Chile between 1964 and 1974, Congress was only
briefed on eight. Similarly, almost $4 million of the CIA budget in Chile was simply not mentioned to Congress. The actions in Chile could seem diplomatic at best, but they played out with almost zero legislative oversight. The operations there demonstrated just one instance of the CIA’s rogue belief that expediency and unilateral action were most possible without Congress or proper legislative oversight.

Addressing the sort of foreign manipulations that had occurred in Cuba, Vietnam, and Chile, the Senate passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in late 1974. The amendment allowed for the President’s approval of payment or military action as part of covert operations as long as Congress could “monitor and review the intelligence activities of the United States Government.” Without such oversight, “no funds…[could] be expended by…any…agency of the United States Government for the conduct of covert action operations”—a prerequisite aimed at preventing further abuses. At the same time, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment set out to keep the President and Congress informed of each facet of every covert operation abroad. Addressing gaps in past legislature, the Church Committee pointed out that agencies’ “[charters] of powers, duties, and limitations…are not presently [existing]…or, where [they do]…[they are] vague, conflicting, and incomplete.” Hoping to set boundaries where there had been none before, the Amendment created for the first time a formal requirement that agencies report operations to Congress.

President Gerald Ford, however, was as concerned by the Church Committee’s actions as he was by its findings. While some of what intelligence agencies did was indifferent to executive order, most covert actions served presidential aims. The Committee outright declared that many previous executive intelligence orders simply avoided “objections which might be raised [by Congress].” With Congressional oversight, the legality of intelligence operations—beyond executive permission—would be a concern and impede the success of manipulative programs abroad. Continued New York Times coverage of Committee findings would
push intelligence abuses, many executive, into the public view, so President Ford looked for an image boost amid the scandal. Mandating stricter executive responsibility, Ford commissioned a White House Intelligence Oversight Board and prohibited foreign, non-war-related assassination attempts. The new Oversight Board would supplement the White House’s previous Advisory Board and monitor intelligence activity on a day-to-day basis, informing the President of possible illegalities. Unlike the last Advisory Board, Ford set out to create more stringent regulations that, if not approved by Congress, would at least be known by the President. Now recognizing the importance of oversight, the executive and legislative branches could firmly guide intelligence agencies towards effective but legal operations outside of the nation.

For a number of years, the public would live without seeing another intelligence scandal. Soon, though, that hope was marred by Ronald Reagan’s Iran-Contra Affair. Yet another president to put clandestine agencies to work for his agenda, Ronald Reagan hoped to use CIA power to back the rebel Contras, a group battling Communist Sandinistas in Nicaragua during the larger Cold War. Achieving this support legally, through those measures implemented in the wake of the Church Committee, proved difficult, and the legislatively powerful 1982 Democrats, opposed to such interventionism, successfully restricted operations in Nicaragua.

In a seemingly unrelated event, seven Americans were hostages held by Iran in Lebanon, and President Reagan chose to trade weapons for their freedom. That trade would go blatantly against the grain of Reagan’s foreign policy stance of non-negotiation with terrorists, so he undertook the swap in secret, without legislative oversight. In late 1986, though, Lebanese newspaper Al-Shiraa described the trade in detail; at that point, the U.S. had already sent one and a half thousand missiles to Iran, but only received three hostages. A media explosion ensued in the United States, and several televised denials from Reagan left only 14 percent of the nation believing the arms sale was not a hostage negotiation. The Church Committee declared the U.S. to have “contradicted not only its official declarations but its…principles” in Chile, and
many drew comparisons between prior abuses and Reagan’s actions with the hostages in Iran. As indictments and intense investigations began, the true illegality of the deal became apparent: only $12 million of the $30 million the U.S. had received from Iran for the arms was accounted for. Under the control of John Poindexter, White House Advisor to the National Security Council, the remaining two-thirds of the money was being siphoned off to support the Nicaraguan contras. Intelligence agencies were illegally fueling the Contra war that left 30,000 dead in Nicaragua and damaged the country’s economy. The Ford-created White House Intelligence Oversight Board and the Hughes-Ryan Act were simply bypassed, with agencies repeating what the Church Committee referred to in Chile as “an attempt to overthrow a constitutionally-elected civilian government.” With an almost chilling parallel to the articles that prompted the Church Committee’s founding, the *New York Times* ran a series of articles detailing the Iran-Contra affair and the intelligence community’s uncontrollable nature. Politicians could and did take remedial action in the wake of the affair, but many wondered how such steps could work when the same course of action had been taken in the past.

Reagan’s Cold War rhetoric contributed to a clandestine proxy war in Afghanistan. After a power struggle between the leftist Khalq Party and the long-ruling Khan family, American-backed leader Hafizullah Amin took control of Afghanistan in 1979, shifting the stance of a country previously neutral in the Cold War. The USSR invaded the country, sending 100,000 troops to Afghanistan and installing as leader Babrak Karmal, convincing Presidents Carter and Reagan that that nation could be the most important Cold War front yet. By 1980, Jimmy Carter’s annual support for anti-Soviet Afghans reached $30 million, and Reagan had expanded that budget by tenfold only three years later, with no officially-sanctioned support from Congress. While the United States clearly differed from Afghanistan’s fundamentalist factions on many fronts, the groups stood together in opposition to the USSR’s Marxist campaign. And, with many moderate factions to choose from, the CIA instead decided to team with jihad groups
in Afghanistan because of the latter’s extremism. Legislators, with no hand in the decisions in Afghanistan, could not veto the support of groups that included the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahedeen, what would become Osama bin Laden’s base of power. The support of the United States was controlled solely by the President and the CIA, but it fueled what would, by 1988, become a war of more than a million casualties. The absence of proper congressional oversight also created a flawed withdrawal from Afghanistan. With the Cold War over, the CIA largely just left a war-scarred Afghanistan, paving the way for the “nation building” efforts of the early 2000s. And, leaving many of their weapons in Afghanistan, CIA operatives essentially supplied a fledgling Taliban and eventually al-Qaeda with tools to attack the U.S. Short-sighted and improperly executed, America’s first war in Afghanistan demonstrated that the Cold War would motivate presidents and intelligence agencies to work beyond their spectrum of power, even after legislative reform like the Hughes-Ryan Act.

From the beginnings of the Cold War until the advent of the Church Committee, the United States intelligence community enjoyed what some historians call the “Era of Trust.” During this period, executive agencies grew in size and budget, existing as a large exception to the American structure of checks and balances. So, while lawmakers were horrified by some of what agencies accomplished in this era of blind trust, they saw the Church Committee as the first endeavor to change the way American intelligence worked. There had never been any attempt to monitor the agencies before, and it lay within reason that the Church Committee could successfully create federal oversight. But, as University of Chicago professor Edward Levi declared in one address, “the misuse of law as but another device for leverage is profoundly corrupting.” Desire for that leverage, even after the Church Committee, proved too strong of an incentive for some intelligence agencies and their leaders. As the Iran-Contra affair and the covert war in Afghanistan demonstrated, a few years of extreme governmental vigilance could not fill all the gaps in intelligence oversight. Some laws prompted by the Committee,
like the Freedom of Information Act and a revised Privacy Act, did take strides towards proper intelligence operations. The legislative branch’s distrust of intelligence, however would persist through the years. While the Church Committee placed intelligence operations into the thoughts of the American public and legislators, it could not create federal oversight programs able completely to monitor or regulate intelligence agencies.
Notes

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49 Ibid., at 141


52 “Armstrong v. EOP,” Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Privacy Information Center, n.d.


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55 Sullivan III, p. 88
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OPLAN34A began in 1964 as a South Vietnamese, Laotian, and American joint operation against Vietnam. American deployments only included CIA and Special Forces troops, without any traditional troop deployment.


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Hard though it sometimes is for us to understand, communists also believed their own doctrine. Just because communist ideology now seems wrongheaded in retrospect, that doesn’t mean it didn’t inspire fervent belief at the time. The majority of communist leaders in Eastern Europe—and many of their followers—really did think that sooner or later the working-class majority would acquire class consciousness, understand its historical destiny, and vote for a communist regime. They were wrong. Despite intimidation, despite propaganda, and despite even the real attraction communism held for some people devastated by the war, communist parties lost early elections in Germany, Austria, and Hungary by large margins. In Poland, the communists tested the ground with a referendum, and when that went badly its leaders abandoned free elections altogether. In Czechoslovakia, the communist party did well in an initial set of elections, in 1946, winning a third of the vote. But when it became clear that it would do much worse in subsequent elections in 1948, party leaders staged a coup. The harsher policies imposed upon the Eastern bloc in 1947 and 1948 were therefore not merely, and certainly not only, a reaction to the Cold War. They were also a reaction to failure.

The Soviet Union and its local allies had failed to win power peacefully. They had failed to achieve absolute or even adequate control. Despite their influence over the radio and the secret police, they were not popular or universally admired. The number of their followers was shrinking rapidly, even in countries like Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, where they had initially had some genuine support. As a result, the local communists, advised by their Soviet allies, resorted to the harsher tactics that had been used previously—and successfully—in the USSR. The second part of this book describes those techniques: a new wave of arrests; the expansion of labor camps; much tighter control over the media, intellectuals, and the arts. Certain patterns were followed almost everywhere: first the elimination of “right-wing” or anticommmunist parties, then the destruction of the noncommunist left, then the elimination of opposition within the communist party itself. In some countries, communist authorities even conducted show trials very much along Soviet lines...

A CLASH OF CULTURES: AN ANALYSIS OF ORIGINS OF THE FIRST OPIUM WAR AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA

Emily Mu

From the time of Marco Polo, European merchants have sought to reach China. Asian products were coveted by the European upper class for both their novelty and their value. It was not until the late 18th and 19th centuries, however, that the West was able to establish stable trading connections with Asia. At the time of the initial arrival of the Europeans, China was the dominant force in the South China Sea. Trade was conducted through the traditional Canton tributary network in which surrounding nations paid tribute to the Chinese emperor. The ruling Qing emperors reigned secure in their own supremacy and limited trade in order to preserve both order and culture. Furthermore, the Qing represented the continuation of over 2,000 years of imperial rule. Obedience to the emperor was enforced by both the values of deference promoted by Confucianism and by the belief in an imperial Divine Mandate. The Europeans, on the other hand, had begun to see the Chinese political and commercial system as antiquated and only utilized the tributary network to attempt to
expand commercial trade with China. Increasing European and American interest in China, especially in opening the elusive Chinese consumer market to Western goods, conflicted with Chinese traditional beliefs in imperial supremacy and self-sufficiency. This conflict would eventually culminate in the First Opium War, which would result in both the opening of China to Western powers and technological and political reforms. This paper will analyze the origins of the First Opium War and how its aftermath resulted in both ideological and political reforms that would eventually characterize modern China.

Traditionally, China has viewed itself as the center of civilization, as shown by its name *Zhongguo* meaning “Middle Kingdom.” As a result, China viewed trade not as a means of communication or commerce, but rather as foreign acknowledgment of China’s own superiority. Trade in China’s tributary system was primarily one-way: foreign princes and envoys were expected to send valuable gifts and commodities in a display of submission to the Chinese emperor. In return, the emperor would grant trade favors and imperial protection to the tributary states.

To the Chinese, the tributary system was a mere extension of a belief system rooted in Confucianism. Confucius’s teachings, which formed the cornerstone of Chinese culture for almost 2,000 years, were based on the values of ceremonial deference to the emperor and the emperor’s responsibility towards his subjects. The Qing emperor Kangxi outlined these principles in his “Sacred Edict,” which he ordered to be recited throughout the kingdom in the late 17th and early 18th centuries: “Esteem most highly filial piety and brotherly submission, in order to give due importance to human moral relations... Explain ritual decorum and deference, in order to enrich manners and customs.” The tributary system formed a continuation of Confucian thought. Tributary states were expected to display deference towards the superiority of China in return for imperial favor. For over a century before European intervention, Confucian principles, and in extension the Canton tributary system, remained the primary moral code in South Asia.
For 2,000 years, China remained secure in its supremacy over the South Asian maritime trade network. It would not be until the expansion of Western trading interests into Asia that both China’s tributary system and her traditional Confucian doctrines collapsed. To the West, China’s tributary network provided a way for European nations to expand trade with China. While Sino-European trade connections grew throughout the late 18th century, European trade was restricted to the Canton area after 1760. This action was perceived by the emperor as the best solution to both maintain order and culture within the empire while restricting foreign influences on Chinese civilization. For the Europeans, however, the decision came with higher costs. China had no desire for European goods outside of precious metals while Chinese products, including porcelain and silk, became increasingly popular in Europe’s wealthy circles. Consequently, in 1793, George Macartney, British statesman and diplomat, led the first official British mission to China. The Macartney mission brought numerous tributes and presents for the Chinese emperor, including an elaborate planetarium, in addition to a written request from King George in the hopes of opening additional trading ports in China.

However, the trip was unsuccessful. The Chinese saw the tribute as British acknowledgment of Chinese strength in trade and denied the request to open up additional ports to British trade. In his response to King George III of Britain, Emperor Qianlong expressed goodwill towards the foreign monarch but refused to make commercial concessions:

“Yesterday your Ambassador petitioned my Ministers to memorialize me regarding your trade with China, but his proposal is not consistent with our dynastic usage and cannot be entertained. Hitherto, all European nations, including your own country’s barbarian merchants, have carried on their trade with Our Celestial Empire at Canton. Such has been the procedure of many years, although Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no products within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.”
However, it should be noted that Emperor Qianlong did not force the tributary system upon trading European nations. The English gifts were seen by the Chinese as the willing English recognition of Chinese superiority, both morally and in trade.

As seen in Emperor Qianlong’s response to King George III in 1793, the Qing imperial government was uninterested in opening up the Chinese market to European industrial goods. In the meantime, European demands for Chinese tea and porcelain continued to rise. As demand for Chinese products grew, the British East India Company, which held a monopoly on British-Chinese trade, found that it was importing increasing amounts of Chinese goods while exporting few British products to the Chinese market. This, unsurprisingly, resulted in a massive trade deficit for Britain, which the British struggled to rectify in the face of the Chinese lack of interest in British industrial goods. Thus, throughout the 18th century, Britain looked for a product that would open the impenetrable Chinese market.

Coincidentally, the British East India Company also took over opium production in British-controlled India in the 1780s, around the same time Lord Macartney had embarked on his futile tributary mission to open Chinese ports. With the introduction of manufactured Indian opium into China, it seemed that the British finally found the product to finance their trade with China. Opium addiction in China became so prevalent that in 1799, Emperor Jinqing ordered a ban on all opium products, making both opium trade and Chinese poppy cultivation illegal. Still, however, the opium trade continued, and by the early 19th century, a staggering 40,000 crates of opium were being shipped to China each year.

By 1825, Emperor Daoguang realized that the amount of Chinese silver they were paying for opium was affecting the Chinese economy. In fact, the amount of silver leaving China resulted in a deficit that doubled the price of silver in only half a century. Peasants, who had always paid imperial taxes in silver, were finding it increasingly difficult to fulfill their tax obligations each year. Tensions mounted. In 1834, the situation intensified
with the ending of the British East India Company’s monopoly on trade. Opium traders from all parts of Europe and the United States rushed to supply opium to the lucrative Chinese market.\textsuperscript{12} With the price of silver rising and with over 40,000 chests of opium imported illegally each year, Emperor Daoguang had to decide to either legalize the growing opium trade or to crackdown on the ban his father had made 40 years earlier.\textsuperscript{13}

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly why opium smoking became so popular in China in the early 19th century. Although opium had long before made its way into China through trade with Java, opium smoking, or the inhalation of opium through a heated pipe, was only introduced to China by soldiers in the late 18th century.\textsuperscript{14} Much of the popularity of opium may have resulted from its therapeutic properties including the relief of pain and emotional stress. Thus, opium first became popular among the wealthy, including aspiring governmental officials preparing for their strenuous examinations, wealthy women, and eunuchs.\textsuperscript{15} However, with the introduction of Indian opium by the British East India Company in the early 19th century, opium became increasingly available to civilians of all social strata. In fact, by the time Emperor Daoguang became emperor, it had been estimated that over 10 percent of the Chinese population was addicted to the drug.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, the opium trade became not only detrimental to the Chinese economy but also to Chinese productivity as addiction to the drug continued to rise.

After the death of one his own sons from an opium overdose in 1838, Emperor Daoguang made his decision. He appointed scholar Lin Zexu as commissioner of Canton and ordered him to stamp out the opium trade. As commissioner, Lin used the Confucian state organization in his efforts to end the opium trade. He issued public proclamations and edicts declaring the dangers of opium addiction, and he formed special groups within each social class with the purpose of spotting and turning in opium addicts. Lin’s methods worked. By fall 1839, over 50,000 pounds of opium had been confiscated from the Chinese population.\textsuperscript{17} Still, Lin wished to stop the illegal opium trade at its source. In
a letter to Queen Victoria of Britain, Lin used carefully-worded moral persuasion to try to convince the Queen to make efforts to end the opium trade:

“Suppose there were people from another country who carried opium for sale to England and seduced your people into buying and smoking it; certainly your honorable ruler would deeply hate it and be bitterly aroused. We have heard heretofore that your honorable ruler is kind and benevolent. Naturally you would not wish to give unto others what you yourself do not want.”

Lin then ordered all foreign merchants to give up all their stores of opium and enforced his proclamation with a blockade of the port. After six weeks, the foreigners had agreed to give up 20,000 chests of opium.

As he flushed 3 million pounds of raw opium out to sea, Lin commented in a letter to Emperor Daoguang that the foreigners did not “dare show any disrespect, and indeed I should judge from their attitudes that they have the decency to feel heartily ashamed.” To both Commissioner Lin and the Emperor, the foreigners, or “barbarians” as they were called, were submissive to the Chinese court. The merchants were seen as grateful recipients of imperial guidance and favor and were “determined” to be morally inferior to the Chinese.

Unfortunately, however, the British merchants had not been shamed in the least by the display and instead pressed the British government for compensation for their destroyed opium. One British merchant referred to the blockade as “even fortunate as adding to the account for which we have to claim redress.” Although the Qing did not realize at the time, the opium confiscation and consequent retribution plans had been amplified by the refusal of the British Crown to renew the monopoly that the British East India Company held over trade with China in 1834. The immediate ramifications of this decision resulted in a massive influx of opium into China as independent British merchants sought to profit from the Chinese opium trade. This increase of trade with China also necessitated the creation of a new post of superintendent of foreign trade in Canton. As the East India Company had
lost its monopoly on trade, this post was held by a deputy of the
British crown itself. When Lin forced British merchants to give
up their opium through the blockade, the merchants turned in
their opium to the superintendent rather than directly to Qing
officials. Thus, Lin’s actions in forcibly confiscating and destroying
British goods could be seen as aggression towards the nation of
Britain, and military retaliation could be called upon to defend
the interests of the merchants.

Meanwhile, back in Britain, popular opinion began to
swing towards initiating war with China. Intensive lobbying efforts
from chambers of commerce and the opium merchants themselves
increased the popularity of retaliation efforts. In fact, opium mer-
chant William Jardine traveled back to England as a representative
of Chinese merchants to help the effort, advocating his cause by
spreading propaganda in leading English newspapers. Although
the morality of the selling of opium had long been contested by
Protestant societies and missionaries, the extensive lobbying ef-
forts by both the manufacturing industry and Jardine influenced
public opinion enough to limit the influence of moral objections
while increasing the pressure on Parliament for retribution.

In response to the lobbying of wealthy British opium mer-
chants and popular opinion, Parliament agreed to send a naval
force to China in order to secure the reimbursement for the lost
opium. In a letter to the minister of the Emperor of China, Brit-
ish Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston acknowledged
the illegality of the opium trade in China, but argued that “Her
Majesty cannot permit that Her Subjects residing abroad should
be treated with violence, and be exposed to insult and injustice;
and when wrong is done to them, Her Majesty will see that they
obtain redress.” As Parliament voted to send the task force to
China, tensions increased in Canton. An incident on the island of
Kowloon in which drunken British seamen murdered a Chinese
villager led the Qing government to demand that the accused
be handed over for trial. However, knowing that China had no
jury-trial system, the British authorities refused on the grounds
of “extraterritoriality” or that British citizens could only be tried
by British judges. The sailors were tried in Canton, sent back to England and immediately released. This incident further incensed the anti-British sentiments of the local population. As a result, foreigners and Western ideals became increasingly unpopular and hostilities continued to rise.

Commissioner Lin capitalized upon the popular opinion at the time. As he began the mobilization of imperial forces, he also encouraged the Chinese populace to take action against the British themselves. One of Lin’s proclamations advised, “Purchase arms and weapons; join together the stoutest of your villagers and prepare to defend yourselves.” The local population took Lin’s words to heart and harassed the British merchants by poisoning wells and refusing to sell foreigners food. By the time the naval forces arrived in Canton, hostility was rife between the Qing and the British.

In June of 1840, under the authority of the British government, Captain James Bremer ordered the Qing government to pay recompense for both the confiscated opium and the disrupted trade. Commissioner Lin refused to comply. In retaliation, Lord Palmerston ordered the start of what would become known as the First Opium War. The British expedition was ordered to blockade the Pearl River and took Chusan. The Chinese junks were no match for the warships of the British fleet, and by the middle of 1842, the British had taken over Hong Kong, defeated the Chinese at the mouth of the Yangtze River, and were occupying Shanghai. Shocked and humiliated, Emperor Daoguang had no choice but to sign the Treaty of Nanjing and concede to the requests of the “barbarians.” Not only was the Qing government forced to pay $21 million in reparations, cede Hong Kong, allow extraterritoriality to British citizens, accord Britain with “favored nation” status, and open five new ports of trade, but both Chinese civilians and foreigners alike began to question the authority of the Emperor. European nations saw the Qing as a weak memorial to a great imperial age, and consequently, European imperialists began turning their interest towards Asia. Chinese civilians, alarmed by China’s rapid defeat in the First Opium War, began to support
reforms both industrially and politically. The Divine Mandate of Heaven under which previous dynasties had long claimed power and prestige was beginning to crumble.

One of the immediate effects of the Opium War was the decisive hostility towards the English by the Chinese population. A paper read at a great public gathering in Canton expressed common Chinese sentiments at the time:

Behold that vile English nation! Its people are at one time like vultures, and then they are like wild beasts, with dispositions more fierce and furious than the tiger or wolf, and natures more greedy than anacondas or swine...They are dogs, whose desires can never be satisfied. We do here bind ourselves to vengeance...let us not lose our just and firm resolution.37

The Nanjing Treaty also marked the beginning of the decline of the Qing dynasty and established society. Increasing discontent at insufficient government actions towards foreign nations led to escalating tensions and hostility as Chinese citizens attempted to take matters into their own hands. Continuous rebellions and uprisings threatened both Qing power and the foreign presence in China after the end of the First Opium War as anti-Western convictions continued. Lin was not the last Chinese leader to capitalize on foreign unpopularity created by the First Opium War. In the late 19th century, the society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists began the Boxer Rebellion with the goal of eradicating all foreigners and Christians from China by execution.38 In June 1900, the Empress Dowager Cixi capitalized on the increasing popularity of the movement by issuing an imperial proclamation ordering the deaths of all foreigners in China. Only intervention by an international force composed of European nations and America eventually brought the Boxer Rebellion to an end in September of 1901.39 Mao Zedong, although pushing for a Communist reformation of China, recognized the importance of the Opium War on Chinese culture, urging the Chinese people to “take up the study of the [...] history of China in the last hundred years” because “very few really know the history of the Communist Party of China and the history of China in the hundred years since the Opium War.”40 To the Chinese, the Opium War marked the beginning
of a century of Western imperialism and subjugation marked by constant power struggles and war.

To the West, Britain’s success in the First Opium War increased foreign interest in China as other nations sought the same preferential treatment that Britain had received. In fact, unsatisfied with the terms agreed upon in the Treaty of Nanjing, Britain forced China to sign a supplemental treaty in October in 1843, known as the Treaty of the Bogue. This treaty granted Britain most favored nation status, in which Britons were given permission to reside in the new ports and Britain would be automatically given any privilege any other power received. Together with the Treaty of Nanking, the Treaty of the Bogue marked the first of the Unequal Treaties, in which China was forced to make continuous commercial concessions to the Western powers, who used their military might to pressure China into signing the treaties. In the next several years, China signed several more of the Unequal Treaties including the Treaty of Wanghia with the United States and the Treaty of Whampoa with the French in 1844, the Treaty of Canton with Sweden and Norway in 1847, and the Treaty of Kuljia with Russia in 1851. By this time, the decline of Qing power was obvious to both the Western powers and to the Chinese populace.

Still, as European interest bloomed, trade concessions initiated by the Treaty of Nanjing began to bloom into territorial interests. In a famous French political cartoon published in 1898, China is shown as a cake being divided by the monarchs of the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, France and Japan. A Qing official is frantic in the background but powerless in the face of the powerful Western nations. The fitting caption reads, “China—the cake of kings and of emperors.” As depicted in the cartoon, the carving up of China had already begun a few years prior. In the Treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1884 between China and France, France took control of Annam, currently Vietnam, and incorporated the region in French Indochina. Meanwhile, in the north, Japan and Russia began to eye Manchuria and other outlying regions with interest. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan forced China to recognize the
independence of Korea and give up tribute payments, and also to cede Taiwan and portions of the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan.\textsuperscript{46} Having already lost Annam to France, this treaty marked the final end of China’s tributary network and any forms of control the Qing still retained over the South Asian trading sphere.

Additionally, the humiliating defeat of the Qing in the First Opium War brought about a westernization of both Chinese ideals and institutions. The most immediate reforms taken by the Qing in the aftermath of the First Opium War were technological. China purchased modern weaponry and updated its navy after seeing the display of Western industrial strength.\textsuperscript{47} The increased presence of Europeans in China also increased the presence of missionaries and Christianity in China.\textsuperscript{48} When establishing a new government in the later years of the Qing dynasty, China attempted both a republic and its present-day Communist form of government rather than instituting another imperial regime.\textsuperscript{49} Even in the later years of the Qing dynasty, reform became increasingly popular. In response to weaknesses exposed by defeat by both Western nations and Japan, Emperor Guangxu launched a series of cultural and political reforms in his Hundred Days’ Reform.\textsuperscript{50} In his movement, Guangxu abolished the traditional Confucian exam system, created a modern education system, instituted a constitutional monarchy, formed an industrial plan, and introduced capitalism to the Chinese economy.\textsuperscript{51} Although Guangxu was ousted from power by the Dowager Empress Cixi in 1898 and his plan abolished, some of Guangxu’s reforms were eventually put into effect, including the abolition of the exam system in 1905.\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, this failure of reform gave rise to revolutionary forces who increasingly believed that change within the established government was impossible and the only feasible solution was to overthrow the establishment itself.\textsuperscript{53} Thus, the First Opium War began the modernization of China both technologically and politically.

Although the Opium War marked the beginning of China’s modernization, the specter of the Opium Wars continues to haunt Sino-European relations to this day. In China’s eyes, the
First Opium War only ended with the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese government in 1997. According to one Hong Kong publisher, “Whether we are from Hong Kong, China or Taiwan, I believe our viewpoint is the same—that the Opium War was not a trade war but an act of expansionism or militarism on the part of the British…For many Chinese, the wrongs of the Opium Wars were not righted until Hong Kong was handed over in 1997.”

Even so, the Opium Wars continue to be a sore point for China, which remains wary of the West. The increasing influence of Western culture in China has received angry responses from political leaders. In an essay published in a Communist party publication, President Hu Jintao of China wrote, “We must clearly see that the international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.” To the Chinese, the First Opium War represents the start of an era of weakness and humiliation by the Western powers. Although Sino-Western relations have made great improvements over the last few decades, the Opium Wars “reminds [the Chinese] what may come when [they] are weak.” Consequently, throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries, China has focused on becoming both economically and politically powerful.

The return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997 marked the conclusion of imperialism in China. Begun by English trade interests in China combined in combating Chinese traditional trading systems, the First Opium War resulted in the bitter realization that China was in dire need of reform. The aftermath of the war lasted far longer than the war itself. The Treaty of Nanjing was not only a national humiliation but also marked the beginning of the end of both the Qing dynasty and Chinese dominance in South Asia. As other Western powers clamored to claim power over China, the need to reform became increasingly apparent to both the ruling Qing and to the Chinese populace. Later groups from the Boxers to the Communist Party capitalized on the hatred initiated by the war to popularize their own causes. Although the First Opium War represents the beginning of a pe-
period of Western subjugation to many Chinese, the influence that the war has had on the shaping of modern China is undeniable.
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Just as the Holocaust expressed the quintessential nature of National Socialism, so did the Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia (1975-1978) represent the purest embodiment of Communism: what it turns into when pushed to its logical conclusion. Its leaders would stop at nothing to attain their objective, which was to create the first truly egalitarian society in the world: to this end they were prepared to annihilate as many of their people as they deemed necessary. It was the most extreme manifestation of the hubris inherent in Communist ideology, the belief in the boundless power of an intellectual elite guided by the Marxist doctrine, with resort to unrestrained violence in order completely to reshape life. The result was devastation on an unimaginable scale.

The leaders of the Khmer Rouge received their higher education in Paris, where they absorbed Rousseau’s vision of “natural man,” as well as the exhortations of Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre to violence in the struggle against colonialism. (“One must kill,” Sartre wrote. “To bring down a European is to…suppress at the same time the oppressor and the oppressed.”) On their return to Cambodia, they organized in the northeastern hills a tightly disciplined armed force made up largely of illiterate and semiliterate youths recruited from the poorest peasantry. These troops, for the most part twelve- to fourteen-year-old adolescents, were given intense indoctrination in hatred of all those different from themselves, especially city-dwellers and the Vietnamese minority. To develop a “love of killing and consequently war,” they were trained, like the Nazi SS, in tormenting and slaughtering animals.

Their time came in early 1975, when the Khmer Rouge overthrew the government of Lon Nol, installed by the Americans, and occupied the country’s capital, Phnom Penh. The population at large had no inkling what lay in store, because in their propaganda the Khmer Rouge promised to pardon servants of the old regime, rallying all classes against the “imperialists” and landowners. Yet the instant Khmer Rouge troops entered Phnom Penh, they resorted to the most radical punitive measures. Convinced that cities were the nidus of all evil—in Fanon’s words, the home of “traitors and knaves”—the Khmer Rouge ordered the capital, with its 2.5 million inhabitants, and all other urban centers to be totally evacuated. The victims, driven into the countryside, were allowed to salvage only what they could carry on their backs. Within one week all Cambodian cities were emptied. Four million people, or 60 percent of the population, suffered exile, compelled to live under the most trying conditions, overworked as well as undernourished. Secondary and higher schools were shut down.

Then the carnage began. Unlike Mao, whom he admired and followed in many respects, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, did not waste time on “reeducation” but proceeded directly to the extermination of those categories of the population whom he suspected of actual or potential hostility to the new order: all civilian and military employees of the old regime, former landowners, teachers, merchants, Buddhist monks, and even skilled workers.
RELIGIOUS DISPUTES IN EARLY GEOLOGY

Shuchen Liang

In 1875, the publication of James Hutton’s book Theory of the Earth: or an Investigation of the Laws observable in the Composition, Dissolution, and Restoration of Land upon the Globe marked the start of a new era in the recently formed science known as geology, previously named Earth theory. Studies of how the Earth had changed after its creation depended on the belief that human reasoning could prove that the teachings of the Bible explained the world. However, new discoveries towards the end of the 18th century, where “fossils seemed silent testimonies of mass extinction [and] proof of a universal deluge seemed increasingly incomplete” provided reason to doubt the existence of God or omnipotent divine power.¹ These doubts contributed to Hutton’s work, which proposed a new theory of geology called uniformitarianism. Hutton’s uniformitarianism theorized that the Earth’s structures changed gradually over huge periods of time due to forces such as Earth’s internal heat and pressure. Such a naturalistic interpretation of Earth’s history stood in stark contrast to the Bible’s proclamation of Earth’s creation to have happened in about seven days. This radical theory forced many geologists at the time to question the truth of religion’s role in the narrative of the Earth.

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As a result of the aforementioned observational doubts, which led to uniformitarianism’s growing popularity, general scientific consensus began to minimize the role of a divine power in shaping the Earth. These sentiments culminated in Charles Lyell’s seminal work on modern geology, *Principles of Geology* [1830-1833]. In *Principles*, Lyell wrote about scientific disciplines related to the Earth, including the original formation of the Earth, the processes which changed the Earth into its modern state, and also the diversity of life forms on Earth and how they came into existence.

Scientists unwilling to move past the connection between religion and geology promoted reconciliation of new data and biblical assertions. Although many of the authors writing against Christian scripture were religious, they could not dispute the evidence and reasoning that Lyell provided, as “even journals that supported the supreme authority of Scripture acknowledged the virtues of Lyell’s book.” The tensions between scriptural geology and more secular forms of Earth studies were symptomatic of the increasing importance of empiricism in the scientific method. In addition, this new standard for evaluating evidence highlighted the inability to reconcile science and religion during the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

The increasing doubts about biblical geology were evident in the writings of one of the era’s premier intellectuals: Thomas Jefferson. In 1781, several years before the publication of Hutton’s new ideas in *Theory of the Earth* [1785], Jefferson completed the first version of his *Notes on the State of Virginia*. This book was the compilation of Jefferson’s responses to a series of questions posed by French foreign minister François Barbé-Marbois, a total of 23 *Queries*. In *Query IV*, Jefferson writes about the various mountains of Virginia, one of which is the Blue Ridge. He admires the intersection between the Blue Ridge, the Patowmac, and the Shenandoah Valley, remarking that “the first glance of this scene, hurries our senses into the opinion, that this Earth has been created in time, that the mountains were formed first, that the rivers began to flow afterwards.” Jefferson’s description of the scene forming gradually over a period of time, rather than as a consequence of a sudden
change, fits into the theory of gradualism. Also, he does not refer to God or any biblical events, which suggests that he does not believe God had a direct hand in creating the formidable scene before him. Jefferson’s remarks also imply that the great size of the mountain itself was responsible for the creation of the rivers, rather than a supernatural force directing the rivers to move in a certain direction. This could be a result of his Deistic beliefs: that God created the principles and laws of nature, and then let the universe take its course. However, these beliefs would also later call for new justifications of God's involvement in the world.

Jefferson goes so far as to claim that a major event of the Genesis story of Earth’s formation, the Noachian Flood, cannot be substantiated by empirical data. In Query VI, Barbé-Marbois inquires about the production of materials, vegetables and animals. In Jefferson’s response, he mentions the existence of an assortment of petrified shells that were found high on the Andes. He explains his confusion at their appearance and his dissatisfaction with current theories explaining this irregular occurrence and other similar phenomena. Specifically, Jefferson criticizes the opinion that “the bed of the ocean, the principal residence of the shelled tribe, has, by some great convulsion of nature, been heaved to the heights at which we now find shells.” He claims that “we may venture to say further, that no fact has taken place…which proves the existence of any natural agents…of sufficient force to heave, to the height of 15,000 feet, such masses as the Andes.” Jefferson not only questions the legitimacy of the Flood or the Neptunian narrative of the Earth, but also the existence of empirical evidence that past theologians had attempted to use as justification for the Bible. His argument represents a general trend of thought that characterized the transition from Enlightenment thinking, which placed an emphasis on human reasoning, to 19th-century thinking, which required empirical support for the theories that were being produced.

James Hutton’s Theory of the Earth agrees with Jefferson’s doubts and goes on to make arguments that directly attack the tenets of scriptural geology. In this book, he lays the groundwork
for the rise of uniformitarianism as the dominant school of thought, which eventually culminated in the publication of Charles Lyell’s *Principles of Geology*. Hutton first affirms his use of empiricism as the only way to make correct scientific conclusions, asserting that “if data are to be found, on which Science may form just conclusions, we should not long remain in ignorance with respect to the natural history of this earth, a subject on which hitherto opinion only, and not evidence, has decided.” By framing previous works on the subject as mere “opinion,” Hutton casts doubt on their validity in comparison to views based on observations of the natural world. It was an accurate accusation, as many philosophers at the time were rich gentlemen who only contemplated these issues as a hobby, and lacked the capacity to obtain the data to confirm their theories. One notable example of such philosophers was the Comte de Buffon, a well-respected naturalist who wrote *Histoire Naturelle, Generale et Particuliere* (Natural History, General and Specific) [begun in 1749]. *Histoire Naturelle* was an ambitious work, a repository of knowledge on the natural world spanning 36 volumes and covering subjects ranging from animal biology to the origins of the Earth; it quickly became “the book to have in the salons of Paris, and was widely regarded as one of the 18th century’s best sellers.” However, one of *Histoire Naturelle’s* major flaws was that most of the facts and details in the book were not actually collected by Buffon himself; in fact, he “had the reputation of never having made observations on the species he described in Natural History.” Even in his position as one of the highest-ranking scientists in European intellectual society at the time, Buffon’s arguments and so-called “observations” were not grounded in the strict use of empiricism that would become necessary in the 19th century. Hutton uses this distinction between opinion and evidence in scientific study as one of his points of departure from previous scholarship on this subject. The use of empiricism in his work reflects a deeper trend in science as a whole towards the need to support claims with data. This trend also, in part, fueled the controversy behind Hutton’s work, as many researchers could not reconcile his work with the *Bible*. This standard of evaluating
natural history would become ubiquitous in the study of geology with supporters of both Huttonian geology and Neptunian geology.

Hutton also directly refutes the idea that a great Noachian Flood created the natural structures that scholars were analyzing at that time. The theory of the Noachian Flood proposes that the modern world began from a huge flooding of the Earth. The theory states that, first, this flood contained the chemicals and materials from which the Earth’s surface was formed, and second, that this flood created the necessary force and pressure to shape those chemicals and materials into the world as they knew it.

Hutton, however, saw that theory and reality did not fully coincide in a number of instances. Based on his observations, Hutton critiques the claim that the world formed from a giant aqueous solution of water and other materials, specifically through the appearance of calcareous strata, stating that “these natural appearances would not even be explained by this dissolution and supposed filtration…there is also required, first a cause for the separation…from the aqueous menstruum in which they had been dissolved.”

He implies that none of this could have happened because the process is too complex to have spontaneously occurred through water leaving the solution, and in fact, that some of these substances cannot even mix with water. Instead, he points to the intense heat and fusion energy that exist beneath the Earth’s crust, claiming that “the arguments…proving that strata have been consolidated by the power of heat, or by the means of fusion, have been drawn chiefly from the insoluble nature…in relation to water.” His argument of the power of heat and fusion represents another point of departure from previous Earth theories. Whereas previously, people depended on the properties of water in huge quantities to explain the formation of certain structures, Hutton found the real causes in the slow-acting forces of heat and pressure.

The two points of departure thus mentioned set the stage for future analysis in the newly recognized science of geology. Although “most of the members of the Geological Society of this time…rejected the uniformitarianism principle,” scientists began
to recognize that they needed to incorporate stricter standards of empiricism into their work. Geologists who believed religion and science did not need to be contradicting disciplines would attempt to use the first principle to contest the claims of the second. In fact, early 19th-century geology was characterized by “a mixed approach…at the same time admiration for God’s creation among the religious and of service to the utilitarian.” This appeal to utilitarian sentiment is a noticeable distinction from the religious Earth theory of the past, which did not aim for the practical use of its narratives for humans. These new framings of biblical stories also correlated with the Industrial Revolution, which was gaining traction during this time. The Industrial Revolution might have contributed to this trend of appealing to utilitarian sentiment, as it prioritized the exploitation of the Earth’s resources in order to better humans’ lives and increase their level of comfort.

As the need for better empirical or inductive reasoning rose, the theory of the great Noachian Flood needed to adopt a more scientific façade to counteract secularization. This came in the form of the so-called Neptunian theory, which grounded the Flood in scientific terms. Scientist John Murray evaluated these competing theories in his work, *A Comparative View of The Huttonian and Neptunian Systems of Geology* (published 1802), and concluded that the underlying principles of the Neptunian theory were more accurate than those of the Huttonian theory. In response to the idea that the slow but continuous processes of heat and fusion are responsible for the Earth’s form, he wrote, “The intensity of the heat required to produce that fusion whence our strata could have originated is beyond what it is possible perhaps for the imagination clearly to conceive.” Murray appeals to the sense of incredulity that was a common reaction to Hutton’s radical ideas. No one in the scientific community had ever discovered the existence of the extreme heat and pressure necessary for uniformitarianism. Yet, a massive flood would have been plausible for people in that age. The Bible, still widely considered infallible in its claims about the world, never mentions God using thermal energy to create the world but instead teaches that God flooded the Earth to punish the collective sins of the world. So, Murray’s argument is derived from
both the lack of the instruments necessary to confirm Hutton’s ideas, as well as the prevailing intellectual domination of the Bible.

Murray also used the same logic of strict observation in his arguments against the slow formation of mountains, reasoning that “the highest mountains of the globe run in extensive chains, and these, from their connection, must necessarily have been formed at one time.”15 Because mountains seemed to be always part of a range and never isolated by themselves, as in the case of the Alps, the Appalachians, the Andes, and the Himalayas, Murray hypothesized that the mountain ranges must have formed all together rather than separately. This piece of evidence supports his claim that heat would have needed to be present in enormous quantities, even at the top of the mountain, for Hutton’s theory to make sense. Murray’s defense of the Neptunian theory involves “accounting for the original fluidity of the surface of the globe from the operation of water,” which appears to derive from the fact that the world seemed very fluid and chaotic in terms of its natural formations.16 In a broader sense, his detailed, evidence-based reasoning that the Neptunian theory seemed better proven by data than the Huttonian theory showcases the continuing rise of empiricism in the early 19th century.

Scriptural geologists did not limit themselves to merely rejecting Hutton’s work. The inductive reasoning alluded to earlier was manifested through the argument of intelligent design as a way to prove the existence of God’s role on Earth, in addition to the traditional doctrine of a literal interpretation of the Bible. As evidence for God’s work on Earth, scriptural geologists pointed to the fact that the Earth seemed to be arranged perfectly for humankind and its endeavors. The Rev. William Buckland notes that there exists a “variety of useful minerals almost indispensable to the existence of man in a state of civil society, which this succession of different strata now presents to us.”17 In fact, he goes so far as to say that “in all these and a thousand other examples that might be specified of design and benevolent contrivance, we trace the finger of an Omnipotent Architect providing for the daily wants of its rational inhabitants,” implying that everything in nature that
is useful to humans may be found easily due to the work of an omnipotent God who is still present in the Earth today. People reading these arguments would have found them reasonable, because not only did people struggle to accept the fact that “the geological discoveries seemed to move man ever further from the centre of creation” but also because the idea that humans evolved to fit the world around them (instead of the other way around) had not yet been theorized.

Buckland also responds to the deistic belief that God does not participate in nature because He created physical laws and then left the universe to function on its own. This idea did not make sense according to Buckland, because these laws “can only denote the continued exertion for the will of the Lawgiver, the prime Agent, the first Mover.” By using expressions of God’s power, religious geologists like Buckland tried to use empiricism and inductive reasoning to respond to objections raised by Enlightenment thinkers who used purely deductive reasoning. Returning to Jefferson’s admiration of the beauty of the Blue Ridge and the physical laws that are associated with their creation, Buckland inserts an act of God into the language of science, because he believes that God is the one who gives power to the laws of gravity, friction, and pressure.

Buckland’s arguments also reveal the trend of empiricism as support for rhetoric. Increasingly, during this time, the world seemed to have almost no relation to the sayings of the Bible. As a result, empirical evidence was employed not only by people who questioned the theories of the past, but also by the religious faction of scientists who needed to prove the reasonableness of religion. Although this new tactic had unexpected consequences, hindering the initiative’s long-term success, as “it is the development of an increasingly more rational attitude within faith that in the end affects the credibility of religion,” empirical evidence was the best method religious scientists could use to address skepticism. The academic community expected rational explanations of phenomena based on real observations.
The defining work of this period was Charles Lyell’s *Principles of Geology* (published in 1830), a book issuing a robust defense of both uniformitarianism and a geology that existed independently of God. The book introduces the “concept of ‘the uniformity of nature’ that…gave the book a seminal influence on nineteenth-century culture in general, and helped to define what it means to be ‘scientific.’” Lyell’s argument relies on Hutton’s work, but his approach is more systematic. Rather than the loose set of observations that Hutton brings together to prove a general idea, Lyell devises a system of laws and axioms that he uses to explain geological phenomena.

Lyell begins by criticizing past works on the subject, noting that “they had never compared attentively the results of the destroying and reproductive operations of modern times with those of remote eras.” Similar to Hutton, Lyell distinguishes his work from that of previous geologists because they failed to perform comparative analysis between evidence of geological processes in the past and geological processes today. The extrapolation of the “operations of the modern times” to the rest of the world is important, because it signifies his intent to establish rules that the Earth as a whole must follow, rather than just one specific part of the world. Lyell did not have the formal training in logic that many of his peers in the field had, but he put “emphasis on *vera causa* reasoning” which “appealed to views about the scientific method widely canvassed during the decade before the Reform Bill [1832].” This was also a way for Lyell to give legitimacy to uniformitarianism because he could then reason that since these natural processes of destruction and reproduction had stayed constant, his laws would remain constant as well. This rule would also become one of the axioms of science: that all natural laws and forces, such as the forces of gravity and electromagnetism, remain constant throughout the universe.

Having given his ideas on the theory of science, Lyell needed to then apply them to the study of geology by using specific instances of phenomena explained by the principles of uniformitarianism. To this end, he uses data on the relative ages
of different rock formations (collected by new advancements in dating techniques) to show that “by their organic remains, they were not of contemporary origin, but formed in succession.”\textsuperscript{25} The first conclusion that Lyell draws from this is that the Earth’s structures came about in progression, which is only possible due to the many processes that build upon each other over a long period of time. This disproves the Neptunian theory, which would require these rocks to have formed at the same time and thus be about the same age. Lyell also reminds scriptural scientists of their “reluctant admission, that there was more correspondence between the physical constitution of the globe, and more uniformity in the laws regulating the changes of its surface.”\textsuperscript{26} This diminished the credibility of the geologists against Lyell, because they had chosen to ignore reasoning that proved his accuracy. In the end, the scientific community saw Lyell’s *Principles of Geology* as the more accurate description of the Earth’s formation because it “includes the assumption [that] laws of physics and chemistry as presently understood have applied to all past time and will apply to all future time; they are assumed to be valid unless...they may have differed in quality or quantity in other points in time or space.”\textsuperscript{27} Since this assumption was already widely accepted in other fields such as chemistry and physics, Lyell could use it to prove why his laws of geology would be constant as well. Furthermore, it presents another rejection of the Neptunian theory, as there was no feasible way for the laws of physics to allow the existence of enough water to cover the Earth completely.

Beginning with inquiries made by Jefferson into the validity of 18th-century Earth theory and progressing through scientific defense of the biblical narrative of the flood, geology developed from Hutton’s *Theory of the Earth* as representative of the general trend of thought during the late 18th to early 19th centuries. It was a time of transition, where religion was not rejected outright by contemporary scientists, but rather was rejected slowly as a byproduct of the rising standards of empiricism. Religious science, needing to maintain credibility, attempted to adopt the same standards of empiricism, but ultimately failed due to data that contradicted its ideology. Lyell’s criticisms of past scholars
and works on geology, his evidence using contemporary scientific techniques, and the strong foundation of almost indisputable principles would allow his theory of uniformitarianism to become the dominant school of thought over Neptunian geology. All three reasons were examples of the triumph of empiricism over the purely rhetorical claims during the Enlightenment era, because each rested upon concrete data and observations of the world. Due to Lyell’s work, “Neptunism persisted in Europe through the first three decades of the nineteenth century, but was soon to be phased out.”

Thus, by the early 19th century, geologists reached the point of separation between science and religion.
Notes


4 Ibid., p. 155

5 Ibid., p. 155

6 Flood, Neptunian, and also Deluge all refer to the story of the Noachian flood.


8 Lee Alan Dugatkin, Mr. Jefferson and the Giant Moose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009) p. 16

9 Ibid., p. 18

10 Ibid., p. 65

11 Ibid., p. 66

12 Klaver, p. 18

13 Ibid., p. 3


15 Ibid., p. 29

16 Ibid., p. 100

17 William Buckland, Vindiciae geologicae; the connexion of geology with religion, explained in an inaugural lecture delivered before University of Oxford, May 15, 1819, on the endowment of readership in geology (Oxford: University Press 1820) p. 12

18 Ibid., p. 12

19 Klaver, p. xvi

20 Ibid., p. 18

and Gerard P. Luttikhuizen (Leiden [The Netherlands]; Boston: Brill, 1998) p. 150


23 Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth’s Surface, by Reference to Causes now in Operation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. 20

24 Secord, p. xxii

25 Ibid., p. 87

26 Ibid., p. 86


28 Ibid., p. 63

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In the year-long course I took under Louis Gottschalk at the University of Chicago, there were two principal assignments tailored to the student’s field of specialization. Since mine was the French Revolution, I was asked to determine the hour of sunrise on a particular day during the Revolution. I do not now remember the day (to say nothing of the time), nor do I remember how I solved the problem. But I do recall, after my initial resentment at having to devote so much effort to so trivial a matter, becoming conscious of the importance of determining that fact (it turned out to be critical to some event) and also taking pride, even pleasure, in the practical experience of research.

That was a minor chore. The major assignment was a paper based upon a detailed examination of a few pages from the most reputable, recent work in our field. The charge was simple, or so it seemed until we tried to carry it out. We were to examine every published source cited (manuscript sources were excepted only because they were unavailable to us), first to see whether the quotations and footnotes were accurate, and then, more important, to see whether each quotation or paraphrase was faithful to the sense and context of the source; whether the source itself was trustworthy and impartial (or, if not, whether that was taken into account by the author); whether the author drew the proper inferences from the sources; whether every significant or controversial fact in the text was based upon relevant and reliable sources; and whether there were other relevant and reliable sources that were not cited and that might have supported other facts and conclusions.

It was a challenging exercise and a salutary experience. In my own case, I discovered several errors in quotations and citations and one serious discrepancy between the source and the deductions drawn from it. This was my initiation into the discipline of history—a painful initiation, because it made me acutely sensitive to the rigors and difficulties of scholarship (and because my own half-written thesis had drawn heavily on that book and I had to go back and check all the facts and quotations I had borrowed from it). At the same time it was an exhilarating experience, rather like a game of chess. And like a good game of chess, it gave me a great respect for the craft of the discipline, a craft that was patently not infallible but that did aspire to high standards and could be tested against those standards. (I later discovered that this was essentially the same exercise, on a much larger scale obviously and with access to the primary documents, that Forrest McDonald performed when he refuted Charles Beard’s *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*.)
AWAY FROM ATATÜRK: ERDOGAN AND THE RE-ISLAMIZATION OF TURKEY

Jordan Singer

Although in the wake of Atatürk, secularism has prevailed in Turkey, current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan could upend this national vision completely as he attempts to reintroduce Islam into Turkey’s politics. By looking closely at Turkey, it becomes clear that an Islamic revival was not caused by religion, but by Turkey’s culture and politics; it was a reaction, not a longing for the return of religion to the role it played in previous centuries. Accordingly, the West’s portrayal of Erdogan’s supporters as Islamic extremists opposed to democracy is inaccurate and unhelpful. By portraying Turkey in this light, the West presses the nation further toward Islam and radical politics by fostering such anti-Western (and consequently pro-Muslim) sentiment. However, Erdogan’s radical politics, especially concerning Israel, are undesirable for the international community. In any effort to mitigate this radicalism, the West should take a different approach to assessing Turkish politics. Regardless, the international implications of Erdogan’s regime and his determination to move away from Atatürk’s secular legacy through political Islam will likely be profound.

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The ramifications of Erdogan’s promotion of Islamist legislation have touched the daily lives of most Turkish citizens. Erdogan wants to see a “religious youth” emerge in Turkey, and has introduced controversial enactments to promote religious education. To this end, more than 60 religious schools were opened in the country in 2012. Erdogan also announced plans to build his own grand mosque above the Bosphorus, which he claims will be more prominent than Suleiman’s 16th century mosque. Citizens too have noticed a greater prevalence of headscarves, single-sex beaches, a louder call to prayer, and bans on alcohol. This shift toward Islam is also present in new conservative Turkish Airlines employee attire as well as the airline’s decision to stop selling alcohol on most flights.

While there has definitely been a resurgence of Islam in Turkey, the Western media has been misrepresenting the reasons behind this resurgence, therefore inaccurately critiquing Turkish society and politics. Journalists have unhesitatingly written off recent reforms as “simply about Erdogan’s personal biases.” Addressing the Turkish population, one New York Times contributor went as far as to chide, “The Turks must be taught that religious and legal duties are not one and the same thing, that the former are entirely a matter of conscience and that the Government is not obligated to enforce them.” However, Turkey’s move toward Islam has in fact less to do with religion than with the formation of a new Turkish cultural and political identity. Historian Haldun Gulalp argues that Islamic revival in Turkey is more complex than the West makes it out to be; the revival is a result of Turkey’s lower classes wanting to establish a cultural identity for the country that represents their values. By interviewing rural Turks he concludes that the actual role of Islam in the lives of most Turkish citizens has little to do with religious doctrines and religion itself. Rather, Gulalp believes that Islam in Turkey should not be viewed simply as a religion, but as a social identity representative of cultural and class values. Instead of a compendium of practices and principles, Islam to many is a “cultural code,” a way of life. In this way, Turks associate their values with Muslim values even if they do not derive them directly from the Quran.
The stories of a woman Gulalp interviewed provide an example of how Islam fits into lower-class Turkish culture. To preserve her anonymity, Gulalp refers to the woman as Aliye. Aliye grew up in a rural Anatolian village and later moved to Istanbul. She wears a headscarf as part of her social identity. Yet, while Aliye identifies as Muslim, she does not think of herself as particularly religious. Rather, she wears her headscarf as a symbol of her class. As it stands, religious attire, including the headscarf, is not acceptable among the upper classes in urban Istanbul as high-class, urban Turks are usually strict supporters of secularism. For example, universities attended by upper-class citizens enforce strict no-headscarf policies. Aliye does not interact with those of the upper class, nor does she go to places where those of higher classes spend time. She did not attend one of Istanbul’s universities because of her rural background. Therefore, Aliye wears her headscarf as a symbol of her class identity, emblematic of her pride as a middle-class woman from a rural area.

When asked to compare Erdogan to the former Muslim political leader, Necmettin Erbakan, Aliye once again revealed the importance she places on class unity. Though Erbakan was religious (the former PM was ultimately banned from politics by the constitutional court of Turkey for violating the separation of religion and state as mandated by the constitution), he was wealthy and lived extravagantly. In contrast, Erdogan came from humble beginnings in a poor Istanbul neighborhood as he was born to a low-income migrant family. He went to a religious school and graduated from the economics department of a second-tier university in Istanbul. Aliye says Erdogan was appealing because he was a “good Muslim,” not because he was religious, but because of his working-class background. In this sense, Aliye links Muslim identity to class identity, showing the push for Islam as connected to the support of the working class. However, Aliye stopped supporting Erdogan when he announced his decision to send his daughters to school in the United States. Aliye resented the decision not because of hostility toward the U.S. as Gulalp had originally postulated, but rather because she believed he was selling out the working class of Muslims. When Gulalp suggested Erdogan
might be sending his daughters to the United States so that they could wear the headscarf at school, Aliye denounced this as too individual a solution to a broader issue. The right thing to do, Aliye suggested, would be to put his daughter through the struggle of being a Muslim in a Turkish university just like all the other devout students in the country. Once again, Erdogan’s religious principles were less important than his cultural responsibility to the low to middle-class constituency.7

Gulalp also presents an idea shared by many Muslims that Islam is unique among religions in its inability to be discrete from cultural and political life. Expert Ernst Gellner furthers this, noting that religion in many places around the world is independent of other aspects of society, but Islam is different. Gellner sees Islam as a unique exception among world religions in its centrality to society. Unlike Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and others, Gellner too understands it as more of a way of life than a religion. He finds that, “Islam is unique among world religions, and Turkey is unique within the Muslim world. Turkey is the exception within the exception.” From this perspective, Turkish secularism is at odds with the Muslim majority. Therefore, the natural progression is toward the Islamization of culture and government.8

Conversely, Turkey’s secular forces have been perhaps the greatest source of authoritarian policy in the country, a contrast to what the long-established Western view of Islam as anti-democratic or “anti-the people” would suggest. Gulalp writes: “While in the normative model, secularization is supposed to be associated with enlightenment and freedom of thought, in Turkey it is imposed from above and protected in an authoritarian manner by state institutions, including the military.”9 In Turkey, the army is what protects Kemalism (Atatürk’s principles of secularization). As such, the army intervenes any time democratic elections result in Islamic victory.

Similarly, Gellner believes that a pitfall of the Western media portrayal of Islamic revival is its false assumption that, as Gulap writes, “political Islam is either a remnant of the backward-looking traditionalism of the country-side or an expression of the reaction
of the rural masses to the strain and stress of modernization that they face when they migrate to the big city. In this reasoning, given enough time to adjust, the traditionalists will surely come around and internalize the secular principles of Kemalism." His point here is that the Western media and historians view Muslims as people too uneducated or underdeveloped to see the superiority of Western ideals of secular society over Islam, when in fact, they are very aware of Western practices. It is their informed choice to value Islam as a fundamental part of Turkish culture and identity; many rural Muslims understand the assumption Westerners have that as one moves up in class, he or she leaves Islam and becomes Westernized. As a result, many Turks hold their Islamic identity with all the more pride.

In addition to being central to Turkey’s cultural identity, Islam is also a major part of the country’s political climate. Historian Merendes Cinar expresses a similar sentiment on Islam’s centrality to political life as Gulalp. He examines the history of Turkey in the years leading up to Erdogan’s first term as prime minister to explain how Islam is inherently connected with individual political affiliation in Turkey. In 1995, the country’s Islamist party, the Welfare Party, won its first general election in which Erbakan became prime minister. On February 28, 1997, Turkey’s military-dominated National Security Council (NSC) issued a set of decrees to Erbakan’s government aimed at halting Islamization and preserving the secularity of the state. These measures led to the collapse of the government in 1997 and a subsequent shift of power to the military. Immediately after this power shift, secularism was reinforced and Kemalism reintroduced in schools.

Cinar argues that the current Islamic revival is a reaction to 1997’s dramatic, non-democratic shift of power from the hands of the people to those of the military. Cinar is not pro-Islamic extremism; he believes in the separation of church and state. But from a democratic standpoint, Cinar notes the danger of what happened in 1997 as it set a precedent for military power. As a result of what happened in 1997, individual Turkish citizens associate Islam with personal freedom, the right of the people
to elect a leader, and resistance against military rule. Cinar also points out that many pro-secular Turks now believe that to secure a secular state, democratic freedoms may need to be suspended. This includes placing limitations on representative government and transferring power to the military. Cinar implores Erdogan’s critics to question the validity of condemning Islam in Turkey when the result is the suppression of popular opinion. Indeed, both Gulalp and Cinar note the danger of any party willing to sacrifice democracy. While the Western media views democracy and religion as diametrically opposed, Cinar’s point is that the two are not mutually exclusive. By criticizing Islam the Western media is indirectly encouraging the suspension of civil liberties and democratic practices. As such, the hypocrisy of this criticism is undoubtable.

In addition to defining individual political selfhood, Islam is also important to Turkey’s identity in international politics. This is evident through Turkey’s varying political affiliations with the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. The history and deterioration of Turkey’s relationship with the United States are crucial in explaining Turkey’s emergence as an Islamic nation. Turkey and the United States were allies since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after World War II. For many years, Turkey boasted the second largest army in NATO making it an important ally of the United States during the Cold War, thus solidifying close ties between the two countries. However, tensions threatened this alliance when the U.S. tried to involve Turkey in its War on Terror, a U.S. campaign against terrorism. Turkish support for the Iraq War (2003–2011) was important to the United States for two reasons. First, Turkey’s ideal geographic location held great appeal; the United States wanted to use Turkey’s shared border with Iraq to open a northern front during the War. Second, the U.S. wanted Turkey’s help in gaining political support; the U.S. needed a predominantly Muslim country to show that its War on Terror was not a war on Islam in order to avoid international censure. However, Turkey did not support the Iraq War. On March 1, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) rejected the United States’ request to open a northern
front against Iraq.14 Outraged, the United States excluded Turkey from all subsequent discussions about Iraq, creating animosity between the two countries. The day after TGNA’s decision, U.S. papers printed headlines such as, “Turkey Snubs U.S., Rejects Troops,” while the headline of the main Turkish newspaper read, “Victory for Democracy,” a testament to Turkish democratic principles.15

Turkey and the United States still maintain close ties, but the Iraq War led to widespread anti-U.S. sentiment. While Turkey did contribute troops to the War in Afghanistan (1999–present), the country had the second-lowest support for the U.S. War on Terrorism of all nations surveyed during the Bush administration years.16 Turkish citizens saw the Iraq War as an assault on the Muslim world, and pushed for Turkey to stand up to the United States as a Muslim nation. In fact, the rise of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) correlates directly to the decline in the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. In this way, the Islamic revival in Turkey is very much a reaction to the United States. Islam as an identity for Turkey in international politics was provoked more by the sentiment created by U.S. foreign policy than by a desire to overthrow the Turkish government by way of religious fundamentalism.

In addition to U.S. actions, Europe’s decision not to allow Turkey into the European Union (EU) has also lead to Islamic revival as an anti-Western political identity. For many years, Turkey expressed its desire to join the EU, and the U.S. always encouraged the European Union to accept Turkey as a member. This bid to join the EU is in reality Erdogan’s main justification for saying he is a “pro-Western” leader. Europe’s decision not to accept Turkey as a member (despite the country’s economic success over the past decade) pushed Turkey away from the West and toward the Middle East. While indeed the country’s market economy has the capacity to cope with competitive pressure within the EU, qualms remained regarding Turkey’s disputed claim to the island of Cyprus (namely its recognition of Greek Cyprus), the judicial system and rule of law as well as certain civil liberties including freedom of speech and assembly as well as media freedoms. Turkey, resent-
ing Europe for its decision, reacted by forming closer ties with its Muslim neighbors including United States enemies such as Iran and Syria. As one Turkish journalist writes, “The EU reforms have stopped, and the government’s Islamic reflexes are more obvious now, making the division even sharper.” While Turkey’s political alliances shift from the West to the Middle East, Islam becomes a larger part of its identity as it unifies the country with its conservative Muslim counterparts.

Turkey’s identity as a Muslim country has allowed it to play a major role in recent events in the Middle East. Erdogan’s policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, has brought the nation to the fore of the international stage. In a recent speech to the United Nations in Vienna, after declaring Islamophobia a crime against humanity, Erdogan compared Zionism to Fascism. In fact, Erdogan hails Hamas as a political party rather than a terrorist organization. The Arab Spring stands as another example of how international politics drew attention to Turkey’s identity as a Muslim nation. Erdogan initially took credit for this series of popular uprisings as an exemplar and guide. Muslim Turkey’s secular democracy was upheld as a model, and Erdogan was hailed as a hero while touring Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. Faced with the current situation in Syria, however, Erdogan has not been nearly as successful in promoting the Turkish model of democracy and Islam; Bashar al-Assad rejected Erdogan’s proposals to introduce any democratic reform in the place of repression. Looking more closely at Erdogan’s support, it is important to make the distinction between popular espousal of his Islamic policies and his authoritarian policies. Recently, his popularity has waned slightly. In the 2011 Prime Ministerial election, Erdogan won by a much smaller margin than in his previous victories. This decline in support stems largely from his proposed constitutional amendment that would strengthen his executive mandate at the expense of judicial power and oversight. The reform, which has not garnered enough support to pass, would allow Erdogan to run for a fourth term in office, something not allowed under the current constitution. Many Turks see this proposed reform as a constitutional coup. Journalist and writer Cengiz Aktar says, “The AKP is not a
party any more. It is Erdogan’s apparatus.” Further still, Milliyet columnist and media activist Kadri Gursel believes, “We are witnessing the creation of a cult of personality.” Erdogan’s censorship of the media has also raised red flags. Turkey now has one of the highest percentages of journalists jailed for speaking against the government in the world. Ercan Ipekci, president of the Turkish Journalist Union, calls journalists who are fired “the luckier ones” in light of how many are imprisoned. Ankara’s response to the May 2013 protests against development projects in Gezi Park, one of Istanbul’s last green spaces again raises questions about Erdogan’s policies. The deadly force with which the protests were met—Turkish riot police killed three and injured at least 4,947 by aiming water cannons and tear gas at protesters—inspired consternation worldwide. Yet, Erdogan’s failure to garner support for new authoritarian legislation demonstrates the Turkish people’s commitment to a democratic national vision in tandem with their Islamic inclinations. In contrast to the image the West promotes of Turks blindly following Erdogan to an oppressive Islamic state, Turkish citizens are very aware of the dangers of authoritarianism and have continued to show support for democracy by standing against Erdogan’s recent proposals.

Instead of condemning Islam without understanding what it symbolizes, Western nations like the United States should focus on promoting what the Turkish people believe Islam represents: equal opportunity, economic development, and an uncorrupt government. Such nations must accept responsibility for Turkey’s Islamic identity after the Iraq War and the rejection of its European Union membership. The media’s portrayal of Turkey is an important example of the West’s priority of criticizing its enemies over promoting freedom and democracy. Considering the media’s misrepresentation of Turkey, it is likely that much of what the media says about Islam and religious extremism is misguided. The reality is that Islam represents for many Muslims the very principles of freedom and equality the West upholds as central tenets of its society.
Notes

1 “Turkey and Islam: Dress tests” The Economist (no date, no page)
2 Ibid.
3 Kiper, The Atlantic (June 5, 2013) (no page)
4 Morris, The New York Times (June 6, 2013) (no page)
6 Ibid., p. 386
7 Ibid., pp. 388–400
8 Ibid., p. 400
9 Ibid., p. 394
10 Ibid., p. 401
12 Ibid., pp. 326–328
14 Ibid., p. 94
15 Ibid., p. 99
16 Ibid., p. 100
17 Ibid., p. 102
19 “Turkey’s Erdogan Defends Premiership, Moves on Israel, Arab World,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, (November 19 2005)
20 Tisdall, The Guardian (October 24, 25, 2012) (no page)
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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“Muslim Light: What’s Behind Turkey’s Islamization and the Protests Against It,” The Atlantic Web, 5 June 2013.

Kinzer, Stephen, “Triumphant Turkey? The New York Review of Books” (no date)


“Turkey and Islam: Dress tests,” The Economist

“Turkey’s Erdogan Defends Premiership, Moves on Israel, Arab World,” 2005, BBC Monitoring Middle East November 19, 2015
Much larger was the Crusade of Nicopolis. In 1395, King Sigismund of Hungary (1387-1437) sent a desperate plea for assistance to the French court. Charles responded enthusiastically with money and men, and he urged his subjects to contribute their time and money to the cause. Both Popes endorsed the proposed crusade and issued indulgences for whichever troops recognized them. Many Burgundian and German barons also joined the expedition. The troops rendezvoused in 1396 at Buda, where they were joined by Sigismund and his armies. It was an impressive force, one of the largest crusades ever assembled.

In a council of war, the King of Hungary argued for a cautious advance into Turkish territory, but the knights, eager to cover themselves with glory, would not hear of it. They wanted to follow the example of the First Crusade, fighting the infidel directly and winning conquests all the way to Jerusalem. The crusaders crossed the Danube into Bulgaria, where they took a few small towns. Next they laid siege to Nicopolis, a well-fortified town overlooking the Danube. Sultan Bayazid I (1389-1402) was prosecuting his own siege at Constantinople when he heard of Nicopolis’s distress. At once, he marched his forces to meet the crusaders. The two sides had armies of equal size but unequal quality. Unlike the Christians, Bayazid’s men were well-disciplined and under a unified command. The sultan took up a position on a hill and waited. Sigismund again counseled caution, but the French and Burgundian knights insisted on an immediate attack. They also demanded the honor of leading the assault.

The thunder of the Frankish charge echoed in the valley outside Nicopolis as the brightly-adorned knights galloped toward the Turkish lines. Quickly and decisively, they defeated the Turkish light cavalry. Beyond was a forest of wooden stakes driven into the soil to break up a charge. When the knights dismounted and began removing the stakes, archers approached and showered arrows down on them. The Franks fell ferociously on the archers, who ran up the hill to safety. On foot, the knights pursued them. As they crested the hill, they found an unexpected sight. Waiting for them was the sultan himself with his elite Turkish cavalry and Serbian army. The flower of chivalry turned tail and ran back down the hill, but it was too late. The Turks advanced in good order, crushing the crusading army. The defeat was total. Most of the crusaders were captured or killed; a few escaped into the woods. Those barons who could arrange ransoms were allowed to go free. The rest, about three thousand in all, were stripped naked, tied together with ropes, and led before Bayazid, where they were decapitated.

The destruction of the Crusade of Nicopolis was a devastating defeat for western Europe. Hungary lay virtually defenseless before the sultan’s armies, and beyond that was the German Empire. For the first time, Europeans began to consider seriously what life would be like under Turkish occupation, in a world in which there were no Christian states. Prophecies circulated that all of Europe would be conquered by the Turks before a great warrior would rise up to defeat them. Yet it was not a savior at home that spared Europe, but someone altogether different.

_A Concise History of the Crusades_, John F. Madden
New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999, pp. 196-197
INSPRICATION OR SUBJUGATION?: IN WHAT WAYS DID
SOVIET POLITICAL PRESSURES INFLUENCE COMPOSER
DMITRI SHOSTAKOVICH AND HIS MUSIC?

Marie Tashima

Abstract

Dmitri Shostakovich was a renowned 20th-century Soviet composer; however, the validity of his compositions has been questioned due to the nature of the repressive environment he lived in. Thus, this essay will attempt to address the issue of the extent to which Soviet political pressures influenced composer Dmitri Shostakovich and his music.

To answer this question, the impacts on Shostakovich were divided into two categories: effects on his tendency to anxiety neurosis and effects on his willingness to conform. Within each of these categories, specific effects on Shostakovich’s mental health and on his music were addressed. The majority of sources for this essay were print articles and books discussing Shostakovich, the Soviet Union, and music. Transcripts of speeches given by Shostakovich and decrees passed in the Soviet Union were also consulted during the writing of this essay. The sources used concern Shostakovich’s life from the mid-1930s to the late-1960s.

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this period was focused on because of the strong Soviet presence in Shostakovich’s public and private lives.

The investigation concluded that Soviet political pressures had significant impacts on Shostakovich both as a person and as a composer. Shostakovich was terrified by life within the Soviet Union and consequently displayed eccentric behavior. His music reflected his fear with various stylistic elements and a self-referencing theme. Furthermore, Shostakovich eventually bent to the USSR’s will and conformed. He acted as a puppet, doing what the state wanted him to do and composing music the state wanted to hear.

Introduction

Dmitri Shostakovich was a celebrated, 20th-century Soviet composer. He began composing music in 1918, but he first came into the international spotlight in 1934 with his opera Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District.¹ Shostakovich’s success continued through World War II with his “War Symphony,” viewed by the Allies as a beacon of hope.²

As a Soviet citizen, Shostakovich lived in a climate of fear. In the late 1930s, Stalin implemented the Great Purge.³ During this time, people who were considered enemies of the state were imprisoned, taken to concentration camps, or killed. Between 950,000 and 1.2 million people were killed.⁴ Victims were not limited to a single group, meaning anyone could be a target. The seemingly random purging helped create an atmosphere of fear within the Soviet Union. Citizens, including Shostakovich, quickly learned conformity was the key to survival.

Even though the West viewed Shostakovich as the poster boy of the USSR, he actually treaded a thin line with his music. In Stalin’s cult of personality, artists were expected to create works that aligned with the ideologies of the Party.⁵ Music was supposed to be without dissonance, predictable, and accessible to the people.⁶ Artists who did not conform to these rules could have their works blacklisted, their means of survival taken away, or be sent to the camps.
The Soviet Union denounced Shostakovich twice in his lifetime. The first denunciation came in 1936 with the article “Muddle Instead of Music” in the newspaper Pravda. This article, supposedly written by Stalin, criticized Shostakovich’s opera Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District and labeled Shostakovich as a formalist, a serious charge.\(^7\) Formalism, snidely defined by Prokofiev as music that cannot be understood the first time, was an umbrella term used to describe any music deemed threatening by the State.\(^8\) The article stated Shostakovich’s situation “could end very badly” if measures were not taken to curtail his formalism.\(^9\) A second editorial attack came 10 days later when Shostakovich’s ballet The Limpid Stream was criticized.\(^10\) These two articles suggested Shostakovich mend his ways and reform his music to support the regime.\(^11\)

Shostakovich’s second denunciation came in the year 1948 during the Zhdanovschina.\(^12\) Party Leader A.A. Zhdanov passed a decree on February 10 declaring that composers such as Shostakovich, Khachaturian, and Prokofiev would be censored due to the formalist qualities present in their music.\(^13\) Shostakovich lost his leadership position in the Composer’s Union and had his music blacklisted because of this.\(^14\)

While there is no doubt Shostakovich suffered under the Soviet regime, his attitude towards the state and the extent to which he was affected by his surroundings are the source of much speculation amongst historians. One group, notably led by Solomon Volkov, argues that Shostakovich despised the Soviet Union and protested by creating music that broadcast feelings of despair and misery.\(^15\) The other group insists that, though he did not agree with all Soviet policies, Shostakovich was a loyal Communist and that his music was not influenced significantly by the political climate of the Soviet Union.\(^16\)

One of the main sources of conflict in the study of Shostakovich concerns the validity of Testimony, Shostakovich’s alleged memoirs. In 1979, four years after Shostakovich’s death, Solomon Volkov published the book.\(^17\) Volkov allegedly collected the material for the book through several lengthy interviews with Shostakovich.\(^18\) Before its publication, it had been widely accepted across the world
that Shostakovich was a loyal Soviet citizen.\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Testimony} repudiated this idea with its criticisms of Stalin, Zhdanov, and socialist realism; since its publication, \textit{Testimony} has supported the argument that Shostakovich despised the state of affairs within the Soviet Union. However, the authenticity of the book has frequently been challenged. Volkov has not allowed historians to view his original manuscript; consequently scholars are unsure of how much of \textit{Testimony} was actually written by Shostakovich.\textsuperscript{20} Historians like Geoffrey Norris and Levon Hakobian reject \textit{Testimony}; however, due to the fact that both Shostakovich’s wife and son endorsed the memoirs, this essay will consider its arguments as valid.\textsuperscript{21}

This essay will examine the evidence and assess which argument provides the most definitive conclusion to the question of how Dmitri Shostakovich and his music were impacted by political pressures in the Soviet Union.

Shostakovich’s “Neurosis”

Dmitri Shostakovich was denounced by the Soviet Union twice for creating formalist music. This, along with the mass purges taking place, took their toll on Shostakovich’s mental health. Shostakovich demonstrated neurotic behavior, suicidal thoughts, and an identity crisis through his actions and through his music.

Following his first denunciation, Shostakovich started displaying phobic tendencies due to his “state of abject fear.”\textsuperscript{22} When recounting the events of 1936 in his memoirs, Shostakovich said he felt “everyone knew for sure [he] would be destroyed.”\textsuperscript{23} Shostakovich’s terror was not entirely irrational. The government took away many people close to Shostakovich; Shostakovich’s brother-in-law, sister, and uncle were imprisoned during the Great Purge.\textsuperscript{24} Many of Shostakovich’s friends—including theater director Meyerhold and Marshall Tuchachevsky, the poster boy for Soviet strength—were killed by Stalin’s regime.\textsuperscript{25} Besides the foreboding of destruction, Shostakovich also started feeling a deep sense of paranoia. He reported feeling that “everyone [was] staring at [him]…, whispering and watching [him] behind [his] back.”\textsuperscript{26}
Shostakovich’s terror not only presented itself through his words but also through his actions, particularly during times of great duress. Following the publication of “Muddle Instead of Music,” Shostakovich asked his friend Isaak Glikman to subscribe to a newspaper clipping service.27 Shostakovich would then scour the papers for his own name, trying to figure out the public’s opinion of him and thus discern his fate.28 While this search had the potential to bear fruit, it was obsessive in nature. Considering the context of Shostakovich’s neurotic behavior, it follows that the hostile actions of the Soviet regime brought Shostakovich’s fear to the foreground.

The fear that arose from the public scrutiny after his 1936 denunciation, and the death of his friend Tuchachevsky, led Shostakovich to become extremely apprehensive. The powerful Marshall Tuchachevsky was a close friend of Shostakovich.29 The NKVD30 executed Tuchachevsky in 1937 based on a confession extracted using torture.31 Tuchachevsky’s death was significant to Shostakovich because it meant no one was safe from Stalin. Shostakovich stated that when he learned about Tuchachevsky’s death, he blacked out.32 The danger of being in the Soviet Union “horrified” Shostakovich and he saw “no other way out” but to commit suicide.33 Shostakovich naturally feared what he might suffer if he got on the wrong side of Stalin and consequently believed taking his own life might be preferable to continuing his life in fear. Shostakovich had reason to fear; as a result of his friendship with Tuchachevsky he was called in for questioning by the NKVD.34 Shostakovich’s genuine fear of being harmed by the regime also drove him to paranoia. His family reported that during the worst periods of the Purge, Shostakovich sat in the hallway of his apartment with a small suitcase packed.35 Shostakovich sincerely was afraid the police would come for him and so he would stay up every night listening for them.36 The pervasive atmosphere of fear in the Soviet Union seeped into Shostakovich’s existence and manifested itself in his thoughts and actions.

Shostakovich’s manner of communicating changed as a response to Stalin’s regime. Shostakovich became fluent in double-
speak, meaning his speech was deliberately ambiguous. Friends of Shostakovich learned that if he repeated himself, he meant the opposite of what he was saying. For example, when Shostakovich wrote, “Everything is so fine, so perfectly excellent, that I can find almost nothing to write about,” he actually meant things were too awful to write about. Shostakovich’s friends reported that the purpose of his strange way of communicating was to keep NKVD officials monitoring his letters from detecting his discontent. It follows that Shostakovich changed even the way he spoke with friends in response to his deep-seated fear of Soviet suppression.

One of the most apparent effects Stalin’s cult of personality had on Shostakovich was his “dissociation of identity,” demonstrated through the self-referencing DSCH motif. Using German musical notation Shostakovich was able to spell his name with the notes D-S-C-H. Shostakovich first used the motif in 1948, following his second denunciation, in his Violin Concerto No. 1. This motif, described by Christopher Norris as a sign of Shostakovich’s “protective introvert withdrawal,” presented itself more prominently in Shostakovich’s music during times of distress. For example, in 1960 Shostakovich was pressured into becoming the General Secretary of the Composers’ Union. This position required that Shostakovich be a member of the Communist Party. Shostakovich joined the Party but later told his children he had been physically threatened and forced to join. This event—which, according to Shostakovich’s son Maxim, left Shostakovich in tears—was followed by the composition of the Eighth Quartet. The piece is dominated by the DSCH theme. The significance of this omnipresent theme is amplified by the fact Shostakovich described the quartet as a memorial to himself. Though it is unclear whether Shostakovich was being sincere or sarcastic when he called it a memorial in a letter to his friend Isaac Glikman, the music confirms the validity of the statement. The overbearing presence of the DSCH theme supports the idea of the quartet being a memorial. This theme suggests that Shostakovich felt he was losing himself to the Party and thus wrote his name repeatedly into his music in an attempt to “conjur[e] up an identity” to fill the void in him.
Besides the DSCH motif, Shostakovich’s emotions seeped into his music through his musical style. A composer’s style is like a writer’s voice, making itself apparent through every note. In order to avoid punishment, Shostakovich hid his musical style to make his music align more with the ideals of the regime. Shostakovich was originally receptive to Western modernist influences, composing creative pieces like the Fourth Symphony before his first denunciation; however Stalin’s government denounced modern music, considering it ideologically insensitive. Consequently, Shostakovich’s musical language became conservative and over-simplified, as seen in the Fifth Symphony, Shostakovich’s first major composition after his 1936 denunciation. He made its emotional content more simplified, making it easier to understand and thus satisfying the Soviet Union’s criteria for ideologically sound music. Shostakovich recognized his change in musical style and complained to a close friend, saying “without Party guidance” he would have “displayed more brilliance” and “revealed [his] ideas openly instead of having to resort to camouflage.” This camouflage manifested itself through the frequent changes of Shostakovich’s musical style in an attempt to find an acceptable public language. Despite the many changes in musical language, there is one constant throughout his music: an edgy, tense tone. This fear permeates the music in the form of disruptive effects and ostinato all of which lend Shostakovich’s music a nervous quality. While Shostakovich had always been described as nervous, this notably increased following his denunciations.

From Shostakovich’s first denunciation in 1936 to his death in 1975, it can be seen that the stress from living under a controlling regime had an impact on him. Life in the Soviet Union affected Shostakovich the man by causing suicidal and paranoid thoughts, while Shostakovich the composer was affected and consequently hid his true musical style and developed a distinct nervous feature.

Shostakovich’s Conformity

During Stalin’s regime, Soviet citizens learned that conformity might lead to survival. Shostakovich understood this concept
and thus conceded to Party views when it came to his actions and his music in order to survive.

Before Shostakovich was denounced, he showed a willingness to criticize the state. In 1931, Shostakovich published the “Declaration of a Composer’s Duties,” which stated that Soviet demands on composers were having a “ruinous effect” on the quality of music produced. However, once he faced danger with the denunciations, he stopped dissenting publicly. For example, with the Zhdanovoschina in 1948, Shostakovich was accused of formalism and had restrictions placed upon him, such as his forced resignation from the Moscow Conservatory. Despite the criticisms of his music, Shostakovich did not defend himself. In fact, he even gave a speech saying there were “many serious faults and failures” within his work. Musicologist Alex Ross argued that Shostakovich acted this way because “the situation…stirred memories of the late thirties, when so many people near him disappeared.”

Another incident of conformity came in 1949 when Stalin asked Shostakovich to represent the USSR at the Cultural and Scientific Congress for World Peace in New York. Shostakovich initially did not want to go, claiming to be ill. However, Stalin personally called Shostakovich, asking him to go. Stalin was insistent because he hoped Shostakovich’s presence at the Congress would demonstrate that the USSR was culturally sophisticated. After this encounter with Stalin, Shostakovich agreed to go. As a result, Stalin took Shostakovich’s music off a black list. Shostakovich reluctantly went to the United States, later stating he “felt like a dead man” during the trip, saying he felt “condemned” because of fear of endangering himself by displeasing Stalin.

Besides his conformity through actions, Shostakovich also conformed in terms of his music. When Shostakovich was denounced in 1936, his opera Lady Macbeth was criticized. Along with many other artists of that time, Shostakovich realized that works that were widely broadcasted were heard by many critics and citizens and thus were more susceptible to government censorship. Private music, or chamber music, was written for smaller groups of musicians and was generally not heard by the populace.
Consequently, Shostakovich switched to private music to avoid public attention. In 1938, after his denunciation, Shostakovich wrote the first of his string quartets. Over the years, he would compose many chamber pieces. Shostakovich used chamber pieces as outlets for emotion because private compositions were subject to less criticism and because the ideological demands for private compositions were less strict than those for public symphonies. In his chamber music, Shostakovich was able to display his musical ability without having to contort it to fit the regime’s tastes.

Following his first denunciation, Shostakovich composed many film scores. It was common knowledge in the USSR that Stalin loved films and so Shostakovich believed that by composing good scores he would be able to win back Stalin’s favor. Shostakovich’s film music was made for ideological purposes to portray the battle between the Soviets and their enemies. For example, the films *The Golden Mountains* and *The Counterplan* both depicted the flaws of capitalism and both had scores written by Shostakovich. Thus, by being associated with these Soviet works, Shostakovich would improve his image in the eyes of the regime. Another benefit of film music was that Shostakovich was also exposed to less danger. Any faults with the film would be taken out on the director or screenwriter, not on Shostakovich. Thus, with his film music, Shostakovich found a safe way to earn money for his family while also gaining Stalin’s favor.

Throughout the periods of Soviet disapproval, Shostakovich hid music he thought would be considered ideologically unsound. These pieces were kept “in the drawer,” away from public ears. For example, in 1938, Shostakovich withdrew his *Fourth Symphony* after fears of potential consequences. The symphony was radical in that it did not follow traditional symphonic structure, which meant it could be branded as formalist. Following several rehearsals, Shostakovich decided to withhold performance. Another example of a hidden work was Shostakovich’s song cycle *From Jewish Folk Poetry*. Shostakovich decided not to make the cycle public when he finished it in 1948 because the Soviet Union had switched positions from its support of Israel and instead embarked
on an anti-Semitic campaign. Following Stalin’s death in 1953, Shostakovich premiered many of his “desk drawer” pieces. The aforementioned song cycle From Jewish Folk Poetry premiered in 1955; Shostakovich’s Violin Concerto No. 1, written in 1948, premiered in 1955; and Shostakovich’s Fourth Symphony eventually premiered in 1962, 24 years after its composition.

Following his second denunciation in 1948, Shostakovich composed the “Anti-Formalist Rayok.” For this libretto, or the text of the piece, Shostakovich used transcripts of speeches given by Zhdanov, the Party Leader responsible for Shostakovich’s second denunciation. Though the composition of this piece suggests that Shostakovich was not passively accepting his fate, it should be noted that the piece was not premiered until 1989, 14 years after Shostakovich’s death. This piece demonstrates that Shostakovich was able to use his sharp wit and sarcasm to poke fun at his situation, but he was sober enough to recognize that such a piece would have harsh consequences for him.

Another way Shostakovich conformed to the Soviet regime was by changing his attitude towards composers according to Soviet policies. Shostakovich was originally influenced by composers Stravinsky, Hindemith, and Milhaud. Stravinsky was particularly unpopular in the USSR because he had defected to the United States. Hatred of Stravinsky was so strong that the Soviet Union placed a ban on his music in 1949. When Shostakovich went to the United States in 1949, reporter Nicolas Nabokov asked Shostakovich whether he approved of the ban, knowing that Shostakovich adored Stravinsky. Shostakovich replied in the affirmative, an answer which Nabokov used to argue that Shostakovich was Stalin’s puppet. After losing his original musical influences, Shostakovich turned to Mussorgsky for a muse. Mussorgsky was well-liked in the Soviet Union for his Russian nationalist roots, so Shostakovich was not reprimanded.

Perhaps the most obvious sign of Shostakovich’s conformity was his composition of music specifically to satiate the Party’s ideological demands. Shostakovich wrote pieces of music praising the regime or Soviet icons to gain approval and remain safe. During
World War II, Shostakovich wrote his “War Symphony” to support the Allied fight. This symphony became known as a beacon of hope within the Allied nations. After 1948, Shostakovich’s output divided into official and non-official music. Music that was official and was meant to satisfy the Party included *Song of the Forests* and *The Sun Shines over our Motherland*. The piece *Song of the Forests* was written in 1949 and was meant to support Stalin’s reforestation programs. One of Shostakovich’s students reported that after its premiere, Shostakovich collapsed on a bed and cried because he felt he had been forced to write the piece. The musical style was overly simplistic to satisfy Soviet officials and Shostakovich did not consider it a good piece of music. Shostakovich had to compromise his musical integrity in order to remain safe within Stalin’s regime.

However, following Stalin’s death in 1953, Shostakovich started to break out of his role as a puppet with a new willingness to speak out against the regime. In January 1954, Shostakovich publicly criticized the Soviet practice of forcing art into a single fixed pattern; he argued that artistic creativity should be supported at all times and that the current system was supporting “superficiality, dullness, and stereotyped work” when it should be supporting “bold creative originality.” In fact, in 1973 Shostakovich went so far as to write an article saying “the composer is justified in using any musical means if it is required by his creative plan,” a complete turnaround from his behavior during Stalin’s rule. His fear for his safety had led him to do whatever the USSR wanted, whether it was taking a journey to the United States or composing a song praising Stalin.

Conclusion

Without a doubt, Dmitri Shostakovich suffered in the Soviet Union. He lost close friends and family members, faced harsh criticism about ideology, and did things he did not want to do. The fact that there was an impact on Shostakovich the composer is widely accepted. The main disagreement is over the extent to which Shostakovich’s music was influenced.
After assessing the various arguments about Shostakovich’s music, it is apparent his music was influenced by the fear he felt as a Soviet citizen. His musical style became conservative during times of scrutiny; he developed a despairing musical ornamentation to reestablish his identity; and he hid some of his compositions in order to remain safe. One of the main arguments against this interpretation is if his memoirs, Testimony, were false. However, since a variety of sources other than Testimony support this interpretation, it remains valid.

One question that remains after this investigation concerns Shostakovich’s true feelings about the Soviet Union. Testimony, Shostakovich’s supposed memoirs, gives the simple answer that Shostakovich despised the Soviet Union. While this answer is certainly convenient, the circumstances surrounding the creation of Testimony make it difficult to accept Testimony’s claims. Understanding Shostakovich’s true views on his circumstances would not only allow for greater appreciation of Shostakovich’s music but would also lead to a greater understanding of the growth of culture in a totalitarian, repressive society.

This investigation sought to discover the ways in which Soviet political pressures influenced composer Dmitri Shostakovich and his music and reached the conclusion that Soviet political pressures did indeed influence Shostakovich and his music by making him more afraid and more conforming. Despite this, it is worth noting that though he was tormented by psychological and political pressures, Shostakovich is still recognized as a great composer. Shostakovich’s ability to withstand these pressures and create beautiful, haunting music makes him one of the greatest creative minds of the 20th century.
Notes


2 Symphony No. 7 (1942)


7 Ibid.


11 Mulcahy, p. 6

12 Or “Purge of Zhdanov”

13 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Zhdanov Doctrine by Andrei Zhdanov (1948) print


17 Geoffrey Norris, p. 241

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Edward Gibbon is, in an important respect, the first modern European historian. That is, he is the first historian of the past whose work is still read not merely for pleasure but for instruction. The first volume of his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* appeared in 1776, the last in 1788. It was challenged at the time and has always aroused opposition in some quarters; but no criticism has been able to sink it. Its intellectual content remains valid today, and any discussion of the course and causes of the decline of Rome is still dominated by it. Of no other historian writing before 1830 can this be said. Both as an historical scholar in his mastery and judgment and uses of the evidence, and as an historical interpreter in his examination of causes and effects, Gibbon is still unique in his time.

Of course there are earlier historians whom we still read and enjoy—Froissart, Commines, Clarendon, St Simon. But these were chroniclers of their own time, and their value lies largely in the fact that they were contemporary with the events they chronicled. They were irreplaceable eye- or ear-witnesses. But Gibbon did not write contemporary history. The durability of his work owes nothing to the advantage, or accident, of direct observation. In looking back on the Roman Empire he enjoyed no technical or adventitious advantage over us. Indeed, we may say, he enjoyed less than we do, for the intervening two centuries have vastly increased the evidence for such study. Nevertheless, this increase of evidence has not driven Gibbon, as it has driven every other eighteenth-century historian, out of the field. He remains modern, surprisingly modern. Later commentators may supplement or modify the detail of his work, but they very seldom detect an error. They cannot improve on the style, and they generally endorse the judgment.

Gibbon’s whole life was, effectively, devoted to this work, and it supplies the unity of his life. His first and last ambition, as he himself tells us, was to be an historian. His earlier writings, in themselves unimportant, interest us solely as evidence of the formation of his historical philosophy. Inspired by that philosophy, he set out consciously to solve the great historical problem of his time. Having offered his solution, he never contemplated another major work. His memoirs, left unfinished at his death, are a strictly intellectual autobiography: the biography not, except incidentally, of Edward Gibbon, but of the author of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. 

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Edward Gibbon [1737-1794]
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Volume One
New York: Everyman’s Library
Introduction by Hugh Trevor-Roper (excerpt) pp. liii -liv
Sarah Kang

The Ukraine presidential election in the fall of 2004 marked one of the pivotal moments in modern Ukrainian history. Viktor Yanukovych was publicly supported both by the incumbent, President Leonid Kuchma, and by Russian President Vladimir Putin. His opponent was Viktor Yushchenko, who had the support of an opposition coalition, as well as the U.S. and Western European powers. At stake were numerous issues of international concern: the political stability of Eastern Europe, the resurgence of Russian hegemony, democratization of nearby countries suffering from dictatorship or authoritarian rule, and energy flows into the European Union’s households and infrastructure, among others. For Ukraine, the outcome of this historic election would decide whether it would venture into genuine reform and open democracy, or return to its authoritarian and corrupt past.

To all appearances, the odds seemed to favor Yanukovych. Prior to the election, Yanukovych deployed various state resources, the national media, and private funding from both Ukrainians and Russians in an effort to defeat the opposition candidate Yushchenko.\(^1\) Completely outmatched politically and financially,
Yushchenko was banned from national television and ended up running a campaign based on grassroots meetings. In contrast to Yushchenko, who supported pro-Western politics, Kuchma and Yanukovych welcomed extended Ukrainian-Russian ties. Russia, with its vast resources for exerting influence, showered funding onto its favorite. Putin’s “political technologists” gave tactical advice to both Kuchma and Yanukovych, and helped write the illegal censorship directives for the Ukrainian media. Russian television campaigned on behalf of Yanukovych, and Putin himself visited Ukraine twice during the campaign to express his support. Some even speculate that Russians were involved in the dioxin assassination attempts against Yushchenko.

Despite efforts to thwart the Yushchenko campaign, Yanukovych did not win enough votes for victory in the election’s first round, and therefore the drama continued. In the second round, Kuchma’s government tried to steal the win by clumsily adding votes to Yanukovych’s tally on November 21. In response to the blatant fraud, Yushchenko called on his supporters to come to Independence Square in Kiev and protest the stolen election. Such was the beginning of the “Orange Revolution,” as it has come to be known. One in five Ukrainians—including 48 percent of the population of Kiev—participated in protests against Kuchma and Yanukovych. They remained in the square until December 3, when the Supreme Court annulled the second-round results and declared the round to be re-run on December 26.

The subsequent repeat election was perhaps one of the rare cases of truly democratic exercise in the history of the former Soviet Republics, and avoided the carefully state-managed tactics of the past. Yushchenko won 52 percent of the vote, compared with 44 percent for Yanukovych. Yushchenko’s victory marked the first time a non-communist President replaced an ex-communist leader since Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. In the aftermath of the elections, notable changes arrived in Ukraine. For instance, the presidential election of 2004, and also the parliamentary elections of 2006, saw a marked deviation from single-party dominance and encouraged pluralism and
compromise. Yet for all the optimism and populist rhetoric that surrounded the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s progress towards a stable democracy and a prosperous market economy continued to be slow.

While there are numerous reasons for the failure of the Orange Revolution to bring about the reforms sought by the people, by far the most important factor was Russia’s incessant interference with Ukrainian politics. Persistent cronyism, inefficient bureaucrats, and political infighting all conspired to stall Ukraine’s progress to varying degrees. Meanwhile, the international community, including the European Union and the United States, did not act strongly to support Ukraine’s affairs—partly out of self-interest and partly out of fear of upsetting Russia, a crucial economic partner and formidable political and military foe. However, it was Russia, with which Ukraine has had “fraternal relations” for an extended period of time, which most stood in the way of Ukraine’s move towards greater economic strength and sustained democratic rule. The extent to which Russia hampered Ukraine’s development can be observed in its energy politics with respect to Ukraine, a process that dramatizes the power of natural gas to affect world affairs.

Background of Natural Gas Politics

Ukraine has been a key player in the Soviet gas industry since the middle of the 20th century. In the 1950s, natural gas fields in western Ukraine were home to the USSR’s most important production plants, accounting for nearly half of the total Soviet output. Ukraine occupied a leading position in Soviet gas production during the 1960s—before its gas production declined continuously until the late 1990s. Meanwhile, Ukraine became increasingly dependent on gas imports from the former Soviet republics of western Siberia and Turkmenistan regions. The IEA has calculated that Ukraine’s dependence on gas imports increased from 56 percent in 1985 to 81 percent in 1992, just as it was breaking loose politically from the former Soviet Union.
The importance of natural gas to Ukraine’s domestic governance and foreign relations has become more evident in the years since independence. In the 1990s, cheap gas was used to sustain the perilously weak state in Ukraine in the face of potential social upheavals and a widely perceived threat of complete collapse. While oil import prices to Ukraine reached world market levels in 1993, Ukrainian gas import prices from Russia were set in bilateral negotiations below European levels. Unfortunately, the heavy reliance of Ukraine on gas imports meant that it soon racked up massive debts to Russia. In 1991–1994 alone, Ukraine accumulated debts to Russia for natural gas deliveries totaling $4–4.5 billion.

Ukraine’s apparently chronic debt to Russia in the area of natural gas has been a source of persistent conflict with the neighboring superpower. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, during disputes about debts and non-payment for gas imports, Russia suspended supplies of natural gas to Ukraine. It was the first of many times Russia would resort to such a scare tactic. In response, Ukraine would resort to an equally unfortunate tactic: illegal diversion of gas from transit pipelines operated by Ukrainian companies. Ukraine acknowledged such diversions on some occasions; however, in other cases, it would dispute the violations of contracts. This, again, is a pattern that has not completely disappeared over the years.

Russia made even more aggressive moves, in effect wielding its natural gas reserves as a political tool. In September 1993, for instance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin offered to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk cancellation of debt in return for control of the Black Sea fleet and Ukraine’s nuclear warheads. In early 1995, a Russian government delegation agreed with the Ukrainian government to form a new Russo-Ukrainian company—one where transit assets would be concentrated—in exchange for the write-off of much of Ukraine’s debts to Russia. Not surprisingly, all such moves were eventually rejected by Ukraine’s parliament.

Despite the questionable tactics used by both sides, there were times when gas relations between Russia and Ukraine seemed to be on the verge of resolution. In 2001, then Deputy Prime
Minister of Ukraine, Oleg Dubina, acknowledged that 8.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas had been siphoned off from export pipelines in 2000 alone.\textsuperscript{20} In October of that year, the two sides signed an intergovernmental agreement aimed at regularizing import and transit arrangements.\textsuperscript{21} This was even followed in 2002 by the creation of an international consortium to oversee the Ukrainian pipeline system.\textsuperscript{22} Yet it was not long before all of such arrangements were—once again—ignored or broken by the two nations when political or economic circumstances seemed to demand it.

On the domestic front, change in Ukraine’s gas sector came slowly, if at all. Gas reform efforts at the government level, for instance, were concentrated for a long time on centralizing assets in Naftogaz Ukrainy, the state-owned oil and gas company. A significant proportion of transactions were processed by a barter system that allowed many opportunities for corruption. This, along with the publication of circumstantial evidence that Naftogaz’s chairman from 1998 to 2000 (a close associate of Kuchma’s) had operated a multi-million dollar slush fund for Kuchma, added to the widespread resentment of Kuchma.\textsuperscript{23} This was yet another, potent layer to natural gas politics in the region—one that helped to usher in the Orange Revolution of 2004.

The Putin Factor

When Russian President Putin came to power in 2000, he was determined to restore Russia’s position on the world stage and, accordingly, pursued a strong state policy. In key sectors of the economy, including energy, this resulted in state intervention and an expansion of state ownership (driven by Putin), aimed initially at tilting the balance of power away from the oligarchs and other private interests that had gained so much strength during the Yeltsin period.\textsuperscript{24}

Putin also understood that control of Ukraine was crucial to the recovery of Russia’s power and influence. Ukraine’s population—about one-third that of Russia’s—made it one of the largest of the former Soviet states.\textsuperscript{25} As such, Ukraine had been home to
approximately 37 percent of the USSR’s military and industrial complex.\textsuperscript{26} Earning influence (if not control) over Ukraine would once again give Russia access to its extensive border with areas of former Soviet influence, like Central Europe and the Balkans, as well as to the northern littoral of the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, the subordination of Ukraine to Russian foreign policy would block the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO—perceived threats to what some have seen as Putin’s vision of a 21st-century Russian empire.\textsuperscript{28}

In the energy sector, the strategic importance of Ukraine for Russia was indubitable. Ukraine’s geological position made it the key transit territory for much of Russia’s gas to Europe. In cubic feet, roughly one-third of the European Union’s gas imports was from Russia, and about 80 percent of that gas was transported through Ukrainian land. In turn, the EU accounted for up to 40 percent of Gazprom’s global sales, and Gazprom paid for a quarter of the state’s budget.\textsuperscript{29} The stakes could not have been higher on all sides.

For these reasons, Russia under Putin’s leadership remained determined to establish close ties with Ukraine, often disregarding the means they used to do so. The Russian government put pressure on Yushchenko’s predecessor, Kuchma, to dismiss certain ministers regarded as “unfriendly” to close political and economic ties between the nations.\textsuperscript{30} When Viktor Yanukovych became Prime Minister in August 2006, Russia resumed its pressure on Ukraine to become a full member of the Common Economic Space—Russia’s own version of the EU.\textsuperscript{31} In fact, Ukrainian candidates for high office still go to Moscow to seek the blessing of the Kremlin. In this context, it is not surprising that during Putin’s presidency Russian companies have bought up key Ukrainian companies in the energy field.\textsuperscript{32} Russia’s leaders have, furthermore, repeatedly lobbied to transition the gas pipeline transporting Russian gas to Western Europe from Ukrainian to Russian control.
Aftermath of the Orange Revolution

Among the more momentous effects that the Orange Revolution had was helping to damage relations between Ukraine and Russia in the gas industry. This culminated in the breakdown of price negotiations and the crisis of January 2006, where Russia cut off its gas supplies to Ukraine—with serious consequences for Europe. Although there are other interpretations, the timing of Russia’s increases in import prices into Ukraine would suggest political motivation. Prices of gas imports into Belarus remained low, presumably because the government in Minsk—in contrast to that in Kiev—had agreed in principle to sell Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy titan that consistently ranks as one of the largest companies in the world, an interest in its pipeline network.33

For Russia, the Orange Revolution extended beyond the loss of Russian influence in Ukraine. It was the catalyst for the public realization of Russia’s substantial position of interference in Ukraine’s economic and political dynamics. Furthermore, the revolution awakened fears in the Kremlin that the Ukrainian experience might serve as a model for political change in Russia itself. The Orange Revolution provided a stimulus for political uprisings elsewhere in Eastern Europe, such as the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan of March 2005, and protests in Uzbekistan in May of the same year.34 Russia, perhaps in an attempt to regain political traction, regarded these revolutions as the result of Western influence, and used the excuse to erect a defensive posture toward the West, strengthen ties with other former Soviet Republics, and extend a friendly hand to other emerging superpowers, such as China.35

When Yushchenko and his first government prioritized accession to NATO and the EU, Moscow faced another fear: the loss of a de facto ally and a crucial economic satellite. In the gas industry, Russia’s efforts to abolish the implicit subsidy and deprive Ukraine of control over transit arrangements were intensified. The proposal to increase Ukrainian import prices to European netback levels, previously used as a lever of persuasion on a generally cooperative Ukrainian leadership, became an ultimatum,
resulting in the first cutoff of Russian natural gas to Ukraine since the Orange Revolution.

Round One of Natural Gas Politics

On January 1, 2006, Russia broke its existing gas agreement with Ukraine (valid until 2009), which established a gas price of $50 per thousand cubic meters (tcm).36 Gazprom requested $160 per tcm in mid-2005, but in late 2005 had demanded $230 per tcm.37 At the end of December, President Putin offered Ukraine a loan to help pay for the higher-priced gas.38 When Ukraine rejected this proposal, Russia responded by not only blocking gas shipments meant as payment for transit through Ukraine to Western Europe, but also the shipment of gas from Turkmenistan that Ukraine had bought outright.39 With 66 percent of its domestically consumed natural gas coming from Russia at the time, Ukraine eased the effects of these sanctions by partially diverting gas from European-bound pipelines for its own use.40 Gazprom accused Ukraine of stealing and of being an unreliable transit partner. Ukraine argued that it was following a long-time precedent in sequestering gas as a transit fee instead of cash, or recovering the loss of gas purchased from Turkmenistan.41 For their part, Western Europeans inevitably protested against their loss of gas, and Gazprom was forced to restore pipeline flows on January 2, 2006.42

There is ample evidence that the main aim of the price hike was political in nature. To begin with, the 2003 Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 states that the country’s fuel and energy complex is “an instrument for the conduct of internal and external policy. The role of a country in world energy markets largely determines its geopolitical influence.”43 Gleb Pavlovsky, one of Putin’s leading political technologists, declared: “I think that the most important outcome of the gas conflict is not the additional $3 billion or so that Gazprom intends to earn from the deal with Ukraine, but the experience we have gained of conducting a policy aimed at becoming a great energy power.”44 Just after his resignation, Andrei Illiaronov—a former economic
adviser to President Putin—described, in an interview with *Time* magazine, the price hike as a political weapon.\(^{45}\)

If the price hike was indisputably discriminatory, the way in which it had been proposed was provocative by intent as well. It seems that Russia hoped to prevent the dispute from being settled before Ukraine’s parliamentary elections in March of 2006. These elections were crucial to Ukraine’s domestic reforms and geopolitical orientation.\(^{46}\) The Party of Regions, headed by pro-Russian former Prime Minister Yanukovych, was at its climax of popularity at that time. Yanukovych has said—in no ambiguous terms—that the gas crisis exposed the need for Ukraine to join a “common economic space” with Russia.\(^{47}\) This stance must have resonated strongly with the eastern Ukrainian power base as it protected the interests of Ukrainian businesses, the main backers of the Party of Regions. These business interests depended on Russia for the cheap energy needed to power the steel and other energy-intensive industries they controlled.\(^{48}\)

**Effects of Round One**

The gas cutoff also dealt a blow to the credibility of the Ukrainian government, led at the time by Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine Party. On January 4, 2006, the agreement between Gazprom and Ukraine called for gas to be purchased by Ukraine through a Russian intermediary firm—RosUkrEnergo (RUE)—which would impose higher transit fee payments and an average gas price of $95 per tcm\(^ {49}\). For Ukraine, this meant a joint venture between RUE and Naftogaz would cover one-half of Ukraine’s domestic consumption. This agreement was criticized by Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko (Yushchenko’s closest ally during the Orange Revolution) and other observers in Ukraine on several grounds. Critics objected to the agreement because it provided no guarantees that prices would remain fixed at $95 per tcm for five years.\(^ {50}\) Russia would, therefore, appear free to instigate another crisis in the future. Objections to the gas deal caused the Ukrainian parliament to lose confidence in Yushchenko’s government in January of 2006. Yushchenko has maintained that the vote of lack of confidence was illegal and has refused to accept responsibility.\(^ {51}\)
For ordinary Ukrainians, especially in the Ukrainian-speaking western and central regions of the country, there was rising concern over their government’s perceived weakness in the face of its larger and historically dominant neighbor. Elements of the new agreement, such as the de-linking of transit tariffs and gas prices, led to assertions of an abandoning of national interests. The January 4 agreement, including the sustained reduction and freezing of storage tariffs, only added to these fears—as did the first increase of residential gas tariffs in several years.

The Russians had achieved their aims. The gas crisis had badly damaged the reputation of Yushchenko’s government and contributed to his party taking third place in the March 2006 parliamentary elections—behind Yanukovych’s party. In the autumn of 2006, Russia negotiated a gentler agreement with Yanukovych, setting the gas price at $130 per tcm—well below the rising international standard. With good reason, many observers have seen Gazprom’s tough attitude toward Ukraine in the 2005 negotiations and its relatively friendly stance in 2006 as evidence that Russia had manipulated the gas issue to undermine Yushchenko. In September of 2007, Putin appeared to verify this view when he stated that Russia had no desire to provide cheap energy to “Orange” forces.

Round Two of Natural Gas Politics

In late 2007, Russians took another action that would once again bring the two countries into severe tension: import prices for 2008 gas supplies to Ukraine were set by Russians at $179.50 per million cubic meters (mcm), up from $130 per mcm in 2007. With the increase of gas prices, Ukraine’s debt to Gazprom began to grow again. On February 7, 2008, Gazprom threatened to reduce its natural gas shipments if Ukraine failed to pay $1.5 billion in debts. Again, there were political contingencies that drove the characteristically Russian action. Upon Timoshenko’s return to the office of Prime Minister in 2007 (she had been discharged in September 2005 by President Yushchenko himself), Ukrainian state-owned companies voided sales contracts with UkrGazEnergo, a joint venture between Russian and Ukrainian governments which
had been created in 2006, ostensibly to serve as an intermediary energy company. Timoshenko had long been an opponent of intermediaries in the gas trade, and once stated that “relying on Russia’s long-term systemic problems to curb its pressure tactics will not prevent the Kremlin from reestablishing its hegemony in the short run.” She took the initial step against the Russian side by sharply reducing the amount of gas UkrGazEnergo could legally sell to Ukrainian consumers.

Gazprom soon complained that Timoshenko’s move was not covered by the agreement on January 4, 2006. On February 12, 2008, Presidents Putin and Yushchenko met to prevent a dispute reminiscent of 2006, and to form a plan to resolve the persisting gas debt. Both sides agreed that Ukraine would begin paying off its debts for natural gas consumed in November and December of 2007. The presidents also decided to replace UkrGazEnergo from 2009 with a trader owned jointly by Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy. Timoshenko’s work toward the removal of intermediaries, for its part, revealed Ukraine’s wish to step further away from Russia in the Ukrainian energy market.

Despite the cooperative negotiations between the two parties, the unpaid debt remained. On March 3, 2008, Gazprom cut its shipments to Ukraine by 50 percent, on the grounds of the unpaid $1.5 billion debt—an amount Ukrainian officials claimed had indeed been paid. Ukraine then went on to dispute the bill and refused to pay the whole, saying the debt was $1 billion. Amidst the disputes, in October of 2008, Prime Minister Timoshenko and Putin issued a memorandum that appeared to bring an end to the latest set of problems surrounding natural gas. Building on the October Putin-Timoshenko memorandum, on October 24 the apparently cordial agreement “On the Principles of Long-term Cooperation in the Gas Sector” was signed by the chief executives of Gazprom and Naftogaz.

With all the progress made in October and having set out the basis for improved relations back in February 2008, why did the two parties fail to implement the agreed-upon plan? On the surface, large amounts of debts remained outstanding on, and
after October 30, the deadline by which Gazprom and Naftogaz had agreed to sign a long-term supply contract. In mid-December, Gazprom announced that a $2.195 billion debt had accumulated. Naftogaz in turn made a payment of $800 million and promised that a further $200 million would soon be paid. Despite this exceptional action by Ukraine, Gazprom maintained its intention to cut the supply of natural gas to Ukraine on January 1, as long as Ukraine did not fully repay the remainder of $1.195 billion debt in natural gas supplies, plus an additional $450 million in fines levied by Gazprom. On December 19, Gazprom announced that it would interrupt supplies to Ukraine unless a new contract was signed.

There were other, similarly unprovoked moves by the Russians against the Ukrainians. As early as the third week of November, Gazprom’s chief executive Aleksei Miller, following a meeting with the Russian President, announced that if no agreement was reached by the end of the year, prices could rise to $400 per tcm on January 1, 2009. A few days later, Prime Minister Putin added that if there were any interference with the transit, supplies to Ukraine would be completely cut off. These warnings were repeated throughout December, with the additional warning that disruption to European supplies could result. Russia officially activated an Early Warning Memorandum on December 18, 2008, and the Russian Deputy Zubkov wrote to President Barroso of the European Commission and 27 member states to warn them of a possible natural gas interruption as a result of the dispute. The European Commission made no attempt to intervene, but the Energy Charter Secretariat issued a statement on December 23 in which the Secretary General made reference to the dispute and recalled the principle of uninterrupted transit. This was meant as an underhanded reminder to Ukraine of its obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty, which it had signed.

On December 30, 2008, Naftogaz paid $1.522 billion for outstanding gas deliveries to RosUkrEnergo. Gazprom insisted that a further $614 million in fines and penalties was still owed, although on January 2, 2009, Naftogaz declared it was ready to go
to international arbitration to resolve the issue. On December 31, 2008, Dubina wrote a letter on behalf of Naftogaz warning Gazprom that, in the case of natural gas delivered to Europe, Naftogaz may consider this gas to have an “unidentified owner” and therefore liable to confiscation under Ukrainian customs law. While the two parties were not able to agree on a price for a 2009 year, the threat of supplies being cut was increasingly felt. Whether Ukraine was prepared to divert gas shipments from other supply chains as it had done in 2006 remained to be seen.

Ukraine and Russia had failed to agree on a price for Russian gas and a tariff for its transit before previous agreements expired on the last day of 2008. On January 1, Gazprom proceeded to cut all supplies for Ukrainian consumption while supplies to Europe continued. Next day, gas deliveries to several European member states were affected—notably those to Bulgaria. On January 5, Gazprom cut the volume of gas going into Ukrainian pipelines by about one-fifth, arguing that Ukraine had stolen 65 million cubic meters of gas during the first four days of the year. Gazprom further urged Ukraine to replace this gas, and on January 6, cut supply by a further three-fifths. In the early hours of January 7, the transit system was shut down completely, and Russian deliveries were halted. On January 19, under enormous economic pressure, a 10-year supply and transit contract was signed between Prime Ministers Putin and Timoshenko; the next day, gas flow to Ukraine and Europe was restarted, and supplies returned to normal levels across European consumers after two days.

Effects of Round Two

As a result of the gas crisis of 2009, Gazprom suffered serious damage to its reputation as a reliable energy supplier. Several European nations had been directly affected by the disruption. The Czech foreign minister stated “the main lesson learned from this crisis is that Russia and Ukraine aren’t reliable suppliers. Europe must think about alternative sources and pipelines.” After the crisis, the EU began to re-discuss the strategy of diversification of resources, pressuring members to advance their searches for alternative supply options. It appears that Russia was willing to
accept such damages to Gazprom, because the gains were significantly greater.

Indeed, the 2009 gas crisis allowed Russia to pivot toward its favored position with respect to the Ukraine. This is not to say that Russia wished to regain control of Ukraine in a recapitulation of the USSR. As Simon Pirani, author and scholar on natural gas markets in the former Soviet Union, wrote, “To portray Gazprom’s tough stance on prices as motivated by political revenge, or to depict its policy on pipeline infrastructure as simply a projection of Russian imperial ambitions, would be as naïve as to deny the role of politics altogether.” Domestically, Ukraine faced a presidential election in 2010. With much of the government hampered by the crisis, public disaffection led to a challenging of the vision reflected by the Orange Revolution—namely, a democratic state anchored to Europe—and weakened President Yushchenko’s mandate. The stage was all set for the return of Russia’s old choice for the helm of Ukraine: Viktor Yanukovych. In one of modern history’s great ironies (or come-backs), the very man who incited the Orange Revolution would become, a mere six years hence, President of Ukraine.

Conclusion

Russia is Ukraine’s primary natural gas supplier. Ukraine, in turn, is the major provider of gas transit pipeline to Russia and serves as the gateway to Europe. With Ukraine’s increased dependence on Russia’s energy resources, Russia has been able to bring the Ukraine into its hands, slowly but surely. While Russia’s ultimate intentions remain open to debate, evidence points to Russia’s willingness to interfere with Ukraine’s politics without surcease. The result is that Ukraine is de facto under Russia’s dominant influence. To become more independent of Russia’s economy and politics, Ukraine clearly needs to diversify its energy imports to other parts of the world (possibly including the United States, which has forbidden exports of natural gas to countries with which it does not have free-trade agreements) and develop innovative energy resources to support its domestic activities. In fact, to overcome its excessive dependence on Russia, Ukraine is
carrying forward with instituting energy imports from the Caucasus areas such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Libya.

If the past is any indication of the future, however, prospects for Ukraine remain grim. Ever since its independence from the former Soviet Union, the country has been mired in cronyism. While Ukraine’s economy grew significantly in the first decade of the 21st century, much of this was due to rising energy prices globally—a trend that was sharply reversed during the 2008 global financial crisis and that has never recovered since then. Furthermore, much of that growth led to the fattening of individual pockets, not to aiding the middle and working classes. What is more, the country remains sharply divided between nationalist or pro-Western groups in northern and southern Ukraine and the pro-Russian factions in southern and eastern Ukraine. Given this geopolitical dynamic, Russia could all too easily exert influence on Ukrainian affairs. Indeed, this is what Russia seems bent on doing, as the natural gas politics has shown in two conspicuous moments following the Orange Revolution, whose protagonists aspired to rewrite modern Ukrainian history, to little avail.
Notes


4 Ibid., p. 2

5 Taras Kuzio, “Former security chief reveals extent of threats to Yushchenko’s presidential bid,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, no. 106 (June 1, 2005)


7 McFaul, p. 49


9 McFaul, p. 50

10 Fraser, p. 2

11 In 1955, the Prikarpattian fields accounted for 2.8 bcm of the total Soviet output of 5.9 bcm; Simon Pirani, *Ukraine’s Gas Sector* (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2007) p. 17

12 *Natural Gas Transportation and Regulation* (Paris: IEA, 1994) p. 335

13 Pirani, *Ukraine’s Gas Sector*, p. 18

14 Ibid., p. 18

15 See for a thorough analysis of Ukrainian debts to Russia for energy deliveries: Gregory V. Krasnov and Josef C. Brada, “Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 5 (July 1997) p. 828

16 Pirani, *Ukraine’s Gas Sector*, p. 19

17 Ibid., p. 19

18 Ibid., p. 19

19 Ibid., p. 20

20 Ibid., p. 22
Ihor Bakai, chairman of Naftogaz from 1998 to 2000, is now living in Russia and is the subject of an extradition request by the Ukrainian authorities.

Fraser, p. 10; Ukraine’s population of 48 million is about one-third the size of Russia’s population of 143 million.


U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Russia’s Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine, p. 2


By January 2, Hungary was reported to have lost up to 40 percent of its Russian supplies; Austrian, Slovakian and
Romanian supplies were said to be down by one third, France 25–30 percent and Poland by 14 percent. Italy reported having lost 32 million cubic metres, around 25 percent of deliveries, during January 1–3. German deliveries were also affected but no further details are known.

43 Fraser, p. 14
45 Fraser, p. 14
46 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Russia’s Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine, p. 4
47 Ibid., p. 4
48 Ibid., p. 4
49 Ibid., p. 4
50 Ibid., p. 4
51 Ibid., p.4
52 Pirani, Ukraine’s Gas Sector, p. 101
53 Ibid., p. 101
54 Fraser, p. 15
55 Ibid., p. 15
57 Ibid., p. 8
60 Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 12
61 Yuliya Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May/June 2007) p. 74
63 Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 12
65 Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 13
66 Ibid., p. 15

Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 15
Ibid., p. 16
Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 16

Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 17
Ibid., p. 17
Ibid., p. 19
Ibid., p. 54; Bulgaria suffered 100 percent natural gas cut from Russia, with no diversification. Gas storage went for 2–3 days only covering 35 percent of gas demand. Alternative fuel was no use after 20 days.

Ibid., p. 3
Ibid., p. 3
Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 19

Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava, p. 57
Varol, p. 251

Steven Pifer, Averting Crisis in Ukraine report no. 41 (n.p.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) p. 3
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THAT “GERM OF AMERICAN FREEDOM”:
THE TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER

Matthew Waltman

Americans often take freedom of the press for granted. If political leaders act in an unreasonable or inappropriate manner, Americans expect the news media to report on it. Yet, this was not always the case. In 1734, John Peter Zenger was charged with seditious libel after his New York Weekly Journal published articles critical of New York’s colonial governor, William Cosby. The law of seditious libel made it a crime to publish statements that maligned the character or authority of a government official. While Zenger clearly violated the law by printing the challenged articles, the jury refused to convict him. Instead, contrary to prevailing law, the jurors found that since the published statements were true, Zenger was not guilty. Following his acquittal, Zenger published an account of the trial.¹ Historians have described this account as one of “the most important book[s] published in America” prior to the American Revolution.² As noted historian Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., commented, in the years leading up to the Revolutionary War, “patriots time and again cited the verdict as justifying their own assaults on overweening authority.”³ Thus, while the Zenger case did not overturn the law of seditious libel, it nonetheless was an

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important event in the years preceding the American Revolution. It altered the mindset of the American people, making them more willing to speak out against unjust government officials, as well as repressive imperial policies, without fear of reprisal.

The Zenger case is replete with villains, heroes, and political intrigue. The villain was a man named William Cosby. He was appointed colonial governor of New York in July 1731, following the death of the former governor, John Montgomerie. Cosby received the appointment by virtue of marriage, not because of merit. His wife’s brother was the Earl of Halifax, a member of the King’s Privy Council, and her first cousin was the Duke of Newcastle, the secretary of state for the Southern Department, which included the colonies. Cosby chose to remain in England for 13 months after his appointment. In the interim, Rip Van Dam, an Anglo-Dutch merchant and the leader of New York’s Popular Party, was appointed interim governor and granted a full governor’s salary. On August 1, 1732, Cosby arrived in New York. He quickly earned a reputation as spiteful, quick-tempered, and particularly greedy. As esteemed colonial lawyer William Smith recalled, “no representation repugnant to his avarice had any influence upon Mr. Cosby. The weakness of his understanding rendered him reprehensible even to fear.” Within a short time of his arrival in New York, Cosby had managed to antagonize many of New York’s political leaders, including Rip Van Dam.

Cosby found himself at odds with Van Dam over money. In keeping with his greedy nature, Cosby demanded that Van Dam turn over half the salary he had received for the 13 months he had acted as governor, approximately £1,925. Van Dam refused. Instead, he told Cosby he would agree to split his fees if Cosby gave him half the salary he had collected in England during the same period, roughly £6,047. Cosby decided to sue Van Dam for the money. He sought to avoid bringing his case in the traditional common law court, which required a jury trial, since he recognized that a colonial jury would likely be more sympathetic to Van Dam than to him. Instead, he designated the New York Supreme Court to sit as a court of equity, which meant it could adjudicate
the case without a jury and without the need to follow common law rules or procedures.\textsuperscript{11}

On April 9, 1733, three judges of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lewis Morris and Associate Justices James De Lancey and Frederick Philipse, heard the case. Since Philipse and De Lancey were Cosby supporters, the governor was confident he would prevail. However, this would not turn out to be the case. Van Dam’s lawyers, James Alexander and William Smith—two of the colony’s most highly regarded attorneys—argued that the special equity court did not have the power to hear the case and that Cosby had overstepped his authority when he created it.\textsuperscript{12} Chief Justice Morris agreed, holding that it was “unlawful” for Cosby to enact an equity court “without the assent of the legislature.”\textsuperscript{13} While Morris may have been right on the law, he also had his own personal reasons for siding with Van Dam. At the same time Van Dam had acted as governor of New York, Morris had served as governor of New Jersey, which also fell under Cosby’s jurisdiction. Morris had collected some £632 in fees, so if Cosby won his case against Van Dam, he could then come after Morris for half his salary.\textsuperscript{14}

Cosby, angry that Morris had openly challenged his authority, demanded that Morris provide him with a copy of the statements he had made in court.\textsuperscript{15} Morris complied by publishing his opinion as a 15-page pamphlet that the entire colony could read. Cosby viewed the public dissemination of the opinion as a further attempt to humiliate him.\textsuperscript{16} In response, he summarily dismissed Morris as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a position Morris had held for almost 20 years, and replaced him with his political supporter, James De Lancey.\textsuperscript{17}

Cosby’s actions greatly dismayed his adversaries, most notably Lewis Morris, Rip Van Dam, and Van Dam’s lawyers, James Alexander and William Smith. They formed an anti-Cosby faction, known as the Morrisites after Lewis Morris, and decided to start a newspaper to provoke public sentiment against Cosby.\textsuperscript{18} At the time, the \textit{New York Gazette}, founded in 1725, was the colony’s only newspaper. \textit{The Gazette} was edited by Francis Harison, dubbed Cosby’s “flatterer-in-chief,” and it was uniformly supportive of Cosby
The Morrisites intended their newspaper, the *New York Weekly Journal*, to be just the opposite. As James Alexander, the *Weekly Journal*’s editor, wrote to his friend, former New York governor Robert Hunter, the goal of the paper was “Chiefly to Expose [Cosby] & those ridiculous flatteringes with which Mr. Harison loads our other Newspaper.”

The Morrisites turned to John Peter Zenger, a German immigrant and one of the few experienced printers in the colony, to publish the *Weekly Journal*. Zenger had arrived in New York in 1710, at the age of thirteen. For eight years, he served as an apprentice to William Bradford, the publisher of the *Gazette*, before opening his own printing shop. Zenger was struggling financially at the time he was hired to publish the *Weekly Journal*.

The first issue of the *Weekly Journal* was published on November 5, 1733. It included a flattering account of Morris’s victory as the Popular Party candidate for the Westchester County assembly. It detailed how Morris had won despite Cosby’s effort to rig the election by disqualifying Quakers voters, who strongly supported Morris, because their religious beliefs allowed them only to affirm, rather than swear, the oath required of voters. Each week, the newspaper continued to publish articles and letters to the editor regarding Cosby’s perceived misdeeds. It also poked fun at him through mock advertisements. For example, one advertisement likened Cosby to a monkey who played tricks on the people of New York and should be sent back to England:

A Monkey of the larger Sort, about four Foot high, has lately broke his Chain and run into the Country, where he playd many a Monkey Trick....Whosoever shall take this little mischievous Animal, and send him back to his Master, so that he may be chained up again, shall have for his Reward a Thousand Thanks....

The newspaper also published material promoting freedom of the press as an important safeguard against government corruption. An essay in the second issue of the paper, for instance, noted that
“Liberty of the Press” served as a restraint against a “powerful and wicked” minister. It could “awaken his Conscience…Sting him with the dread of Punishment, cover him with Shame, and render his Actions odious to all honest Minds.” The ideas set forth in these essays would later form the basis of Zenger’s defense at trial.

The Weekly Journal proved very popular among the colonists. As historian Stanley Katz notes, it quickly became a powerful tool “of invective and satire against the Governor.” As the publisher of the newspaper, Zenger’s role was mostly technical (setting the type, etc.), as opposed to editorial. Many of the essays on freedom of the press, as well as the content critical of Cosby, were written by James Alexander and Lewis Morris. However, they never signed their real names in order to insulate themselves from charges of seditious libel.

The English law of seditious libel, which applied to the colonies, made it a crime to publish statements critical of the government or its officials. According to John Holt, Lord Chief Justice of England, seditious libel had to be punished, because if publishers were able to encourage people to have “an ill opinion of the government, no government can subsist. For it is very necessary for all governments that the people should have a good opinion of it.” Truth was not a defense to a libel charge. In fact, English courts held that “the greater the truth” of the challenged statements, “the greater the libel,” reasoning that people were more likely to believe truthful statements than false ones, which would make them less confident in the government.

When it came to the Weekly Journal, seditious libel was very much on the mind of Governor Cosby. In a letter to the Board of Trade in London, Cosby complained that the paper “sworn with the most virulent libels,” which served to “incense and enrage the people against the Governour.” As the paper continued to criticize him, Cosby decided the time had come to put a stop to these attacks. Since he could not go after the newspaper’s writers because they had masked their identities, he instead focused on the easier target, John Peter Zenger, whose name appeared as printer on every issue of the paper. Cosby instructed Chief
Justice De Lancey to seek a grand jury indictment against Zenger on charges of seditious libel. At the time, a New York grand jury was comprised of nineteen men, chosen twice a year from a list of property owners. Their mission was to decide whether there was enough evidence that a crime had been committed to bring charges against the accused. De Lancey twice tried to have Zenger indicted for seditious libel (in January and October 1734), but the grand jury refused.

After failing to obtain a grand jury indictment, Cosby next turned to the Provincial Council and the Assembly in his efforts to silence the *Weekly Journal*. He asked them to order the burning of four particularly offensive issues of the paper (issues 7, 47, 48, 49) that he claimed contained libelous statements about him. The Council decided that the four issues were seditious and should be “burnt by the Hands of the Common Hangman,” but the Assembly balked. Since the colonial assembly refused to assent, Cosby arranged for the sheriff and a few of his men to carry out the Council’s order. He also issued a proclamation promising a reward of £50 for information regarding the identity of the authors of the “Scandalous, Virulent, False and Seditious Reflections” printed in the *Weekly Journal*. Although it was an open secret that Alexander and Morris had authored the material critical of Cosby, no one came forward to collect the reward. Undeterred, in November 1734, Cosby had the Provincial Council issue a warrant for Zenger’s arrest and ordered him committed “to the Prison or Common Jail” for publishing the “Seditious Libels.” To get around the grand jury’s refusal to indict, Cosby had the attorney general file an “information,” a highly unpopular legal procedure that allowed the prosecutor to charge Zenger with the crime of seditious libel without an indictment.

Six days after his arrest, Zenger appeared in court with his lawyers, James Alexander and William Smith. They argued that Zenger’s bail should be low since he had submitted an affidavit affirming that his net worth was not “above the Sum of forty pounds, the tools of his trade & his wife & children’s wearing apparel excepted.” Nonetheless, Chief Justice De Lancey set bail
at £400, ten times Zenger’s net worth. Unable to raise such a sum, Zenger languished in prison for the next eight months. It is unclear why Zenger’s wealthy associates did not pay his bail. It is possible they thought he would soon be set free since two grand juries had refused to indict him. Perhaps they thought they could use Zenger’s continued imprisonment as a means to elicit public sympathy for their cause. Indeed, following Zenger’s arrest, the Weekly Journal published several letters purportedly written by Zenger, highlighting his deprivation of liberty. Whatever the reason, it is apparent they considered posting his bail, as among James Alexander’s handwritten notes regarding Zenger’s case was a list of 20 prominent members of the Popular Party “proposed to be John Peter Zenger’s bail.”

After being imprisoned for five months, Zenger was formally charged in April 1735. At Zenger’s arraignment, his attorneys, Alexander and Smith, not only attacked Governor Cosby’s method of proceeding against Zenger, but they also took exception to the commissions of the two Supreme Court judges, James De Lancey and Frederick Philipse, and challenged their ability to hear Zenger’s case. Judge De Lancey was furious that Alexander and Smith had questioned his authority, and declared that they had “brought it to that Point, that either We [De Lancey and Philipse] must go from the Bench, or You from the Bar.” Not surprisingly, De Lancey chose the latter and disbarred Alexander and Smith, excluding them from further practice before the court. Such action left Zenger without his chosen lawyers. In their place, Alexander “secretly engaged” Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia to defend Zenger at trial. Hamilton was one of the most famous lawyers in all the colonies. As William Smith, Jr., the son of one of Zenger’s original lawyers, stated, he “had art, eloquence, vivacity, and humour, was ambitious of fame, negligent of nothing to ensure success, and possessed a confidence which no terrors could awe.”

Regardless of Hamilton’s skill, defending an individual against a charge of seditious libel was challenging. Under the English law of seditious libel, a determination of the legal issues
was divided between the judge and the jury. The jury decided the facts—whether the material was written or published by the accused—while the judge decided the law—whether the material was libelous. At the time, a traditional defense to a seditious libel charge was that it was unclear whether the accused had printed the material, or even if he did, that he did not know its contents. Hamilton decided to employ a different strategy.

Hamilton’s approach, along with a full account of the trial, is set forth in *The Trial of John Peter Zenger*, which was published several months after the trial. Although it reads as if Zenger were the author, the pamphlet was actually written by James Alexander. It became one of the most widely read political pamphlets in the decades leading up to the Revolutionary War. It is an important document in the history of the American Revolution, in that it reflects emerging ideas about liberty in colonial America and provides an early example of how Americans were willing to depart from British laws they viewed as unjust and instead exercise their own independent judgment.

Zenger’s trial began on August 4, 1735. The prosecutor, Attorney General Richard Bradley, had planned to call several witnesses to establish that Zenger had published the issues of the *Weekly Journal* containing disparaging statements about Cosby. But Zenger’s lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, obviated this need and stunned the assembled crowd by admitting in his opening statement that Zenger had published the papers. As Hamilton stated, “I’ll save Mr. Attorney the Trouble of examining his Witnesses to that Point; and I do (for my Client) confess, that he both printed and published the two newspapers set forth in the information.” After dismissing his witnesses, Attorney General Bradley demanded the case go to jury, which would need to find Zenger guilty. He argued that since “Mr. Hamilton has confessed the printing and publishing of these Libels, I think the Jury must find a Verdict for the King.” Hamilton disagreed. He claimed the prosecutor still had to prove the statements were libelous in order to convict Zenger, since the charge against Zenger accused him of publishing “a certain false, malicious, and seditious scandalous Libel.” This
he could not do, according to Hamilton, because the published statements about Cosby were true.

Hamilton had little law to support his position that truth should be a defense to a libel charge. He compensated for this weakness by arguing that what constituted good law in England was not necessarily suited to America, claiming “What is good Law at one Time and in one Place, is not so at another Time and in another Place.” This argument was important because it stressed that America was different from England, and that the colonists had their own independent beliefs and desires. Hamilton also emphasized that citizens should have the right to criticize their rulers. Taking a dig at Cosby, Hamilton said it was the inherent right of the people to criticize a government official who “brings his personal Failings, but much more his Vices, into his Administration and the People find themselves affected by them, either in their Liberties or Properties.”

In response, Bradley reiterated that the jurors should convict Zenger because he had admitted to publishing the articles critical of Cosby; it did not matter whether they were true or false. Chief Justice De Lancey agreed. He told the jurors they could determine whether Zenger had published the articles, but they must “leave it to the court to judge whether they are libelous.” Hamilton boldly disputed this assertion, stating that the jury had the right to render a verdict as to both the facts and the law, that is, whether Zenger published the statements and whether they were libelous. Speaking to the jury, he said, “A proper Confidence in a court is commendable, but as the Verdict (whatever it is), will be yours, you ought to refer no Part of your Duty to the Discretion of other Persons.” In his dramatic concluding statement, Hamilton argued that Zenger’s freedom, and by extension the freedom of all colonists, rested with the jury:

The Question before the Court, and you, Gentlemen of the Jury, is not of small or private Concern; it is not the Cause of a poor Printer, nor of New-York alone, which you are now trying: No! It may in its Consequence, affect every Freeman that lives under a British government on the Main of America. It is the best Cause: It is the Cause of Liberty!
The jury followed Hamilton’s advice. After deliberating only a short time, the jurors returned a verdict of not guilty. As Zenger described it:

The Jury withdrew and in a small Time returned, and being asked by the Clerk whether John Peter Zenger was guilty of publishing the Libels they answered, “Not guilty.” Upon which there were three Huzzahs in the Hall, and the next Day Zenger was discharged from his imprisonment.62

Upon his release from prison, Zenger expressed his thanks to the jurors in the next edition of the *Weekly Journal*.63 The results of the trial were widely publicized on both sides of the Atlantic, from Barbados, to London, to Philadelphia, leading to a debate about whether the outcome was correct. For instance, Jonathan Blenman, the King’s attorney in Barbados, writing under the pseudonym Anglo-Americanus, published two articles in the *Barbados Gazette* that criticized the outcome of the trial.64 James Alexander responded with several articles in Benjamin Franklin’s *Pennsylvania Gazette*, in which he asserted that “FREEDOM OF SPEECH is a principal pillar in a free government: When this support is taken away the constitution is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins.”65

Over the years, people have continued to debate the significance of the Zenger case. Several historians and legal scholars have taken the position that the Zenger case stands as a landmark decision in favor of freedom of the press. For example, law professor Julius Marke has referred to the Zenger trial as “the cornerstone of the liberty of the press in this country.”66 However, it is clear that the case did not have any immediate effect on the law of seditious libel in either England or America.67 For this reason, historian Leonard Levy has argued that Zenger’s victory was purely personal, “like the stagecoach ticket inscribed ‘Good for this day only.’”68 Similarly, legal historian Stanley Katz contends that Zenger and his associates were “a somewhat narrow-minded political faction seeking immediate political gain rather than long-term governmental or legal reform,” and thus the case itself was not “a landmark in the history of law or of the freedom of the press.”69
Although the case did not alter legal precedent, it nonetheless was an important political victory. Following Zenger’s acquittal, royally-appointed governors were reluctant to pursue charges against the colonial press for seditious libel, despite existing law, for fear the jury would follow the lead of the 12 jurors in the Zenger case. As a result, colonists and the press became more willing to openly criticize British officials and acts of the mother country they perceived as unjust. The Zenger trial also had a significant influence on revolutionary thought. It showed the colonists that they could successfully oppose unreasonable British laws and regulations. This was a lesson they would return to time and again in the years leading up to the American Revolution.

The Zenger case not only guided the patriots during the Revolutionary period, but it also later influenced the free speech protections embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Despite these protections, however, press freedom would be threatened with the adoption of the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime to publish statements that criticized the federal government or the President. While the Sedition Act appears to be at odds with the Zenger verdict, this is not entirely the case. While the act temporarily revived the law of seditious libel until its expiration in 1801, it also accepted the truth of the challenged statements as a defense to such charges—just as Andrew Hamilton had argued at Zenger’s trial. This shows that the lessons of the Zenger case had staying power, even in times of political crisis. As Governeur Morris, the grandson of Chief Justice Lewis Morris and a leading delegate to the Constitution Convention of 1787, would later say, the Zenger case was the “germ of American freedom—the morning star of that Liberty which subsequently revolutionized America.”
Notes


7 Katz, Brief Narrative, 2.


9 Finkelman, Brief Narrative, 8.

10 Marke, “Zenger’s Trial,” 41-42.


12 Finkelman, Brief Narrative, 10.

13 Lewis Morris, The Opinion and Argument of the Chief Justice of the Province of New-York: Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Supream Court of the Said Province, to
Determine Causes In a Course of Equity (New York, 1733), Main Collection, New-York Historical Society, New York.

14 Finkelman, Brief Narrative, 11.

15 Livingston Rutherfurd, John Peter Zenger: His Press, His Trial and a Bibliography of Zenger Imprints (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1904), 15.

16 Finkelman, Brief Narrative, 11.


18 Rutherfurd, John Peter Zenger, 28.


26 Katz, Brief Narrative, 8.

27 Finkelman, Brief Narrative, 17.

28 Jarrow, The Printer’s Trial, 34.

29 Quoted in Finkelman, Brief Narrative, 18.

30 Ibid.

32 Jarrow, The Printer’s Trial, 38.
33 Zenger, Trial of John Peter Zenger, 3.
37 “Bench Warrant for Arrest of John Peter Zenger” (November 2, 1734), in Lindner, “Zenger Trial.”
38 Katz, Brief Narrative, 19.
41 Katz, Brief Narrative, 19.
42 For example, shortly after Zenger’s arrest, a letter appeared in the newspaper stating how Zenger initially “was put under such Restraint that [he] had not the Liberty of Pen, Ink, or Paper, or to see or speak with People.” New-York Weekly Journal, no. 15 (November 25, 1734), Main Collection, New-York Historical Society, New York. While the letter was signed “J. Peter Zenger,” historians believe it and other similar letters were actually written by James Alexander. Jarrow, The Printer’s Trial, 53-55.
43 James Alexander, “Persons Proposed to be Zenger’s Bail” (1734), File 25, John Peter Zenger Trial Collection, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library, New York.
44 Judd, “William Cosby.”
145

Quoted in Zenger, *Trial of John Peter Zenger*, 16.

Ibid., 16-17.


Ibid.

Marke, “Zenger’s Trial,” 43.

Zenger, *Trial of John Peter Zenger*.

Jarrow, *The Printer’s Trial*, 77.

Finkelman, *Brief Narrative*, viii. The pamphlet was reprinted 15 times before the end of the eighteenth century. Lindner, “Zenger Trial.”


Ibid., 28.

Ibid., 27.

Ibid., 35.

Ibid., 48.

Ibid., 47.


Ibid., 72.

Ibid.


Quoted in Finkelman, “Politics, the Press, and the Law,” 39.

Marke, “Zenger’s Trial,” 55. Similarly, while not personally ascribing to this view, historian Stanley Katz notes that, “Modern textbooks of American history continue to describe the trial as one of the foundational stones of the freedom of the press.” Katz, *Brief Narrative*, 1.


Ibid., 36.

For instance in 1800, Thomas Cooper, a lawyer and Pennsylvania newspaper publisher, was charged with violating the Sedition Act by defaming President Adams. Although Cooper was ultimately convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment and a $400 fine, at his trial, it was recognized
that truthful statements could provide a valid defense to a charge of seditious libel. Thomas Cooper, An Account of the Trial of Thomas Cooper, of Northumberland: on a Charge of Libel against the President of the United States, Taken in Short Hand with a Preface, Notes, and Appendix (Philadelphia, 1800), The Sid Lapidus ‘59 Collection on Liberty and the American Revolution, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, http://pudl.princeton.edu/objects/pk02cb48p (accessed April 3, 2015).


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GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS:
MILITARY INNOVATOR OF THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

Chou-Hsien Lin

Shrouded in smoke, bursting with fire, the battlefields of the Thirty Years War were a hellish slaughterhouse of unprecedented proportions. They were the birthplace of a multitude of innovations in warfare, as well as a diverse range of extraordinary characters whose names have persisted in folklore and textbooks. From Oxenstierna to Pappenheim, perhaps the most progressive and revolutionary advocate of the new martial methods was Gustavus II Adolphus, the Swedish King from the House of Vasa. During the early part of the war, Gustavus Adolphus was the most prominent leader of the Protestant forces and the most dangerous enemy of the Catholic League. A charismatic leader, he was able to obtain vital victories across northern Germany and provide the scattered Protestant contingent with a unified goal. Most importantly, Gustavus Adolphus embraced untried military tactics that would prove themselves on the bloody battlefields of this religious war, and set the pattern for military development over the next few centuries. By introducing to the European style of warfare such initiatives as volley fire, combined arms operations, and regimental artillery, Gustavus Adolphus broke with

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traditional tacticians and transformed the European battlefield with the modern techniques of maneuverability and firepower. Widely and quickly copied by other European nations, Gustavus’ techniques allowed the Swedish military to become one of the most effective fighting forces of the Thirty Years War, triumphing at the Battle of Breitenfeld [1631]. Moreover, he enforced strict discipline among his soldiers and demanded respect for civilians, giving the Swedish military an unprecedented reputation across the continent. Gustavus’ revolutionary renovation of European military policies essentially established what would become the basis of modern warfare.

Birth of a King

“…the King (Gustavus Adolphus), in personal conduct, was an Alexander in audacity; a Caesar in intelligence.”

—Theodore Ayrault Dodge

Gustavus Adolphus was born on December 19, 1594, in Stockholm, Sweden. He was the eldest son of Charles IX, the incumbent King of Sweden and a belligerent in wars against Denmark, Poland, and Russia. From an early age, Gustavus Adolphus displayed a remarkable penchant for warfare and a precocious ability in diplomacy. One account reports that Charles IX sometimes permitted his 10-year-old son to reply to diplomatic messages on behalf of the Swedish Crown. Gustavus Adolphus also possessed a notable capacity in languages and other intellectual pursuits; by early adolescence, he had become fluent in German, Dutch, Latin, and Italian, in addition to his native Swedish. Thus he was able to converse with foreign diplomats and discuss military tactics with veterans from all over Europe, especially those of the Eighty Years War, in which his military idol, Maurice of Nassau, had served.

Intellect and quick wit were showing signs of an able monarch. With these dashing qualities, Gustavus Adolphus rose to the throne at age 17, when Charles IX suddenly died of illness amid his three wars with the aforementioned powers. Gustavus’ methodical military mind, the result of constant study and discussion, decided to approach each conflict separately and in turn. Gustavus managed to secure peace with Denmark in the Treaty of
Knared (1613), and with Russia in the Treaty of Stolbovo (1617). These treaties allowed Gustavus to focus solely on his most immediate enemy, Poland, then ruled by Sigismund III. A stubborn Catholic and a cousin of Gustavus, Sigismund had laid claim to the Swedish throne and presented a serious threat to Sweden, prompting Gustavus to invade Poland in 1621. A series of brief truces followed this initial invasion, though Gustavus was consistently victorious in most of the battles that did occur; a lasting peace was not signed until 1629, in which Sigismund relinquished the Swedish throne to Gustavus.5

Gustavus’ experience in Poland triggered several implications in his future career. Representing Protestant defiance, Gustavus’ fight against the Catholic Sigismund drew the attention of Protestant princes across northern Europe, who began to see the Swedish King as their deliverer from Catholic aggression;6 this prefigured Gustavus’ important role in the Protestant effort during the Thirty Years War. In the Polish campaigns, Gustavus also displayed his proclivity to lead from the front, something that appalled his officers but made him extremely popular among the soldiers.7 Repeatedly wounded, Gustavus insisted on leading his army in person, an inclination that would ultimately claim his life. Militarily, Gustavus saw in Poland the deficiencies of the Swedish army; while his infantry could hold its own against that of Poland, his cavalry was perpetually outmatched by the Polish horsemen, who were superior in both action and appearance.8 This realization prompted the Swedish King to initiate the military innovations that would thoroughly alter the European style of warfare and set the path for future development.

Pike and Shot: The Ways of War

The style of warfare in the early 17th century was essentially standardized across Europe. Pike and musket squares, mostly based on the Spanish *battalia* or *tercio*, formed the main body of an army. These squares were composed of 2,000 to 3,000 infantrymen each, and were arranged with other squares into diamond- or arrowhead-shaped formations.9 Within the squares, the pikemen formed the core while musketeers were positioned
around the perimeter. In battle, these formations would line up almost parallel to the enemy’s formations, presenting a solid wall of pike points and musket balls. Infantry maneuvers were slow and complex, as squares needed to maintain their geometric integrity in order to remain effective. Beside the infantry, cavalrymen would charge toward the opposing side and, upon closing the distance, discharge their pistols at the enemy; they would then ride back to their own lines to reload. Artillery, though relatively refined, was still heavy and cumbersome; pieces had to be carefully positioned before a battle and could not advance in support of a moving army. This system of fighting largely depended on the weight of the initial impact to overwhelm the enemy; the artillery barrage would soften up and punch holes in the opposing formations, the cavalry would provide constant harassment and skirmishing, and the pike and musket formations would confront the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

This system, however, had some inherent problems. The most obvious was the general independence of each type of soldiers, in that the infantry, cavalry, and artillery could not effectively work in concert during a battle. The infantry, locked in dense, tight squares, could not maneuver effectively to support the cavalry. The artillery pieces were excessively large and unwieldy, so much so that when a battle commenced and men began to move, the guns could not keep up with infantry maneuvers and had to remain stationary, limiting their effectiveness. This also meant that when an artillery position was being overrun by the enemy, the guns could not be swiftly moved to a more secure location; thus they often fell into hostile hands, as was the case at the Battle of Breitenfeld. In that encounter, Count Tilly, commander of the army of the Catholic League, had placed his artillery battery atop a hill that overlooked the battlefield, giving him a good vantage point and field of fire. As the Protestants advanced, however, Tilly’s soldiers were swept from their position and the guns captured; the Catholics then began to receive fire from their own artillery in addition to the Swedish cannonade, which contributed in no small part to their eventual defeat.
On top of the static artillery, this system’s use of cavalry also had some severe drawbacks. In antiquity and the medieval eras, cavalry were valued for its shock action in a galloping charge. The prevalence of firearms in the 17th century, however, asserted itself on cavalry doctrine and tactics. With the notable exception of Poland, who retained melee weapons in its cavalry arms, European nations began to outfit their mounted soldiers with missile equipment. From this trend emerged two distinct types of cavalymen, the cuirassier and the harquebusier, both of which used firearms from horseback (as opposed to dragoons, which were essentially infantry that moved around on horseback). The cuirassier was a direct descendant of the medieval men-at-arms, clad in a suit of armor and intended to carry the core of cavalry action; the harquebusier, on the other hand, wore much less armor and wielded a harquebus or carbine, and was intended to support the cuirassier by skirmishing and harassing the enemy. As the wheel-lock firearm replaced the lance, horsemen began to rehearse such elaborate maneuvers as the *caracole*: mounted soldiers would ride towards the enemy line, in a fast trot instead of a blazing charge, fire their pistols at relatively close distances, and turn away before contact with the enemy infantry. Successive waves of riders would follow this wheeling attack, unleashing a great volume of fire and shot. However, in actual combat, the *caracole* was as ineffective as it was elaborate. Cavalry were consistently outshot by musketeers in both range and accuracy, while horses that came too close to the formations fell victim to the point of the pike. The eternal virtue of cavalry, i.e. its ability to shock and overwhelm, was lost by the *caracole’s* reluctance to make contact. Thus cavalry became subordinate to the pike and musket of the infantry.

The Tactical Revolution—Foot and Horse

Such was the method of warfare when Gustavus Adolphus entered the turmoil of military conflict. In his wars against Poland, and later against the Catholic League and the Holy Roman Empire, Gustavus attempted to ameliorate the shortcomings of contemporary practices. In doing so, Gustavus reshaped the Swedish army into a highly flexible and mobile fighting force that
could excel in firepower as well as shock action. First, he decided that the infantry formations of the day were unnecessarily dense and heavy, which hindered their movements; Gustavus divided his infantry regiments into two units of around 500 men each, called squadrons, which could operate independently but also combine to confront a larger force.\textsuperscript{16} In battle, Swedish squadrons would usually form into brigades of four squadrons in a diamond formation or three in an arrowhead.\textsuperscript{17} This modulated system allowed for more maneuverability and flexibility in the chaos of battle.

Gustavus also saw the relative superiority of the musket’s offensive force over the pike’s defensive capability. Thus he decreased the number of pikemen in each squadron while increasing the number of musketeers, whom he equipped with lighter muskets that did not need the cumbersome rest on which heavier models had to be held.\textsuperscript{18} Paper cartridges also made their first significant appearance in Gustavus’ reforms;\textsuperscript{19} stored in pouch slings, these convenient devices prepackaged the powder, ball, and wadding for the musketeer, facilitating faster reloads and easy transportation. Accompanying this catalyst of firing rates was Gustavus’ introduction of volley fire, in which different sections of musketeers would fire at alternating intervals, thus providing a constant wall of lead towards the enemy. If the enemy remained undaunted and attempted to advance, the six-man deep rank would consolidate the musketeers into three ranks, in which “the front rank would kneel, the second rank would crouch and the third rank would stand.”\textsuperscript{20} These three ranks would, on an order, fire a single simultaneous salvo at the enemy, the notorious “Swedish Salvee.”\textsuperscript{21} This technique, along with the perpetual volley fire, provided the Swedish squadrons with ample firepower that could repulse an oncoming pike square.

Just as he improved the infantry situation, Gustavus Adolphus also made changes to the cavalry. Swedish cavalry had always been a subject of disdain and contempt in the military world of the 17th century, as Sweden lacked a strong equestrian culture and the Scandinavian climate impeded the breeding of tall and gallant steeds.\textsuperscript{22} Sweden also did not have the industrial capacity
to manufacture cavalry equipment until the 1640s, before which necessities such as wheel lock pistols, carbines, and armor had to be imported from more developed nations. Thus it was hardly surprising that when Gustavus started his reforms in the 1620s, Sweden possessed only one worthwhile cuirassier unit, the Adelsfana, which was composed of nobles whose feudal contract enjoined them to serve. Due to its aristocratic status, however, the Adelsfana was almost never involved in a serious operation. The mainstay of the Swedish cavalry, therefore, rested on the light harquebusiers, who did not have a heavy counterpart to support and had to carry out the shock actions themselves.

Such deficiencies in the Swedish cavalry prompted Gustavus Adolphus to make unorthodox changes to his army. When he returned from the first Polish campaign and a tour in Germany in 1621, Gustavus Adolphus began to remove the harquebus from the inventory of the harquebusiers and replace them with pistols, which were traditionally weapons of the cuirassiers. Thus Gustavus’ harquebusiers morphed into another class of cavalrymen, the Ringerpferd, or light horsemen. A jack of all trades, the light horseman could gallop in a furious charge as well as dash along in a scouting detachment. The versatility of the light horsemen compensated for their lack of quality, as specialists could easily defeat these general purpose plebeians in pitched battle. In addition, Gustavus Adolphus brought back the notion that cavalry should be utilized for its shock impact, an idea that had almost been eliminated by the popularity of firearms and the emphasis on pike and shot formations. On the battlefield, Gustavus’ light horsemen would harass the enemy with pistol fire, much like the caracole did, but on a given signal would all draw swords and charge. Targeting areas that had been disrupted by the salvos, the cavalry would slash and stab asunder an infantry square, rendering the enemy formation broken and scattered. This emphasis on rapid and powerful maneuvers to punch through enemy lines was arguably revived by Gustavus, and can still be seen in the German blitzkrieg, the air cavalry in Vietnam, and even the armor tactics of the Gulf Wars.
The Tactical Revolution—Artillery

Among the three types of fighting units, i.e. the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, Gustavus’ most eminent contribution to modern warfare is perhaps in the third category. Since its introduction to European warfare, artillery had played a major, if not revolutionary, role in the progression of defense and offense. Whereas arrows and other non-gunpowder projectiles faced a serious opponent in a castle’s walls, a blazing sphere of lead, propelled by the power of chemical combustion, smashed into fortifications with effect. Gunpowder-propelled projectiles also retain more kinetic energy over long distances, allowing them to tackle thicker walls and armored entities. From Urban’s cannon in the siege of Constantinople to the GPS-guided Excalibur shells of the U.S. Army, artillery experienced a wide range of change and adaptation in its journey to become the deliverer of indiscriminate destruction. Many of those changes came under the supervision of Gustavus Adolphus, who arguably elevated artillery to the status of the third arm.  

Modern concepts such as regimental artillery, standardized bore configuration, and fixed ammunitions all originated with the Swedish monarch.

By the start of the Thirty Years War, artillery had already become a significant force on the battlefield. Manned by master artillerymen, these pieces could obliterate an infantry square or thwart a cavalry attack. There were still, however, several shortcomings that plagued these tools of war; beside the lack of mobility, the artillery of the day was hindered by their slow rates of fire and the alienation of the artillerymen as artisans rather than soldiers.  

Retaining the medieval system of guilds, the artillery was an independent commercial enterprise and not a part of the regular army; the master gunners were civilian chemists who worked for profit and relentlessly guarded the secret of their art. Individual masters would concoct their own special blend of powder, forge their own tubes in a variety of calibers, and devise their own instruments in positioning these guns. This commercial diversity inevitably destroyed effective management and resulted in logistical disasters. Artillerymen also differed from the regular soldier
in conduct; motivated only by their pay, artillerymen were prone
to abandon their posts as the enemy approached their immobile
pieces, leaving the guns to their foes while escaping with their
lives. Thus artillerymen were often accompanied by infantry units
assigned as artillery guards, who not only protected their position
from enemy advances, but also prevented the artillerymen from
running away on an impulse.29 On the positive side, artillerymen
usually avoided looting and plundering, which were common
practices of ordinary soldiers during the Thirty Years War.30

It was this convoluted collaboration of soldiers and civilians
that Gustavus Adolphus amended first. Instead of hiring capricious
artillerymen when the occasion arises, Gustavus sought to raise
his force through a series of national conscription and training
schools.31 The artillerymen would be trained just as soldiers were,
strengthening their resilience, order, and organization. They were
also issued standard equipment; instead of the assorted variety of
guns brought by individual artillery masters, Gustavus Adolphus
introduced three distinct classes of artillery: siege, ship, and
field.32 The differences between the three were mainly in size and
weight; whereas a 24-pounder gun of the siege type weighed three
tons, its equivalent (also firing a 24-pound projectile) in the field
class weighed only 2,700 pounds.33 The ship artillery weighed in
somewhere between these two classes. Gustavus was also quick to
embrace innovations in gun design. Von Siegeroth, one of his
artillery officers, had discovered in the 1620s that short-barreled
guns, of quality manufacture, could achieve the same ballistic
performance as longer-barreled pieces. This discovery prompted
Gustavus to stipulate, in 1624, that all aging and obsolescent
pieces be melted down and recast into new patterns that were
more wieldy and manageable. In 1625, Gustavus himself devised
a light cast-iron piece that could be adequately transported by a
single horse or three men. Each infantry regiment was issued one
or two of such pieces, which, due to their reduced weight, were
able to move along with the infantry and provide local artillery
fire.34 Thus every regiment could call upon artillery support even
when they were detached from the main army. Quickly adopted
by other European nations, Gustavus’ light piece became known
as the *pièce Suédoise*, it also jumpstarted a new kind of artillery called “regimental artillery,” a term still in use today.

A lighter and more mobile gun, however, was not enough to satisfy the Swedish King. In a further break with orthodox canon, Gustavus increased the ratio of artillery pieces to infantrymen; while other armies typically had one gun to every thousand men, the Swedish lines could boast up to six, mainly because of the smaller regimental pieces that came with each individual regiment. To accompany his regimental artillery, Gustavus Adolphus also introduced the first artillery cartridge. Whereas previous guns required loose powder and projectile to be rammed down separately, the Swedish piece utilized a thin wooden case to hold both the powder and projectile, which could then be loaded into the gun as a single unit. This was the first instance of self-contained ammunition being used in an artillery piece, and it dramatically increased the rate at which the gun could be fired. In the time it took a contemporary musketeer to fire six shots, Gustavus’ regimental artillery piece could discharge eight rounds. This substantial rate of fire gave the Swedish artillery a prodigious reputation throughout Europe, and no doubt helped cement Gustavus Adolphus’ place as one of the most remarkable contributors to modern warfare.

**Fighting in Unison**

Having substantially improved all three arms, Gustavus Adolphus set about combining them in tactical cooperation. By training the infantry, cavalry, and artillery to work in concert, Gustavus produced a coherent force that excelled in both ranged and melee techniques, a combination forgotten in Europe since the apex of Roman expansion, when the proud Roman legionnaire threw his *pilum* and drew his *gladius*. Realizing the mutual dependence between each type of arm, Gustavus arranged his forces to minimize individual vulnerabilities. For instance, the cavalry, due to the limited range of wheel-lock pistols, was vulnerable to enemy musketry if deployed on its own; Gustavus therefore positioned “plottons” of around 50 musketeers among the cavalry squadrons. The musketeer could respond to enemy fire at a
longer range and could help defend against enemy cavalry. This junction of different arms was aptly summed by Brian D. Moore:

His regiments were merged into brigades on line (linear tactics) and integrated with cavalry and artillery (combined arms) to form self-sustaining combat groups which could also provide mutual support when acting in concert. The cavalry could be used to overrun the enemy infantry and artillery (shock action) or neutralize the opposing cavalry (“the best weapon against a tank is another tank”). The artillery would suppress the enemy supporting arms (gain fire superiority) while the infantry would advance firing by salvo (fire and maneuver) until near enough for the “push of the pike” (close combat).  

Beside innovations in equipment and technology, Gustavus also revolutionized several military policies and doctrines. Realizing that mercenaries were expensive and unpredictable, he sought to create a Swedish national army through planned conscription. This thoroughly Swedish army was probably the first example of a modern military organization, as soldiers would have national allegiance to their country and could be mobilized relatively quickly throughout the year. In contrast, other contemporary European powers relied mostly on foreign mercenaries when a war seemed inevitable, and often ended up spending a large percentage of the national coffer to pay these professional, albeit usually capricious, soldiers of fortune. When the fighting was concluded, the mercenaries would be discharged to find another employer. Although they were skilled soldiers, mercenaries could be as big a threat to their employer as they could a benefit. When underpaid, mercenaries had a tendency to plunder the vicinity or worse, turn against their employers; such was the case when Carthage failed to pay its mercenaries after the lengthy First Punic War, which resulted in an orgy of bloodshed between discontented mercenaries and loyal Carthaginian forces known as the Mercenary War or, alternatively, the Truceless War. The danger of using mercenaries thus prompted Gustavus to recruit native Swedes into his army, establishing the basis of modern conscription and the regular military.
Conduct and Discipline

“You may earn salvation under my command, but hardly riches.”—Gustavus Adolphus to his soldiers.

Gustavus also had a proclivity for strict discipline in his army. Deeply religious in the Protestant faith, Gustavus mandated prudent conduct and courteous respect among his soldiers. Pillaging and mistreating civilians, which were common practices of other contemporary armies, were punishable by death in the Swedish army.46 Gustavus’ army obtained most of its supplies through good relationships with the local population, in contrast to the blatant plundering and robbery exploited by other armies.47 This exceptional respect for noncombatants was unprecedented in Europe and gave the Swedish army and Gustavus Adolphus an affable reputation among civilians. Although this distinction between soldiers and civilians would fluctuate over the subsequent centuries, with a notable low during World War II, it remained one of the most important and emphasized aspects of any modern military doctrine.

Breitenfeld

Gustavus’ reforms and innovations culminated in the great battles of the Thirty Years War. In his furious clashes with the Catholic League and the Holy Roman Empire, Gustavus proved that flexibility and firepower trump weight and density. At the Battle of Breitenfeld, in 1631, the Swedish army came up against the hitherto undefeated Catholic forces of Count Tilly. Composed mostly of mercenaries, Tilly’s soldiers were notorious for the siege and subsequent sacking of Magdeburg earlier that year. In that bloodbath, 40,000 of Magdeburg’s inhabitants were slaughtered by Tilly’s forces and every building, except the city cathedral, was burned down.48 When asked to control the violence being practiced upon Magdeburg, Tilly was said to have replied, “I’ve promised three days for pillaging and slaying. The soldiers must have some amusement after so many fatigues!”49 Those Catholic forces thus proved to be a marked antithesis of Gustavus’ well-disciplined soldiers, whom they finally met in pitched battle on September 17, 1631, at the Battle of Breitenfeld. Prior to this dramatic clash,
Gustavus had secured the alliance of John George I, the Elector of Saxony, and thus added about 18,000 Saxons to his army. In total, the Protestant contingent numbered about 45,000 troops, while Tilly commanded around 40,000. Representing the old order, Tilly arranged his infantry into 15 or so massive squares, each boasting around 1,500 men. He placed about 30 pieces of heavy artillery in front of the squares, atop a small hill, and positioned his cavalry along the flank of the main formation. On the other side, Gustavus, utilizing his reformed tactics, drew his infantry into two lines, with four brigades forming the first and three brigades the second; he also made sure to keep an adequate number of reserves in the rear, to respond to any surprise or flanking maneuvers. The Swedish artillery only had 12 heavy guns positioned in front of the infantry, but placed 42 regimental pieces among the brigades.

Thus arranged, Tilly’s and Gustavus’ forces commenced to fight. Pitting the former’s orthodox formation against the latter’s revolutionary tactics, the battle opened with an artillery barrage that persisted for two hours. As the shelling drew to an end, Tilly’s cavalry surged forward to harrow the Protestants with pistol fire, only to be shot down by Gustavus’ well-placed musketeers. The Catholic force then attempted to advance upon the Protestant line, and succeeded in driving the inexperienced Saxons from the field. The Swedes, seeing their Saxon allies breaking in flight, quickly regrouped into squadrons and counterattacked the advancing Catholics. The flexibility and mobility that accompanied the Swedes’ smaller formations ensured that they could rapidly maneuver to meet an attack, while the regimental artillery and combined arms tactics offered the squadrons unparalleled firepower against the enemy assault. Whereas the extremely dense Catholic squares fell victim to the numerous pièce Suédoise, the smaller, more maneuverable Swedish squadrons suffered less from Tilly’s heavy guns, which could not be effectively traversed to follow infantry action. Just as the Swedish squadrons were turning back the Catholic advances, Gustavus personally led a cavalry charge that swept across the Catholic line, cutting down exposed infantry and capturing the heavy guns on the hill. These pieces were then promptly re-aimed towards the Catholic squares, smashing into the
close-knit, sluggish formations; further cavalry action, in conjunc-
tion with artillery, broke the Catholic ranks and inspired chaos
therein. Scattered and disorganized, the Catholic forces suffered
everous casualties (more than 7,000 killed or wounded) and
ceased to function as a coherent army. The Swedish side counted
only 2,000 dead.\textsuperscript{52}

In Retrospect

“I am the King of Sweden! And on this day I seal with my
blood the liberties and religion of the German nation.”

—Gustavus Adolphus, before his death at the Battle of Lützen.

Breitenfeld proved to be a complete victory for Gustavus Adolphus
and his revolutionary tactics, and also marked the first major de-
feat for Count Tilly’s fearsome army. The Swedes’ combination of
firepower and flexibility, much of which is still emphasized today,
made itself felt as regimental artillery decimated Catholic squares
and Swedish squadrons regrouped with unprecedented speed.
Gustavus would continue to lead the Protestant forces until his
untimely death at the Battle of Lützen, where his propensity for
action and personal participation cost him his life. His innovations
and tactics, however, would outlive him by several centuries. The
emphasis on flexibility and firepower, so central to the Swedish
doctrine, would reassert itself as the German \textit{blitzkrieg} swept across
Europe during World War II. Shock cavalry found a new manifesta-
tion in the charging panzers, while regimental artillery took to the
sky, as Stukas dive-bombed enemy targets. The cohesion between
tanks, aircraft, and infantry necessary for \textit{blitzkrieg} was a direct de-
cendant of the combined arms tactics pioneered by Gustavus, 300
years earlier. More recently, the American forces during the Gulf
Wars also drew upon Gustavus’ innovations. Using the speedy and
powerful M1 Abrams Tank, as well as attack helicopters, American
armored divisions smashed through the Iraqi T-72s with rapid
movement and overwhelming firepower; this reflected Gustavus’
emphasis on maneuver and shock actions, which facilitated the
American victory over a numerically superior enemy.
Although the Thirty Years War may seem like a distant event from today’s perspective, the changes and innovations that emerged from it are still very relevant. The combination of infantry, cavalry (tanks, helicopters, motorized troops, etc.) and artillery remains just as important on the modern battlefield as on the bloodied ground of Breitenfeld. The concept of a national military, composed of citizens, remained the norm for most stable countries in the 21st century. When Gustavus Adolphus started his military innovations in the 1600s, he laid down the basis on which the modern armed forces are still being built; his revolutionary tactics transformed the European style of warfare and paved the way towards modernity. With no foreseeable end, this process of military advancement is likely to accompany humankind throughout its journey, cementing the lasting impact wrought by the indomitable Swedish monarch.
Notes

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ATTACKING THE AIRWAVES: HOW TELEVISION CHANGED THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Byung Joon Lee

On the eve of the 1952 presidential election, Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson sat down with his family and running mate John Sparkman for a nationally-broadcast election eve special. For Stevenson, the 1952 election had been an uphill battle against Dwight Eisenhower, a popular and decorated World War II general. The election eve broadcast was Stevenson’s last shot at a victory. After engaging in small talk with Sparkman and his two sons, Stevenson faced the camera for his closing remarks.1 Speeches had always been Stevenson’s forte; he was well known in political circles as a powerful orator.2 However, as Stevenson neared the climax of his final speech of the 1952 campaign, the producer of the television station cut him off. He had run over time.3

Stevenson’s election eve disaster signaled a new age for American politics. The era of long-winded campaign addresses and flowery radio speeches was over. Like it or not, presidential candidates now had to adapt to a whole new medium: television.

The process of selecting the President has always been a vital part of American democracy. One of the key components of this process is the presidential campaign, which allows the

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candidates to share their views with the American public. Over the past six decades, the advent of television has fundamentally altered the way in which campaigns are carried out. Television continues to be the cornerstone of the modern-day presidential campaign; in 2012 the Obama and Romney campaigns spent 41 percent and 50 percent of their respective campaign funds on television advertising.4

This paper analyzes the evolution of television’s influence on the presidential campaign by examining the first five presidential races that widely incorporated television: Eisenhower vs. Stevenson (1952 and 1956), Kennedy vs. Nixon (1960), Johnson vs. Goldwater (1964) and Nixon vs. Humphrey (1968). Ultimately, television’s overall impact on the American presidential campaign is mixed: while it increased the exposure average Americans had to presidential candidates, it also shifted the campaign away from issues and towards image and emotions.

What Is the Purpose of a Campaign?

Before analyzing the impact of television on the presidential campaign, it is important to discuss what a campaign is. A campaign can be defined as the period before an election marked by a heavy volume of “information flow.”5 Simply put, during a campaign candidates disseminate information about themselves and their policies to voters.

How, then, does a presidential campaign contribute to the democratic process? To answer this question, it helps to look at the history of American democratic philosophy. Although the Founding Fathers never imagined the campaign craze that surrounds modern-day elections, they still agreed on the importance of an informed electorate. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, long emphasized the “necessity of educating the people generally, and… strongly stressed the importance of keeping them informed about specific issues.”6 Therefore, in its most ideal form a campaign works to create the “informed electorate” that Jefferson envisioned. Campaigns do so by “outlin[ing] the positions and character of the candidates so that voters can make informed decisions.”7
Modern political scientists typically pay attention to two factors when evaluating an election: political equality and deliberation.\(^8\) Political equality is the idea that all voters, regardless of background, should have their voices heard by actively participating in an election.\(^9\) Deliberation is a process in which voters “weigh… competing considerations through discussion that is… informed… balanced… substantive… [and] comprehensive.”\(^{10}\) Good elections uphold political equality while also encouraging deliberation among the electorate. To put it differently, the quality of an election depends on two benchmarks: (i) the number of citizens who participate in the election process; and (ii) the extent to which voters engage in serious, thoughtful consideration and discussion before casting their ballots.

Under this definition, a campaign should promote both deliberation and political equality to ensure a good election. For a campaign to encourage deliberation, it must focus on presenting the candidate’s political ideals, as well as his or her stand on various issues. That way, voters have the necessary information to engage in thoughtful dialogue prior to voting. At the same time, a campaign needs to uphold political equality. To do so, all citizens—regardless of background or socioeconomic status—should have equal access to a campaign and the information it provides.

Any campaign that fails either of these responsibilities does not fully perform its role of “outlin[ing] the positions and character of the candidates so that voters can make informed decisions.”\(^{11}\) A campaign that reaches a wide audience but is devoid of discussions of policy and issues fails to spark deliberation. On the other hand, even if a campaign focuses on providing voters with information about a candidate’s views, it does not promote political equality if only a select group of citizens have access to the campaign. Only a campaign that informs the entire public of the viewpoints and policies of a candidate provides the ideal foundation for informed, meaningful voting.
Despite the over 200-year long history of the presidency in the United States, the presidential campaign is a relatively new concept. In the early days of the American political system, presidential campaigns were done in private among members of the political elite. The beginning of the “modern” campaign can probably be traced back to the election of 1828. The race pitted Andrew Jackson, a War of 1812 hero dubbed “Old Hickory,” against John Quincy Adams. Unlike older campaigns, the race of 1828 saw the candidates appeal directly to the public. This was especially true for Jackson, who was able to use his war hero status and charismatic personality to gain widespread public support. In the end, 57 percent of eligible electors cast ballots—a dramatic increase from the mere 27 percent that had voted the previous election—and Jackson was sworn into office.

Jackson’s campaign had relied primarily on in-person communication; Jackson would organize rallies and speeches in which he would directly address voters about political issues. Campaigns after that of 1828 relied on similar methods; candidates would travel across the nation, delivering speeches and meeting voters face to face. During the 1896 presidential race, for instance, Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan delivered over 600 speeches. Despite the efforts of the candidates, such campaigning methods did not reach many individuals. William Jennings Bryan’s cross-country tour had a combined audience of only 5 million people. To make matters worse, attendees of speeches and rallies were often politically involved individuals who already had knowledge of the candidate and his or her policy stands. Uninformed voters who were uninterested in politics remained uninformed. Although these early campaigns often contained substantial discussion of policy, they failed to reach the general public. These campaigns, therefore, did not achieve political equality.

However, in 1928—exactly a century after Jackson’s victory—a new technological development fundamentally altered the campaign: the radio. Although it had been in existence for some time, 1928 was the first year the radio was used as a serious com-
Communication tool by presidential campaigns.¹⁹ That year, Herbert Hoover based his entire campaign around “seven well-crafted radio speeches to the nation.”²⁰ Following Herbert Hoover’s successful radio campaign, Franklin Delano Roosevelt also extensively used the radio in his presidential bid in 1932. The radio provided candidates with the unprecedented ability to address the entire nation simultaneously; by 1940, over 80 percent of American households owned one.²¹ This was a sharp contrast to the campaigns of the past, where candidates could not reach a significant audience. Public excitement over the radio’s political potential is probably best summed up in a 1924 Radiola advertisement, which excitedly proclaimed that

“No ‘influence’ needed this year for a gallery seat at the big political conventions! Get it all with a Radiola Super-Heterodyne… It used to be all of the delegates’ wives and the ‘big’ folks of politics. Now it’s for everybody. Listen in. Get it all!”²²

The introduction of the radio is therefore credited with creating campaigns that better informed the general public, as access to the candidates was no longer limited to rally participants and party leaders. The radio thus brought about a marked increase in the political equality of presidential campaigns.

Eisenhower/Stevenson and the Birth of the Spot (1952–1956)

The 1952 campaign would prove to be an even larger turning point for the presidential campaign. In 1950, only 10 percent of U.S. households owned television sets. By 1952 that figure had more than doubled to 25 percent.²³ Television was becoming a dominant communication medium, and the American democratic process began to adapt to this change.

The 1952 presidential race pitted well-liked World War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was then president of Columbia University, against Adlai Stevenson, who was serving as governor of Illinois.²⁴ Stevenson believed that, when addressing the nation through television, candidates would primarily communicate through speeches.²⁵ Speeches had been the medium du jour on the radio, and numerous candidates such as Franklin Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover had successfully used radio speeches to gain
popular support. Stevenson was renowned in political spheres as an eloquent and witty public speaker; in fact, he had secured the Democratic nomination partly due to a rousing opening speech at the 1952 Democratic National Convention. Believing his speeches would translate to television, Stevenson’s campaign purchased 30-minute blocks of airtime on national television. However, the campaign quickly realized that ratings for these televised speeches were abysmally low. The campaigning model that relied on 30-minute speeches was no longer relevant. Television required a more concise, brief, and attention-grabbing method of communication.

On the other hand, Stevenson’s opponent, Dwight Eisenhower, used a different approach in his television communications. The Eisenhower camp quickly acknowledged that television was a medium that had no precedent in political communications. Therefore, they turned to Rosser Reeves, a prominent Madison Avenue television advertising executive, for guidance on the new medium.

Reeves was well aware of television’s celebration of brevity. In fact, he initially wanted to consolidate Eisenhower’s entire platform into a single issue. Reeves stated in a memo that “[Ike] cannot write an advertisement that says thirty-two things about the product and expect the audience to remember. [He] should have taken one of those issues and really wrung it out.” Reeves believed that speeches were an over-long and outdated medium that was incompatible with television. Instead, he suggested that Eisenhower base his television campaign on spots. Spots, which were 30-seconds to a minute in length and modeled after television commercials, were short television segments in which candidates could communicate their views to the public. Although the political spot was a nascent concept, the Eisenhower campaign poured $2 million into a three week spot campaign. Michael Levin, an adviser to Eisenhower, lauded the spot as the “quickest, most effective…means of getting across a message in the shortest possible time.”
Eisenhower’s Levin-assisted campaign was tailored to the brevity of television broadcasts. By comparison, Stevenson’s speech-heavy strategy seemed hopelessly backwards. Unbeknownst to Stevenson, lengthy speeches had slowly begun to go out of fashion long before the campaign of 1952. During radio’s heyday in the 1920s and 1930s, campaign managers quickly found that the medium had a low tolerance for lengthy speeches. John W. Davis, who was the Democratic presidential candidate in 1924, commented that the radio “will make the long speech impossible or inadvisable…the short speech will be in vogue.” The birth of radio thus marked the end of the long campaign speech.

However, whereas the radio had merely shortened the campaign speech, television largely eliminated it altogether. Spots, which replaced speeches, boiled down a candidate’s platform and message to a meager 30 seconds. Inevitably, these shorter lengths came with a significant limitation: it was more or less impossible to discuss policies in depth in such a limited time frame. An adviser to Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign went as far as to state that “the shorter lengths” of spots “are less suited as a vehicle for examining issues.” Speeches had provided candidates with opportunities to support their claims with evidence and propose specific policies; such a luxury of time was not available in television spots.

The effects of this length difference are best observed when spots are compared to radio speeches. In 1936, during the depths of the Great Depression, then-candidate Franklin Roosevelt made a radio campaign address discussing the economic downturn. During the speech, he outlined several policies and changes he would enact if elected to combat poverty. Roosevelt stated he would work “to reduce hours over-long, to increase wages that spell starvation, to end the labor of children, to wipe out sweatshops….continue every effort to end monopoly in business, to support collective bargaining, to stop unfair competition, to abolish dishonorable trade practices.” Roosevelt continued by discussing American agriculture, urging “for reforestation, for the conservation of water all the way from its source to the sea, for drought and flood control, for better marketing facilities for
farm commodities, for a definite reduction of farm tenancy, for encouragement of farmer cooperatives, for crop insurance and a stable food supply.” Of course, Roosevelt’s speech was not based solely on policy points; nevertheless, he outlined several concrete steps he would take to fight the effects of the Great Depression.

Like Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower also tackled a number of economic issues in his 1952 campaign. Chief among these issues was the concern surrounding high inflation. To address the topic of rising prices, Eisenhower’s campaign produced and aired a spot entitled “High Prices.” The spot began with an actor playing a female citizen. She complained about how “high prices are just driving [her] crazy.” The camera then cut to Eisenhower, who delivered a brief response:

Yes, my Mamie gets after me about the high cost of living. It’s another reason why I say it’s time for a change, time to get back to an honest dollar and an honest dollar’s worth.

Unlike Roosevelt, who had had the opportunity to deliver speeches, Eisenhower could only speak for around 10 seconds in his spots. Consequently, Eisenhower’s spots featured far fewer policy points than Roosevelt’s speeches. In his radio speeches, Roosevelt had given voters a detailed idea of what actions he would take to alleviate poverty if elected president. Voters were able to learn that Roosevelt would, for example, create “better marketing facilities for farm commodities” and push for “farmer cooperatives” and “crop insurance.” In contrast, viewers of Eisenhower’s spots were only treated to vague promises of getting “back to an honest dollar.”

This is not an isolated incident; research shows that in general, television spots have failed to propose or discuss specific policy initiatives. As the campaign transitioned from radio-based to television-based, candidates lost the chance they once had to discuss issues and policy at length. To put it differently, the shortening of political communication by television spots made it harder for campaigns to fulfill their responsibility of promoting deliberation.

Eisenhower, who was the favorite to begin with, eventually won the race in a landslide, capturing 422 Electoral College votes
to Stevenson’s 89. In retrospect, just as important as Eisenhower’s victory were his milestones in political communication. Eisenhower had introduced America to the presidential spot, and in doing so he had paved the way for television’s increased role in American politics. Adlai Stevenson’s 1952 debacle also served as a powerful reminder that television was not a mere extension of the radio: it was an altogether different medium with a different set of characteristics and expectations.

Eisenhower’s introduction of the spot, however, was not met with universal support. Adlai Stevenson decried it as the “ultimate indignity to the democratic process” because it “merchandise[d] candidates like breakfast cereal.” Stevenson had produced spots in his 1952 race, but his campaign had considered them an afterthought. Stevenson’s spots during this campaign were shoddily produced to the point of being laughable; they often featured choppy animation and uninteresting visuals. Nevertheless, by the time Stevenson ran for office again in 1956, he was forced to admit that television had permeated the political system. Working with an advertising agency, Stevenson produced several spots, including two attack ads on Dwight Eisenhower and a biographical spot about his upbringing in Libertyville, Illinois. Stevenson had, in effect, agreed to be “merchandised like breakfast cereal.”

Eisenhower also made changes in his television campaign in 1956. Most significantly, he produced several spots that relied on testimonies from ordinary citizens. Such spots reinforced the idea that Eisenhower had been a popular president who was in touch with the average American. Stevenson’s surrender to television in 1956 showed just how powerful and unavoidable a medium television had become. 1956 also marked the first year when a larger percentage of Americans learned about candidates through television compared to any other medium. Eisenhower again won by large margin in 1956, capturing 457 electoral votes; Stevenson only obtained 73.
Kennedy/Nixon and the Introduction of the Presidential Debate (1960)

Pitting young Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy against then-Vice President Richard Nixon, the 1960 presidential race was among the closest in history. Kennedy eventually prevailed by a margin of less than 200,000 votes. Television played a major role in the campaigns of both candidates. As Stevenson and Eisenhower had done in the previous decade, both Kennedy and Nixon used spots extensively. Kennedy’s spots often highlighted his youthfulness and willingness to enact change. A jingle from Kennedy’s campaign lauded him as a man “who’s seasoned through and through/ but not so dog-goned seasoned that he won’t try something new.” In an unprecedented move, Kennedy also produced two celebrity-endorsement spots that featured Henry Fonda and Harry Belafonte. These spots reinforced Kennedy’s image as a young, down-to-earth politician who was in tune with modern popular culture. Nixon’s spots took a radically different approach. Unlike Kennedy, who stressed his youthfulness, Nixon used his spots to highlight his experience. Almost all of Nixon’s campaign spots followed the same format: Nixon sat at his desk, stared directly into the camera, and answered questions about foreign and domestic policy. Through his spots, Nixon tried to continuously reinforce the idea that he was the more qualified and experienced candidate, and that such political experience was necessary to defend American freedom from Communist threats.

Although spots did play a major role in the campaign, the 1960 election is best remembered for the introduction of the televised presidential debate. Political debates are a process as old as democracy itself. Athens, the birthplace of direct democracy, frequently hosted lengthy debates about political affairs. Somewhat surprisingly, however, presidential debates have only a brief history in American politics. Before the mid-1900s, the closest thing America had seen to a presidential debate was the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas senatorial debates. In 1948, Harold Stassen and Thomas Dewey, who were both candidates for the Republican nomination, held a radio debate on the issue of outlawing the
Communist party. Although the Stassen-Dewey debates were a success, drawing an estimated 40 million to 80 million listeners, subsequent campaigns did not follow their example.

In 1960, however, Nixon and Kennedy agreed to a series of four hour-long debates that would be aired on all television networks. Because the debates were specifically tailored to television, they inevitably differed from political debates of the past. For one, television shortened the length of the debate. Each Lincoln-Douglas debate had given both candidates 90 minutes to discuss the topic of slavery. The radio-broadcast Stassen-Dewey debates allotted one hour total for the discussion of Communism. Unlike these previous debates, which focused primarily on one issue, the Nixon-Kennedy debate covered a wide array of topics in a one-hour period. Consequently, each candidate had only 2 to 4 minutes to address and discuss each individual issue.

Most importantly, the 1960 debates allowed everyday Americans to visually experience a discussion between the candidates. Previous debates had not been visual experiences; the Lincoln-Douglas debates were primarily accessed through newspaper reports, while the Stassen-Dewey debate was solely broadcast through the radio. The visual component of the 1960 presidential debate proved to be an important factor. Average Americans were able to feel a personal connection to the candidates that they had previously been unable to experience. As Theodore White points out,

[The debates were able to give] the voters of a great democracy a living portrait of two men under stress and let the voters decide, by instinct and emotion, which style and pattern of behavior under stress they preferred in their leader…What the TV debates did was to generalize this tribal sense of participation, this emotional judgment of the leader, from the few to the multitude.

White’s analysis of the debates, however, applies also to television as a whole. Before television’s advent in politics, political candidates rarely received much individual attention. Oftentimes, political parties were the deciding factors of elections; the personal qualities of individual candidates were less important. By allowing for a visual connection with the campaign, television humanized the
candidates. In effect, television encouraged “a sense of personal choice of leader” that had been lacking in previous presidential elections.70

This humanization of presidential candidates changed the criteria with which they were evaluated by the public. Because candidates were now viewed as individuals instead of mere representatives of their respective political parties, voters began to judge candidates on personal qualities. The personality and public image that a candidate projected became crucial parts of the campaigning process. This is reflected in the painstaking efforts campaigns made to groom the public images of their candidates. Kennedy’s 1960 campaign constantly emphasized his youthfulness and willingness for change. Kennedy tried to paint himself as “the shy young sheriff ready to thwart the scheme[s]” of Nixon, who the Kennedy campaign portrayed as a “slick, shady railway lawyer about to bilk the townspeople.”71 In his 1968 presidential bid, Nixon’s advisers wrote copious memos before each of his major television appearances, stressing the importance of having Nixon appear “smiling, confident, [and] easygoing.”72

Television, therefore, helped create an entirely new criterion for judging candidates that was based on image. Of course, the growth of image politics meant that campaigns were less prone to focus on issues and policies.73 This made it difficult for television-era campaigns to fulfill their duty of providing in-depth information about candidates to voters. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that television’s humanization of politicians and candidates was an important turning point in 20th century America politics.

Johnson/Goldwater and the Visual Campaign

The most defining characteristic of television was its potential for visual expression. Unlike the mass mediums of the past, such as the radio, magazines, and newspapers, television was not a textual or verbal medium; it was instead a fundamentally visual one. Between 1952 and 1960, many spots failed to creatively use television’s visual potential. Most spots were in the “talking head” format, where a candidate addressed the camera directly.74 Never-
theless, a small number of campaign advertisements during this period showcased an appreciation for television’s visual possibilities. Dwight Eisenhower used a Roy Disney-directed cartoon spot called “Ike for President” to convey a warm and approachable persona. In his 1956 campaign, Adlai Stevenson released a spot titled “National Parks” which effectively used photographs and video clips of national parks to criticize Republican environmental policy.

However, campaign communication did not fully adapt to television’s visual nature until the 1964 race, which pitted Democrat Lyndon Johnson against Republican Barry Goldwater. At the time, Johnson was enjoying popularity due to the recent passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Goldwater, on the other hand, was a more divisive figure. Although many Republicans respected his firm commitment to conservative values, Goldwater also caused controversy with his blunt, outspoken demeanor. He went as far as to state in his acceptance speech for the candidacy that “extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.” Goldwater, however, was perhaps most notorious for his statements supporting the use of nuclear weapons. In an age of Cold War paranoia, Goldwater’s attitude towards nuclear weapons was met with outrage.

Taking advantage of this fear, the Johnson campaign released the spot “Peace, Little Girl” in September 1964. The spot opened with an image of a young girl, who was seen counting daisy petals in a field. Suddenly, she was interrupted by a menacing male voice, which slowly began a countdown. The camera gradually zoomed in on the girl’s face, which was by then panic-stricken. When the man finally reached zero, a bright flash appeared on-screen, accompanied by a deafening boom. After the infamous opening, Johnson declared in a voiceover that “these are the stakes: to make a world in which all of God’s children can live, or to go into the darkness. We must either love each other, or we must die.” The minute-long spot ended with a narrator calmly reminding viewers to “vote for President Johnson on November 3rd” as “the stakes are too high for you to stay home.”

Despite airing once, “Peace, Little Girl” went on to be a crucial factor in Johnson’s landslide victory. The spot also marked
a watershed moment in American political communications, as it was the first time that a visual image had played such a major role in a candidate’s victory. In retrospect, this shift from verbal to visual is extremely significant. Compared to verbal mediums, visual mediums have a higher emphasis on the visceral and emotional as opposed to the logical. As Gavriel Salomon once wrote, verbal communication is “logical…and sequential” whereas visual communication is “impressionistic, dense and ‘fuzzy.’” Verbal communication relies on language, which consists of universally agreed-upon rules, definitions and meanings. In contrast, visual images are often subjective and open to interpretation. Due to this, it is much more difficult to present logic-based arguments through visual images. Since it cannot effectively appeal to logic and reason, visual communication instead relies on emotional and visceral appeal. In effect, the criteria for evaluating presidential candidates were shifting away from a logos-based discussion of policy and ideas to a pathos-based discussion of emotions.

“Peace, Little Girl” showcased television’s reliance on the emotional. The intended purpose of the spot was clear: Johnson wanted to firmly associate Goldwater with nuclear destruction. What was interesting, however, was not the message of the spot, but how the message was delivered. Johnson did not state or attack any of Goldwater’s nuclear policies or beliefs; in fact, the spot never even mentioned Goldwater by name. Instead of such a logical approach, the spot capitalized on nuclear anxiety and society’s protective instincts towards children to create a powerful appeal to emotions.

Other spots released during the Johnson campaign showed a similar reliance on visual and emotional appeal. The spot “Poverty” consisted of photographs of poverty-stricken children; the spot “Ice Cream” juxtaposed the image of a young girl eating ice cream with narration warning of Goldwater’s support of nuclear testing; “Merely Another Weapon” used a video clip of an exploding bomb to suggest a Goldwater presidency would lead to disaster. The visual spots proved to be extremely effective; they
created a powerful link between Goldwater and chaos in the minds of the public.91

Johnson wound up winning the presidency with 486 votes to Goldwater’s 52. Looking back, historians believe Johnson’s spots to be a deciding factor in his massive victory.92 The 1964 race proved, in essence, that visual images could help decide elections. American politics had now entered a phase where visual communication was on a near-equal level of importance with verbal communication. However, visual communication is subjective and vague; each viewer interprets visual messages somewhat differently. Visual mediums are thus discouraged from conveying factual information, which is objective as opposed to subjective.93 Therefore, the cultural transition towards visual images made it difficult for a campaign to fulfill its duty of providing the information necessary for thoughtful deliberation.

Goldwater’s spectacular failure in the election highlighted another important facet of television: it “reject[ed] sharp personality.”94 The size of television’s audience surpassed that of any previous method of political communication. The broadcast nature of television meant that candidates could now reach larger numbers of voters than ever before. At the same time, this meant that candidates now had to cater to an extremely diverse set of interests and opinions. Because of this need to please a broad audience, television discouraged controversial or polarizing statements. In other words, instead of outspoken or opinionated politicians, television favored politicians with a friendly, non-controversial demeanor. In his book, *The Selling of the President 1968*, Joe McGinniss notes that

Television demands gentle wit, irony, understatement….The TV politician cannot make a speech; he must engage in intimate conversation. He must never press. He should suggest, not state; request, not demand. Nonchalance is the key word. Carefully studied nonchalance.95

In fact, candidates had avoided taking controversial stances on camera since the early years of television. During his 1952 television spot series “Eisenhower Answers America,” Dwight Eisenhower tackled a number of divisive topics such as taxation. However,
Eisenhower’s campaign staff discouraged him from explicitly taking a stance on these issues, fearing such an approach would “prematurely commit” Eisenhower to a “strait-jacketing answer.” Instead, the spots were purposely vague and open-ended. In effect, television made campaigns “unsuited to hot issues and sharply defined controversial topics.”

Television created a political climate that avoided controversy and firm ideological stances. Goldwater, who was a firm conservative, refused to adhere to these expectations. He spoke passionately about his political ideals and openly took strong stances on highly polarizing topics such as nuclear warfare and the Vietnam War. Furthermore, he addressed the public in a blunt, outspoken manner that contrasted heavily with that of his contemporaries. Goldwater’s refusal to play by television’s rules can therefore be seen as a contributing cause to his defeat.

Although television’s ubiquity made political information more accessible, some criticize its aversion to controversial topics. According to detractors, television hindered meaningful political discourse by discouraging candidates from publicly discussing divisive issues. As Edith Efron points out, “despite official freedoms from censorship” television had “a self-imposed silence.”

Nixon/Humphrey and the Television Election of 1968

Following Lyndon Johnson’s refusal to run for reelection, the Democrats chose then-Vice President Hubert Humphrey as their 1968 presidential candidate. Humphrey was up against Richard Nixon, who had successfully returned to the political sphere after years in the private sector.

By the time the 1968 presidential race arrived, television was ensconced as the main communications medium in presidential campaigns. During the election, a record 89 percent of Americans used television to learn about presidential candidates. Many of the practices and trends that television had created and developed over the past decade were on full display in both the Nixon and Humphrey campaigns.
Spots, which had slowly grown in importance since their introduction in 1952, played a larger-than-ever role in the 1968 campaign. Both candidates produced a quantity of nationally-broadcast spots that was unrivaled by any previous campaign. Nixon, in a move that further demonstrated the importance of spots, even chose to run a primarily spot-oriented campaign.

The 1968 campaign saw a massive influx in emotional, visual-oriented spots by both major party candidates. At the forefront of this change was Richard Nixon. During his first campaign in 1960, Nixon’s major spots had virtually all been in the “talking head” format; Nixon sat at his desk and directly addressed the camera, answering questions about civil rights, taxes, communism, and foreign policy. It was a strategy similar to that of Dwight Eisenhower, whom Nixon had served under. Nixon’s 1968 campaign, however, employed a different method. Only a small percentage of Nixon’s spots featured the candidate addressing the camera; instead, Nixon created spots that focused on personality and image.

Nixon relied mostly on a series of advertisements produced by filmmaker Eugene Jones. Jones took a new approach to spots: instead of creating spots that merely incorporated visual images, he directed spots that were based entirely on visual images. The most controversial of these was “Convention,” which aired a mere eight days before the election. “Convention” featured no written or spoken text. Instead, it displayed a rapid montage of photographs of Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey addressing the Democratic National Convention. These photographs were interspersed with images of poverty-stricken farmers and dying Vietnam War soldiers which were accompanied by dissonant sound effects. “Convention” was another turning point in political communication. For the first time, a candidate had created a spot that completely abandoned verbal communication and relied entirely on visual communication.

Nixon was clearly creating a link between Hubert Humphrey and the various socioeconomic problems of the 1960s through “Convention.” Because the spot is entirely visual, how-
ever, Nixon was unable to criticize Humphrey’s ideas or policy initiatives. Therefore, he could not make a logical argument against Humphrey. Instead, the spot relied solely on the emotional responses triggered by the graphic images and haunting music. “Convention” was, not surprisingly, met with disdain from the Democratic community, and Nixon pulled the spot after one broadcast. Nonetheless, “Convention” continued the growth of visual campaign communication that had been started by “Peace, Little Girl.” Aside from “Convention,” Jones produced eight other spots for Nixon. All but one of these spots revolved around rapid cuts, music, sound effects, and photographs. Like “Convention,” these spots were largely emotional in nature, with little discussion of policy or issues.

Hubert Humphrey also broadcast a number of visually oriented spots. Like those of his predecessor Lyndon Johnson, these spots heavily depended on images of children and nuclear weaponry to provoke fear. One, titled “Bomb,” opened with a video clip of a nuclear bomb exploding in the ocean. A narrator then criticized Nixon’s refusal to pass the United Nations’ Non Proliferation Treaty. Another advertisement, titled “Mother and Child,” depicted a mother hugging her young son and worrying about his future. Both attempted to elicit strong emotional responses from the viewer: “Bomb” aroused fear about nuclear arms, while “Mother and Child” targeted the concerns parents had for the well-being of their children. Like the spots of Nixon, however, Humphrey’s spots also contained little discussion of policy.

Although Hubert Humphrey proposed a presidential debate, Nixon refused. He had experienced a crushing defeat at the hands of Kennedy in the 1960 debate, and was unwilling to risk a repeat of this disaster. Furthermore, Nixon’s campaign wanted to promote a warm, universally approachable public image for their candidate. A debate risked alienating viewers and shattering this facade. By deliberately avoiding making controversial statements to the media, Nixon steered clear of the mistakes Goldwater had made in the previous election. Nixon’s decision to forgo the 1968 debate showed that television was a
medium where image-making took precedence over educating voters and discussing policy. Furthermore, it demonstrated that the presidential debate, which was hailed in 1960 as a landmark development for American politics, was not a guaranteed part of elections. Debates were not a mandatory public service candidates needed to perform; instead, whether a debate happened or not depended on the preferences of the candidate. All of these developments called into question whether television campaigns were truly beneficial to the American voters.

One final political development in 1968 was the proliferation of presidential primaries. This change would have the unintended consequence of cementing the influence of television. Previously, convention delegates, who voted for party candidates, were dominated by party leaders. A few states held primaries, but the practice was not widespread.121 The 1968 race, however, proved to be a chaotic one, featuring both the withdrawal of Lyndon Johnson and the assassination of Robert Kennedy. Furthermore, chaos ensued due to infighting between Democratic candidates Eugene McCarthy and Hubert Humphrey.122 In response, the Democratic Party decided that it needed to change its candidate selection process. A committee proposed the adoption of primaries in every state as a solution. Average citizens would vote in the primaries, and convention delegates would vote in accordance to the results of these primaries.123 By the 1972 race, primaries had become the norm for Republican and Democratic presidential nominations.124 The primary meant that “candidates had to appeal directly to the public” as opposed to “party activists and leaders” to secure the nomination of their party.125 Television, which allowed for such public appeal, was now as important to the candidate selection process as it was to the general election.

It is no exaggeration, therefore, to call the 1968 election a television election. In 16 short years, television had completed its journey from a fringe medium to the preeminent method of political discourse in America.
Conclusion

Television’s effects on the campaigning process are impossible to ignore. Whether those effects were positive or negative, however, is a difficult question to answer. According to the criteria established in the beginning of this paper, a campaign can be evaluated based on its ability to spark deliberation and maintain political equality. Judging by these benchmarks, television is a somewhat mixed blessing. On one hand, television provided campaigns with a far greater ability to communicate directly with the public. As a result, campaigns were able to reach larger audiences than previously possible. This introduced an unprecedented level of political equality to campaigns. On the other hand, television campaigns moved away from a logic-based discussion of policy. Instead, these campaigns often relied heavily on emotions and public image. To make matters worse, television discouraged the open conversation of controversial issues. All these changes made it harder for voters to get an accurate idea of what actions and policy initiatives a candidate planned to pursue if elected President. Consequently, it became more difficult for voters to engage in meaningful deliberation. In short, television lowered the quality of the information campaigns provided, but disseminated this information to an exceptionally large audience.

Famed media theorist Marshall McLuhan famously stated that “the medium is the message.” In other words, when information is communicated, the content of the information will inevitably be influenced by the method of communication that is being used. As an examination of campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s shows, political campaigns are not exempt from this rule: political communication adapts to the medium through which it is conveyed, not the other way around. Every era of history has its dominant medium, and the presidential campaign will adapt itself to fit the unique characteristics of that medium.

Television was a concise, broadcast, and visually-oriented medium, and thus political campaigning through television became concise, broadcast and visually-oriented. As our society slowly abandons television and moves towards online mediums,
the same principle will most likely hold. Online mediums, such as social networking sites and blogs, have a number of characteristics that separate themselves from television. For one, they are interactive; whereas television viewers passively consumed content, Internet users can share and comment. Furthermore, as shown by the 140 character limits of Twitter and the short lengths of most YouTube videos, online mediums favor brevity even more than television. The campaigns of the future will no doubt adapt to fit these idiosyncrasies. How effective these new mediums will be in promoting ideal campaigns remains to be seen.
Notes

3  Jamieson, p. 62
9  Fishkin and Luskin, p. 285
10  Ibid., p. 285
11  Nadler and Schulman
14 Ibid., p. xiv
15 Ibid., p. x
17 Ibid., p. 22
19 Michael X. Delli Carpini, “Radio’s Political Past,” Media Studies Journal (Summer 1993) p. 27
21 Iyengar and McGrady, p. 24
22 Radiola, Advertisement, Popular Science (July 1924)
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29 Ibid.
30 Diamond and Bates, p. 55
31 Ibid., p. 55
34 Diamond and Bates, p. 54
35 Ibid., p. 54
36 Delli Carpini, p. 25
38 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Speech at Madison Square Garden” (Madison Square Garden, New York City, 31 October

39 Ibid.

40 “High Prices,” Political advertisement (1952; Citizens for Eisenhower, 2012) from The Living Room Candidate

41 Ibid.

42 The Living Room Candidate

43 F.D. Roosevelt, “Speech at Madison Square Garden”

44 “High Prices”


47 Ibid.

48 The Living Room Candidate

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And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war, I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. Not that even so the truth was easy to discover: different eye-witnesses give different accounts of the same events, speaking out of partiality for one side or the other or else from imperfect memories. And it may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past, and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever.

Many of the technologies that we use today are the result of the Industrial Revolution. A major example is the railroads, which still transport many of the manufactured goods across the country. The Industrial Revolution, in turn, was possible because of the vast increase in production of metals, especially iron. The production of iron, in turn, would not have been possible without anthracite coal. Although anthracite coal initially met severe opposition, it became the first reliable, efficient fuel that affected many American industries without which the Industrial Revolution would never have taken off in the United States.

Coal first formed 360 million to 290 million years ago during the Carboniferous period. Dead vegetative matter, called peat, accumulated along with silt and other sediments. Tectonic movements (movements of the earth’s crust) buried the peat bogs and sediment, pushing them closer to the earth’s center. The closer to the earth’s center the bogs and sediment were, the higher the temperature and more pressure that, over time, changed the chemical structure of the peat, making it first into lignite, or brown coal. If the newly formed coal continued to be subjected to these
extreme conditions, it then became sub-bituminous, bituminous, and then, finally, anthracite.\footnote{1}

Coal formed under less heat and pressure or for a shorter duration has more vegetative matter; while coal subjected to the extreme conditions for longer duration has more carbon content as more of the peat and bogs is transformed into carbon. Another difference between these various types of coal is that while lignite has a brownish color, anthracite is black. Finally, coal formed in the earlier stages is generally also softer and easier to light. In contrast, anthracite is extremely hard, and, as a result, virtually impossible to light without proper equipment. As we will see later, this would turn out to be extremely important.\footnote{2}

Prior to the 1800s, most Americans relied upon bituminous coal and charcoal for most of their heating needs. There was no market for anthracite. In 1806, Philadelphia city’s waterworks bought a few tons of anthracite. Yet they could not use it, and the city tossed out the coal to be used as gravel.\footnote{3} Fourteen years later, in 1820, the nation’s, and especially Philadelphia’s, attitude towards anthracite had not changed much; when Erskine Hazard and Josiah White sent their first shipment of 365 tons of anthracite to Philadelphia, they were unable to find any customers.\footnote{4}

Part of the reason no one tried to use or sell anthracite was because it was hard to access. Most anthracite coal fields were located on rivers (for example, the Virginia and Pittsburgh seams) or on the sea coast (as was the case with the British and Nova Scotia fields). The latter were all in rugged, mountainous areas far away from navigable water.\footnote{5}

Anthracite coal was also hard to use. Its carbon content is between 85 percent and 100 percent, much higher than that of bituminous coal. This means that while it burns cleaner and with a more intense heat than bituminous coal or firewood, it is harder to ignite. Many people, even those who lived in or near the anthracite areas, thought it impossible to ignite.\footnote{6} When Philadelphia city’s waterworks threw out the anthracite coal, it was because they could not light it. Prior to 1812, many American manufacturers found it more economically sound to import coal from Great
Britain than to buy American coal. The War of 1812 temporarily changed this. Trade relations between the United States and the United Kingdom deteriorated. Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York were blockaded, leaving many Americans without a source of fuel. This spurred the search for a more economically viable source of energy, which would come in the form of anthracite coal.7

One of the most important anthracite pioneers, Jacob Cist of Wilkes-Barre, took advantage of the British blockade in the War of 1812. At the time, bituminous coal was still the preferred fuel. However, Cist believed that the uncertainty of supply of bituminous “enhanced hard coal’s [anthracite’s] possibilities.”8 Cist, who partnered with Charles Miner and John Robinson, obtained the rights to begin a venture in the Lehigh field at Summit Mine. This venture proved quite successful. During the winter of 1813–1814, Philadelphia’s major fuel crisis hit, and in March 1814 Cist reported that 100 tons of anthracite had been sold for $2,700, or a profit of $1,650 (or about $550 per partner in 1814 money).

After the War of 1812 ended, the immediate need to find a new, alternative source disappeared, and anthracite coal’s market temporarily withered away. However, entrepreneurs such as Jacob Cist continued to believe in the potential of anthracite. Other pioneers included White and Hazard, who had failed as entrepreneurs in other industries. They wanted to see if anthracite would be a viable alternative to other coal in the production of iron. They just faced the one problem that everyone else faced. It was nearly impossible to ignite.9

They accidentally discovered the secret on Monday, August 15, 1814. White and Hazard supervised their employees as they attempted to light the anthracite. Several times, the employees were ready to give up, but White forced them to stay. It was only at dawn that White admitted defeat and dismissed them, and shut the furnace door in exasperation. Later, a workman who had forgotten his coat went back to retrieve it. He found that the coal had been lit. And within half an hour of quitting, White knew that the solution to lighting anthracite was as simple as closing the furnace door!10,11,12
White and Hazard had been making the mistake everyone else had: treating anthracite as if it were Virginia, or bituminous coal. It does not take much heat to ignite bituminous coal. Moreover, it crumbles as it heats up, exposing more surface area of the coal, making its ignition time quite rapid. Thus, bituminous coal could be lighted even when heat was leaking out of an open furnace door. Anthracite is different. It is a compact, dense substance that does not break down as it is heated. It also takes substantially more heat to light anthracite than bituminous. In this case, the heat lost due to the open furnace door was a big deal. Closing the furnace door has a secondary effect, perhaps more powerful than the first. The closed door forces air, especially oxygen, through the coals, to make up for the lack of pores in anthracite for oxygen to travel through.13

Armed with this knowledge and confident of their abilities to use or market anthracite now that they had discovered how to light it, White and Hazard sought to acquire more anthracite coal. In 1817, White first tried to use the Schuylkill River, but the Schuylkill Navigation Company would not allow White to make the changes needed to bring coal down the river.

White was furious, and decided to try the Lehigh River instead. When in December he went to inspect the river, he became convinced that the Lehigh was a viable option for transporting anthracite. He also took the opportunity to inspect the mine that Cist had opened at Summit Hill, and in 1818, White, Hazard and a new-found partner, George Hauto, bought the mine from Jacob Cist.14

The three partners convinced the Pennsylvania legislature to give them sole and full access to the Lehigh River. They aimed to transform the Lehigh River into a canal to ship anthracite from Mauch Chunk to Philadelphia.

The state legislature agreed, anticipating the project to be a complete failure, as previous attempts had already been made to tame the Lehigh River. As one legislature put it, they were granting White and his partners “the privilege of ruining themselves.”15 Prospective investors were also dubious, and at first the three...
partners struggled to get financial backing. However, White and his partners managed to scrape together enough capital, and by the 1830s, the Lehigh River began to produce a steady supply of coal, reaching the 1 million ton mark in 1845.\textsuperscript{16}

Once geographical barriers were overcome, the next problem was to create a market for anthracite coal. Again, pioneers such as White and Cist prevailed. Their main method was to contact those who had been successful with anthracite to write testimonials about the efficiency of anthracite. Cist was an especially avid propagandist for anthracite using this method. He especially targeted blacksmiths, ironmasters or other manufacturers, the biggest consumers of fuel.\textsuperscript{17} By 1856, anthracite had come to so dominate the fuel industry that an American correspondent to the Royal Society for the Arts wrote: “it [anthracite coal use] is universal in America.”\textsuperscript{18} Not only that, but a blacksmith in the Lehigh region became so addicted to the advantages of anthracite that he said that he “would rather pay $.50 a bushel for anthracite than $.07 a bushel for charcoal.”\textsuperscript{19}

Cist went further, however. He would pay craftsmen to try anthracite so that he could get the testimonials. And where existing technologies failed, he worked tirelessly to invent new ones adapted to burn anthracite. For example, he drew plans for new furnaces that would make it easier to light and burn anthracite.\textsuperscript{20}

There were many advantages to adopting anthracite coal once cheap transportation and easy ignition of the coal had been achieved. For one thing, anthracite became a lot cheaper than either bituminous coal or charcoal. Part of the reason was that nearby forests were depleting quickly, naturally increasing the price of charcoal. By 1830, a ton of anthracite that cost between $7.50 and $8.00 a ton could do the work of 200 bushels of charcoal priced at between $0.06 and $0.08 per bushel. So, the cost of $7.50 to $8.00 worth of anthracite could do the work of $12 to $16 worth of charcoal.\textsuperscript{21}

Another possible contributing factor to anthracite’s economic viability may have been its efficiency. Andrew Fyfe, a scientist in 1841 conducted experiments to determine anthracite’s ability
to generate usable steam as compared to Scotch coal. From his experiments and calculations, using anthracite coal, there was “a loss of 19 per cent [of] the total heat evolved.” He observed that “With the Scotch coal the loss amounted to 28.97 per cent.”22 The loss to which he refers is how much heat is wasted. A difference of 10 percent is a lot, especially on the scales that many manufacturers were starting to operate. A reason that anthracite coal was more efficient is because it burned longer and with a more intense flame than either bituminous coal or charcoal.

Finally, anthracite coal burned cleanly. Anthracite coal has a high carbon content, which means that there are fewer impurities in the coal itself. The result was twofold. The first was that it curried favor among all Americans for domestic uses due to the lack of fumes and smell. The lack of impurities in the coal also meant that there were no impurities to contaminate the iron with which manufacturers were working, thus increasing the quality of the iron.23

One of the biggest impacts the anthracite coal trade had was in the iron and transportation industries. The iron industry was anthracite’s first market because anthracite was considered a better buy than either charcoal or bituminous coal. This was because most fuels had impurities that contaminated the iron. Anthracite, made of almost pure carbon, did not contaminate the iron. Another advantage was that the intense heat that the anthracite coal generated lowered the amount of anthracite needed per unit of iron, decreasing the unit cost of iron.

Evidence of this transition to anthracite can be seen in the McLane Report of 1832, at which time 116 air and cupola furnaces had been listed for the state of New York. A mere 16 relied more on charcoal and bituminous than anthracite and only 11 relied solely on charcoal and bituminous coal.24 This is linked to an increase in total iron production, from approximately 230,000 tons of pig iron to 760,000 tons between 1842 and 1847. And by 1855, according to an estimate by the Royal Society for Arts, the U.S. was tied with France for second in terms of total iron production, surpassed only by Great Britain.25
Industries not related to the production of metals also benefitted from the cheap accessibility of anthracite coal. With the introduction of anthracite, many more manufacturers could use anthracite to power steam engines, which replaced wind or water power, which was unreliable. Oliver Evans, as quoted from *A Landscape of Energy Abundance*, said, “Water-falls are not at our command in all places, and are liable to be obstructed by frost, drought, and many other accidents. Wind is inconstant and unsteady: animal power, expensive, tedious in the operation, and unprofitable, as well as subject to innumerable accidents. On neither of these can we rely with certainty. But steam at once presents us with a faithful servant, at command in all places, in all seasons; whose power is unlimited.”

Steam engines allowed manufacturers to make use of factories and move them into urban areas while guaranteeing a steady supply of power. This meant that they could bring their factories closer to both the market place and the labor force. It saved costs on both transporting labor to the work place and transporting goods to the market place.

One example of a non-metallurgic industry that benefitted from the introduction of anthracite was the glass industry because it “encouraged the adoption of the new form of production.” The process of making glass is similar to the process of making iron; sand, soda, and lime need to be melted together at a high temperature. Anthracite fueled steam-powered machinery that replaced jobs previously done by workers.

Other non-metallic industries benefited from cheap anthracite as well. Machines gradually replaced manual labor in the production of paper. In 1830, nearly all paper was produced by hand; by 1860 paper was produced almost exclusively by machines. The most striking feature is that all of these machines, from the beginning, were powered by steam.

Nor were material goods industries the only ones to benefit from anthracite. The availability of cheap steam power, made possible by anthracite, also played a crucial role in the transportation industry. More specifically, boats were a major beneficiary of the
discovery and cheap abundance of anthracite coal. Until the 1830s, many boats, especially those that ran on western rivers, still relied upon charcoal for fuel. Although bituminous coal was cheaper than wood, it was less reliable in terms of transportation and did not burn as cleanly as charcoal. Most boats carried only one day’s worth of fuel, usually to save weight (although sometimes it was to save space). So to refuel during the trip, boats stopped at forests bordering the river to cut wood and restock.29

In the 1830s and 1840s, this method of refueling the boats became unreliable and more costly. As more and more towns and factories developed in previously unsettled lands, they began to exhaust the wood supplies that boats had previously used. Furthermore, the price of bituminous coal and charcoal increased in the 1840s as a result of the depletion of the natural resources.

Anthracite coal would be the solution to many of these problems. Since 1826, the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company had experimented with using anthracite in their steam engines, and by 1831 had a boat, the Pennsylvania, that burned anthracite. It took a long time to boil the water into steam. However, the fuel saved because of the intense heat anthracite generated more than made up for the time lost. The Delaware and Hudson Company also promoted the use of anthracite coal. They experimented with new boilers that withstood the heat of anthracite and advertised its cheapness, cleanliness and density. The company’s methods worked, and by 1840 most ships in the East had converted to anthracite for their fuel.30

In contrast to the East, the West was slower to adopt anthracite as a source of fuel: “As late as the mid-1850s coal firms were complaining that while western steamboats used bituminous coal, wood was still an important part of their fuel.”31 One culprit may have been the unreliability of coal supplies. Another may have been that technological inventions adopted to burn coal were slow to trickle to the West. This may have been because anthracite was more expensive in the West than in the East. Most of the anthracite coal fields were in the East, around Pennsylvania. The transportation revolution was just beginning with the introduction
of railroads, meaning hefty transportation prices. Consequently, transportation costs alone may have made anthracite uneconomical for western canals, even with the rising costs of charcoal and bituminous coal.

In contrast to the burning of wood by boats on canals, most steam engines used to power railroad locomotives relied upon charcoal and bituminous coal. Ironically, the first American-built locomotive to run in the country, “Tom Thumb,” burned Pennsylvania anthracite coal. However, the intense heat that anthracite produced, which its many users regarded as a benefit, was a problem in locomotive engines. The heat had a tendency to destroy the machinery.

In a report to the President of the Philadelphia and Reading Rail Road Company in 1849, George W. Whistler Jr. details these problems. He states:

The melting of grate bars consequent upon the use of coal, is quite uncertain. I have known whole sets to be destroyed as often as once a month, and again with care, a single set to last several months. The principal causes which govern this waste, are, the care bestowed by the firemen in keeping clear the fire-grate and ash-pan, and the nature of the coal used. If cinder is allowed to adhere and accumulate upon the grate, it will soon be destroyed; for the current of air is prevented that free access through all parts of the grate, so necessary to its preservation.

The resulting maintenance costs made it uneconomical to use anthracite coal in locomotives despite the cheap price. By Whistler’s estimate, every year, one Baltimore Coal Engine burning anthracite on the Reading Railroad incurred $207 more in maintenance costs than wood-burning engines. (For comparison purposes, $207 in 1913 is worth $4,964.51 today, so $207 in 1849 must be worth more than $5,000 today!) Other problems included the “control and retention of steam produced by the slower-burning anthracite, the translation of steam power to adhesion of wheel to track for heavy loads, long hauls and steep ascents, as well as incomplete combustion.”
Two examples of failed attempts at using anthracite were the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad. For a while, both companies experimented with locomotive engines that burned anthracite. However, due to numerous technical difficulties detailed above, they, too, were eventually forced to revert to using bituminous coal.37

No matter what fuels the railroads chose to use for their steam engines, the railroads and anthracite were dependent on each other; neither could have survived without the other. Many railroads began as a means of transportation for anthracite coal. For example, one the first railroads had been established to simply transport anthracite to a nearby canal so that anthracite could be transported to Philadelphia.38 The Philadelphia Reading Railroad was established with the idea that anthracite would be its major cargo, and was designed to challenge the monopoly that the canals had on the anthracite transportation industry.39

Iron was also a beneficiary of anthracite and railroads, and the dependence was mutual. Improvements to the railways were necessary for railroads to become successful, because the old iron railings were too weak to support the weight of the trains and locomotives. This was done by changing the metal used to make the tracks from iron to steel, which is made from iron. Iron also played other important roles in the railroad industry: “For many years the railroads consumed as much as 50 percent of the iron and steel industry’s total output in the form of rails, locomotives, cars, and railroad bridges.”40 And the increase in iron was only possible because of anthracite. Thus, the iron, railroad, and anthracite industries were intricately linked to each other, each dependent on the other.

Anthracite coal played one final, crucial role in the development of American industry. Anthracite allowed Americans to break out of an organic economy, in which “all energy is derived from the direct capture of solar energy.”41 As a society grows, this is an unsustainable path, as trade-offs must be made with regards to the finite resource—land, which poses a significant problem in an organic economy. Land used to grow trees for fuel cannot be used
for farming and/or habitation, and vice versa. The introduction of anthracite allowed a society to increase the acreage of developed land for farming or industrial purposes without sacrificing energy production, which allowed societies to grow exponentially. The increase in energy resulting from the introduction of anthracite was responsible for America’s production to grow beyond the carrying capacity of the land, and is what allowed the U.S. to surpass Great Britain’s iron production near the turn of the 19th century.

Anthracite had one other impact in its wide acceptance for domestic use. Many households prior to the 1830s used bituminous coal and charcoal. As the price of anthracite dropped, and with new innovations that allowed homeowners to burn anthracite coal without the destruction of the grates, anthracite gained favor among the majority of households. An American correspondent for the *Journal of the Society for Arts* wrote in 1856 that the use of anthracite coal in households “is universal in America” and that “we keep very comfortable through long winters, with the thermometer constantly in the neighbourhood of zero, almost as often below as above it.” The writer continued to cite the cheap price, the efficiency and the cleanliness of the anthracite coal as reasons for the coal’s “universal” acceptance in America.42

Anthracite coal was important in many sectors of American industry. Iron and steel production were tied to the development of anthracite coal. Even today, the railroads play a major part in transporting goods all across the United States. Although locomotives no longer use anthracite, its origins are linked inextricably with anthracite’s growth.

We cannot forget that we are consuming more anthracite than is produced naturally per year. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that at the current increase in rate of usage of all coal, America’s coal resources will deplete within 200 years, and 93 percent of all coal is used to generate electricity. Furthermore, 37 percent of all electricity is generated by coal.43

In recent years, interest in coal, and especially in anthracite, has risen. As recently as February 2013, Hal Quinn, the president and CEO of the National Mining Association predicted that by
2015 coal would surpass oil as the world’s primary energy source. China once exported coal in huge amounts, forcing U.S. coal out of the world market. However, as its economy changed, it began importing coal.\textsuperscript{44}

China is not alone in showing interest in coal. In fact, Hal Quinn states that “Ironically, focusing on the China story actually minimizes the growing coal demand elsewhere.” For example, in India, coal currently generates 65 percent of all electricity. That number could rise to 80 percent, as India is hoping to double its generating capacity in a decade. Other countries are also seeking to buy coal, especially anthracite.\textsuperscript{45}

As other countries renew demands for anthracite, Pennsylvania miners are ready to meet the challenge. While consumption of coal nationwide and worldwide far exceeds the rate of production, previous miners had neither the technology nor confidence to dig deep for anthracite out of fear that the mining structures would collapse. Then, for a while, anthracite demand sagged, so even though miners had developed new technologies and techniques to safely access more anthracite, it did not make much economic sense to invest in the necessary equipment. It is only recently that with the increased demand and corresponding rise in prices miners have found it economically sound to make the necessary investments.\textsuperscript{46} And while the world coal supply will eventually be used up, by some predictions, coal, which is predicted to last 118 years, will outlast both oil and gas together, which are expected to last 46 and 59 years, respectively.\textsuperscript{47}

Ironically, increasing coal usage does not necessarily mean higher CO\textsubscript{2} emissions. According to the World Coal Association, an international association that represents the combined interests of the world’s coal industry, by their estimates, 41 percent of all electricity is generated through coal. The efficiency of the plants is about 34 percent, but new, state-of-the-art technology could improve efficiency to 45 percent. This is significant, as a mere 1 percent increase in efficiency would lead to a 2–3 percent drop in CO\textsubscript{2} emissions. So, if all existing power plants were upgraded to state-of-the-art technology and smaller plants made larger, the net
effect would be a 5.5 percent reduction, more than the intended effects of the measures of the Kyoto Protocol.\textsuperscript{48}

Clearly, coal is still an important part of the world and U.S. economy. Anthracite generates much of the electricity on which the United States relies heavily—in 2011, with less than 5 percent of the world population,\textsuperscript{49,50} we consumed 20 percent of all electricity generated.\textsuperscript{51} Besides that, the United States has vast amounts of coal reserves. While perhaps not as much as China or some other countries, the U.S. is certainly in the top 10 for most accessible coal in its borders. Yet, while we celebrate the fact that science has proven that we can continue using coal and reduce greenhouse emissions, we can try to do better. It would certainly be preferable if we could develop sufficient renewable sources of energy such as wind and solar power that do not generate CO\textsubscript{2} emissions at all. That would be a 100 percent reduction. Perhaps it is time for a new Industrial Revolution.
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*Shuchen Liang* (History of Geology) is a Junior at Dougherty Valley High School in San Ramon, California, where he was among the top 12 in the California State Debate Tournament last year. He scored a 7 on the American Invitational Mathematics Examination.

*Jordan Singer* (Atatürk and Erdogan) is a Senior at the Dalton School on Manhattan Island in New York, with an interest in international relations and conflict resolution in the Middle East. He is editor-in-chief of the school paper, *The Daltonian*.

*Marie Tashima* (Dmitri Shostakovich) is majoring in philosophy at the University of Virginia. At the International School Nido de Aguilas in Santiago, Chile, she wrote this International Baccalaureate Extended Essay for the IB Diploma.

*Sarah (San Ha) Kang* (Orange Revolution) is a Senior at the Madeira School in McLean, Virginia, where she has been interested in environmental science. Last year she spent several
months as an intern on Capitol Hill and became fascinated with
the world of energy politics and environmental issues as they
connect with politics and history.

Matthew Waltman (John Peter Zenger) is a Junior at the
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He won first place in the JFK Library Profile in Courage contest.

Chou-Hsien Lin (Gustavus Adolphus) is a Junior at Ronald
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Chamber Orchestra and the Reagan Symphony Orchestra. He
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Byung Joon Lee (Presidential Campaigns) is a Junior at St.
Paul’s School in Concord, New Hampshire, where he received the
Dickey Prize, the school’s highest award in the humanities. He
and his partner received first prize for pairs at the Phillips Exeter
Invitational Debate Tournament, and he has interned at a lab
investigating the political applications of Twitter. He presented
a study at the International Symposium of Business and Social
Science in Sapporo, Japan. He is the chief editor of The Pelican,
the school paper.

Arthur Chang (Anthracite Coal) is a Senior at University of
Chicago Laboratory High School, where he has been on the cross
country, math, and science teams for four years. He participated
in Le Grand Concorps, a national French contest, and placed in the
95th percentile. He is a National AP Scholar, and won a school
book award in his physics class. He sometimes visits relatives in
Taiwan in the summer.
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